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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study not only relations between Latin 
America and the United States, but also Latin American states with each other.  It 
specifically aims to examine the extent to which the United States, the principal 
hegemonic power in the Americas, can play a constructive role by providing regional 
public goods.  These goods include conflict resolution and economic progress.  Although 
the United States has the potential to create such goods, it also has the potential to create 
public bads in the form of regional instability, political terror, and economic stagnation.  
This raises two fundamental research questions: Under what conditions can Washington 
play a positive role and if these conditions cannot be met, under what conditions can 
Latin American nations bypass the United States and create their own economic progress 
and conflict resolution strategies?   
Drawing upon qualitative research methods and case studies that have attracted 
scant academic attention, this dissertation finds that through regional multilateral 
diplomatic negotiations, the United States can play a positive role.  However, due to U.S. 
parochial economic interests and the marginalization of diplomacy as a foreign policy 
tool, these conditions rarely occur.  This research further finds, however, that through 
flexible regionalization Latin American nations can bypass the United States and create 
their own goods.  Supported by an alternative regional power, flexible regionalization 
relies upon supranational institutions that exclude the United States, emphasize 
permanent political and economic integration, and avoid inflexible monetary unions.  
Through this type of regionalization, Latin America can decrease U.S. interference, 
sustain political and economic autonomy, and open space for alternative conflict 
resolution strategies and economic policies that Washington would otherwise oppose.          
ii 
 
This dissertation is academically significant and policy relevant.  First, it 
reconsiders diplomacy as an instrumental variable for peace and offers generalizable 
results that can be applied to additional cases.  Moreover, finding that Latin American 
countries can address their own regional issues, this study recognizes the positive agency 
of Latin America and counters the negative essentialization commonly found in U.S. 
academic and policy research.  Finally, this research offers policy advice for both the 
United States and Latin America.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which the United States, the 
principal hegemonic power in the Americas, can play a constructive role by providing 
collective goods for the region.  These goods include conflict resolution and economic 
progress.  Since this study finds that U.S. regional policy often fails to provide such 
goods, however, I further examine the extent to which Latin American countries can 
bypass the United States through their own regional initiatives and create their own 
collective goods.
1
 
The inspiration for this research comes from personal experience.  Living, 
working, and researching in Latin America for over a decade, I have witnessed the 
military, economic, and psychological power the United States exercises over the region.  
As a result of this extensive influence, the United States occupies a central and often 
negative place in the minds and conversations of Latin Americans.  From university 
intellectuals to urban dwellers and rural folk, Latin Americans speak and write endlessly 
of not only the interventionist policies of the United States, but also the iniquitous power 
structure between them and their neighbor to the north.  Within these accounts, however, 
there’s a salient contradiction.  The passionate contempt the United States often inspires 
in the Latin American people is paradoxically coupled with an admiration for the 
country’s economic, technological, and democratic achievements, as well as a 
concomitant recognition that Latin American nations depend on the United States for 
                                                          
1
 Although I recognize the diverse regional geography of the Americas, due to space and time constraints, I 
will use “Latin America” as an umbrella term for Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean.  
I explain in detail the definition and role of public goods in Chapters 2 and 3.    
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advancement in these areas.
2
  On the one hand, Latin Americans understandably criticize 
Washington for unjust intervention in their political, social, and economic affairs.  This 
interference, many Latin Americans contend, is clearly beneficial for the United States, 
but detrimental for them.  On the other hand, Latin Americans continue, as they have 
historically, to depend on relations with the United States for economic opportunities, 
diplomatic mediation, and a host of other benefits.
3
  Nicaragua’s relations with the United 
States reflect this contradiction.  In 1984, the Sandinista government (1979-1990) lodged 
a formal complaint to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States for 
not only interfering in the country’s domestic affairs and violating its sovereignty, which 
Nicaragua won in Nicaragua v. the United States (1984), but also for not maintaining 
relations by reducing sugar quotas, suspending aid, and finally imposing an economic 
embargo.
4
  Nicaragua, under a left-leaning government, recognized both the good and 
bad involved in U.S. relations.  In fact, most Latin Americans whom I have interviewed 
and held colloquial conversations concede the necessity of sustaining beneficial relations 
with their colossal neighbor, or “hegemon,” to the north.  Even the current “pink 
revolution” reflects this desire.  South American presidents critical of U.S. influence, 
                                                          
2
 In my time living in Latin America, I have found that these contradictory feelings often transcend Latin 
American ideological, economic, and geographical boundaries.  That is, this admiration is not only limited 
to the wealthy elite; many leftist movements share this admiration.  However, the Latin American left, 
although far from being a homogeneous group, recognize the importance with maintaining relations, but 
only on equal terms, not relations in which the United States dictates and imposes orders to its smaller and 
often weaker neighbors. 
    
3
 Rubén Darío’s famous poems “A Roosevelt” (1904) and “Salutación al Aguila” (1906) demonstrate the 
mixed feelings Latin Americans have toward the United States. In the first, the Nicaraguan poet lambastes 
Washington’s interventionist policies throughout the hemisphere; in the other, Darío lauds the United 
States’ progress and technological advancement.  
  
4
 Sandinista refers to the movement that overthrew the Somoza Dynasty in 1979.  The formal political party 
is named el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN).  Many Nicaraguans identify with the 
movement, but not the political party.  The name Sandinista comes from Augusto César Sandino (1895-
1934), the revolutionary who fought U.S. occupation in Nicaragua in the beginning of the 20
th
 century.   
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such as Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s presidents Evo Morales (2006 - present) and Rafael 
Correa (2007 - present), respectively, have indicated that they desire strong relations with 
the United States, but on more equitable terms.
5
     
Research Problem 
This contradiction poses a particular problem for relations between Latin America 
and the United States.  U.S. policy is capable of producing both public goods and bads 
for the Americas.  Although the goods can provide conflict resolution, stability, and 
economic progress, the bads, which include subverting economic development, 
undermining regional institutions, and causing human rights abuses and political terror 
through direct intervention, can have disastrous consequences for the region.  What is 
more, Latin American countries often have little recourse to protect themselves from the 
bads produced through U.S. policy.  The case of Nicaragua again serves as an example.  
Although the Nicaraguan government used the ICJ to protect itself from U.S. 
intervention, Washington, without being forced to comply with the decisions, simply 
continued with its policies.  The ten-year war cost the small Central American country 
over $12 billion and the loss of tens of thousands of innocent Nicaraguan lives (Zamora 
1996).        
The ability of the United States to play such a pivotal part in Latin American 
affairs raises two fundamental research questions: a.) Under what conditions can the 
United States play a positive role in Latin America and if these conditions cannot be met, 
b.) under what conditions can Latin American countries bypass the United States and 
advance their own economic progress and conflict resolution strategies?  Relying upon 
                                                          
5
 The desire for equitable relations has been established in various interviews.  For interviews by the new 
center-left leaders, see the documentary South of the Border (Stone 2009).  
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both qualitative and interpretive methods, as well as a number of case studies that have 
attracted scant academic attention, this research finds that through multilateral diplomatic 
mediation involving the United States Department of State, the United States is able to 
play a constructive role for the region.
6
  However, due to U.S. private economic interests 
and the marginalization of State Department-led diplomacy these conditions are rarely 
met.
7
  Latin American states, therefore, should engage in what I call “flexible 
regionalization,” a form of regionalism that involves permanent political and economic 
integration, yet avoids strict customs and monetary unions.
8
  This type of integration is 
instrumental for Latin American peace and development for a number of reasons.  First, it 
does not completely alienate U.S. regional intervention, which can be beneficial, but 
significantly reduces Latin American countries’ dependency on the United States.  
Second, flexible regionalization opens critical space for Latin American nations by 
allowing them to debate and consider economic and conflict resolution policies that 
Washington would otherwise oppose.  Finally, it recognizes the inherent drawbacks of 
forming customs and monetary unions, particularly the loss of political and monetary 
independence (for an in-depth discussion on monetary unions in Latin America, see 
Ripley 2010b).  Therefore, Latin American countries retain their own political and 
economic autonomy.  Essentially, flexible regionalization allows Latin America to take 
advantage of the benefits regionalization without shouldering all the costs.       
 
                                                          
6
 To demonstrate the objectivity of this dissertation, the author was surprised at this outcome due to the 
imperialist nature of U.S. foreign policy. 
  
7
 The operationalization of the variables discussed here, such as politicization and marginalization will be 
discussed in chapter 3. 
 
8
 Flexible regionalization is based upon the new regionalization taking place in South America, such as 
UNASUR, minus the common currency and monetary unions.   
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Relevance and Contribution 
This research is novel and contributive to the study of international relations and 
Latin American studies for a number of reasons.  First, relations between Washington and 
Latin American nations involve a wide range of issues including human rights, economic 
development, regional institutions, immigration, commercial trade, technology and 
science, among other global and regional policies.  What is more, as my quantitative 
analysis chapter reveals, there is a strong correlation between conflict in Latin America 
and U.S. regional intervention.  As a result, aiming to identify not only conditions for 
peace and progress, but also practical policy suggestions can improve the lives of 
millions of people.  Although the United States will never have a Good Neighbor Policy 
toward Latin America, a Better Neighbor Policy is a possibility.     
Moreover, this study brings diplomacy back to the forefront of analysis.  After the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the outbreak of two wars, academic funding 
and research has significantly increased their focus on issues related to terrorism.  This 
“second wave” of terrorism research has become prominent in not only policy studies, 
but political science journals as well.
9
  One study suggests that the number of refereed 
articles that have been published on terrorism since nine-eleven has actually doubled 
(Young and Findley 2011).  This understandable, yet regrettable academic phenomenon 
is what I call the “militarization” of academic scholarship.  The emphasis on military, 
terrorism, and counterinsurgency research is no trivial phenomena; for it privileges one 
                                                          
9
 The “second wave” of terrorism research comes from the classification initiated by Robert A. Pape 
(2009). The second wave is the research conducted after September 11
th
, 2001, whereas the first is the 
aggregate study of terrorism carried out by non-state actors throughout the decades between 1970 and 
1990.   
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research agenda over another, leading to the marginalization of vital studies, particularly 
diplomacy and peace research.   
Political science, among other academic disciplines, however, has been reluctant 
to explore diplomacy in the first place.  Diplomacy is a difficult variable to measure.  As 
I explain more in-depth, it does not readily fit “normal science.”  In fact, as this research 
demonstrates, it can serve as both the dependent and independent variable.  In an attempt 
to make diplomacy fit into the quantitative positivist model, diplomacy is merely reduced 
to a mediation variable (for instance, see Regan and Aydin 2006).  Although such 
research can provide insight, it neglects the complexity, involved interests, and battle 
over ideas and policy options.  Nonetheless, despite many obstacles to deeply explore 
diplomacy, a number of qualitative pre- and post-9/11 studies demonstrate how state 
diplomacy continues to be a useful tool in conflict resolution, economic development, 
and other critical areas of politics (Stearns 1996; Jentleson 2001; Berridge, Keens-Soper, 
Otte 2001; Copeland 2009; Pigman 2010).  Through the qualitative methods of process 
tracing and congruent testing, the research presented here finds that a number of little-
known diplomatic initiatives between Latin America and the United States created or had 
the potential to create peace through state diplomacy.
10
                      
This research is also contributive because it challenges the established research on 
hegemonic stability theory (HST).  HST is a body of literature that is closely related to 
this research project because the theory aims to determine the public goods hegemonic 
state powers are able to create for a particular region or even the world.  Although 
                                                          
10
 I use the term “state diplomacy” to connote diplomatic relations between states, often known as Track 1 
diplomacy.  Track II and Track III refer to the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and grass 
root movements, respectively.  However, as parts of this dissertation demonstrate, both NGOs and grass-
root movements will be influential in pressuring the state to take develop regional institutions and create 
peace.   
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Chapter 2 deals with HST in more depth, it is first worth noting that the HST research 
agenda has advanced valuable insight into how hegemonic powers create or fail to create 
regional and world public goods.  However, HST has failed to capture the complexity of 
South-North relations due to the following reasons: 1.) The theory’s exaggerated focus on 
world powers; 2.) its assumption that the state is a unitary rational actor; and 3.) HST’s 
overuse of methodological individualism.  
The study here, however, rests on the assumption that the state is not a unitary 
rational actor, but a vehicle for competing ideas within the U.S. government’s 
departmental structure.  These ideas have the potential to significantly influence policy 
decisions.  Therefore, ideas matter.  Essentially, there is no pre-given state interest.  This 
is of particular significance since the field of international relations, particularly HST, has 
been dominated by a limited framework of microeconomics and methodological 
individualism that marginalizes the role of ideas and identities.  “While the talk of the 
‘power of ideas’ has at times carried considerable rhetorical force outside of academic 
International Relations,” observes IR scholar Christian Reus-Smit (2009) on the state of 
the discipline, “such talk within the field has long been dismissed as naïve and even 
dangerous idealism” (231).  Therefore, this study calls for rethinking how we address 
hegemonic stability and the provision of public goods.   
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on bureaucratic decision-making 
theory.  Examining the inter-bureaucratic dynamics of the U.S. government is far from a 
novel research agenda.  For years scholars and journalists have documented the pivotal 
role competing bureaucracies and personalities have had over policy choices.
11
  The 
                                                          
11
 The research, both academic and journalistic, concerning these subjects is too great to do justice here; for 
many great scholars would be left out.  However, two of the most notable and relevant here are Graham 
8 
 
novelty with my research, however, lies in its application to South-North relations.  There 
has been little research on how the competition between departments affects developing 
countries.  Furthermore, it has never been studied within the framework of hegemonic 
stability theory and the hegemon’s capabilities to provide regional public goods and bads.  
As a result, this project advances a unique approach by providing a new model for 
understanding the essential role of a hegemonic power in relation with smaller states. 
Furthermore, my dissertation addresses the many faces of hegemony.  As 
Gramscian scholars remind us, hegemony is not only about coercion and leadership, but 
also the legitimization and perpetuation of elite interests.  The United States, therefore, 
being the principal hegemonic regional power, does not only exercise hegemony over 
Latin America through military and economic coercion.  As I detail later, a significant 
amount of U.S. academic scholarship perpetuates and legitimizes U.S. foreign policy 
interest to the detriment of not only the Latin American nations themselves, but to the 
development of policies that could create regional public goods.  As a result, Latin 
American states need to create their own initiatives independent from the interests of the 
United States.   
Most importantly, this research highlights the invaluable contribution Latin 
American countries have made for academic and policy research.  This includes a wide 
range of areas such as the study of public goods, diplomacy, international law, and supra-
national institutions.  Since most U.S. and European academic research focuses on the 
role of great power politics (Schelling 1966; Bull 1995; Wight 1995; Craig and George 
1983; Keohane 1984; Kissinger 1995; Bussmann and Oneil 2007) and only the negative 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Allison’s seminal study on the Cuban missile crisis (1969, 1971) and Douglas Stuart’s (2003, 2008) 
research on the passing of the National Security Act of 1947.  Amy Zegart (1999) also offers an in-depth 
study of the bureaucratic struggles behind the 1947 Act.      
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events of developing nations (e.g. war, instability), the positive agency and contribution 
of intra- Latin American state relations remain underexplored.  In fact, many prestigious 
and widely-cited academics fail to recognize any contributions Latin Americans can 
make for international relations.  “. . . Latin American countries are takers, instead of 
makers, of international policy,” Robert Keohane (2001) writes, quite erroneously, 
“[t]hey have relatively little influence in international institutions” (211).  However, my 
case studies counter this common negative essentialization—that is, Latin American 
nations inherently have negative and corrupt qualities—and demonstrate Latin America’s 
positive contributions to international relations.   
Additional Cases and Generalizability 
Drawing upon a number of comparative case studies, this study is also important 
because its results can be tested on additional cases.  Although more research is 
necessary, I have already discovered a number of cases that fit this research’s model.  
Other cases include the diplomatic maneuvering prior to the U.S. invasion of Grenada 
and Haiti in 1983 and 2004, respectively.  In both cases State Department diplomacy, 
which appeared to be effective in decreasing conflict, was marginalized.  If diplomacy 
had been prioritized prior to the assassination of Maurice Bishop in 1983 and the illegal 
invasion of Haiti in 2004, Washington could have supported the popular democracy and 
avoided the internationally condemned invasions.  Finally, a salient case example entails 
the invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965), in which multilateral diplomacy, not the 
illegal invasion, was the instrumental variable in bringing back of peace and stability to 
the Caribbean nation.  Furthermore, my research results are applicable to U.S. foreign 
policy initiatives beyond Latin America.  During the Iraq War (2003-present), there were 
10 
 
contentious debates between the State Department and the Department of Defense (DoD) 
on how to implement plans for reconstruction.  The DoD was able to marginalize the 
State Department and essentially manage reconstruction.  This management, however, 
failed to be successful, measured by improving the living standards and quality of life for 
the Iraqi people and controlling the growth of violent insurgency.  This case demonstrates 
the continued importance of researching the role of competing departments and policy 
ideas within the U.S. governmental bureaucratic structure.           
Finally, this research is relevant to regional hegemonies in other geographical 
areas.  As China continues to increase its power, to what extent can the country play a 
positive regional role?  However, if China fails to provide public goods, under what 
conditions can the surrounding states bypass China and create their own stability and 
economic progress?  This is of particular importance as China asserts itself as the 
principal mediator in the recent dispute between the two Koreas.  Therefore, this project 
is research generating.  Scholars and policy makers should continue advancing additional 
research on not only the extent to which other regional hegemons can produce public 
goods, but also the extent to which inter-bureaucratic debates and ideas play a significant 
role. 
Policy Implications 
In addition to contributing to academic research, this dissertation has serious 
policy implications.  First, its results lead to sound policy advice for the United States.  
Over the years, particularly after the failure of Iraqi reconstruction, contentious debate 
has emerged on the issue of not only strengthening the State Department, but also 
increasing its budgets at the cost of other bureaucracies.  Even Secretary of Defense 
11 
 
Robert Gates has begun to recognize its pivotal role, suggesting that money could be 
taken from the DoD and funneled into the State Department.  The findings here offer 
credence to the idea that strengthening the role of an independent State Department vis-à-
vis other departments and advisors such as the Department of Defense and National 
Security Advisor would benefit regional policy.   
This research also posits a number of suggestions for Latin American countries.  
Finding that the United States often fails to provide public goods, this study finds that 
under certain conditions, Latin American countries can bypass the hegemon through 
flexible regionalization.  This type of regionalization recognizes not only the vast 
differences in interests and needs between Latin American countries, but also the 
successes of forming ad-hoc and permanent political and economic unions and 
associations.  Therefore, flexible regional integration can assist Latin America with 
bypassing the United States and creating its own public goods.      
Caveats 
There are a number of caveats related to this study.  First, my emphasis on an 
unequal power structure does not mean that the United States exercises power equally 
across Latin America.  The United States was able to invade Haiti in 2004, removing 
President Aristide from power.  The United States would not be able to exercise similar 
military power, however, over Mexico or Brazil.  Nor is power easy to define.  Latin 
American countries have exercised power over the United States, often in creative ways.  
During his second time in office, Costa Rican President José Figueres (1953-1958) 
cleverly used culture and a mythical conception surrounding the country’s democratic 
and social advancement to influence and exercise his own power over U.S. foreign policy 
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(Longley 1997).  Washington, convinced by Figueres that Costa Rica was the 
Switzerland of Central America, curbed its interventionist policies in the country and 
allowed social and economic development through more socialist oriented policies such 
as land reform.  Additionally, power, as Hans Morgenthau (1948) reminds us and I will 
discuss later, is ambiguous.  It is not easily measured, quantified, or even identified.  
However, the United States does possess a potential military and economic power that is 
unmatched in the region.  Stressing this hemispheric power structure, however, does not 
diminish addressing the complexity of Latin American relations with the United States. 
I also recognize that Latin America is rich in diversity.  Latin American nation-
states are not only distinct from each other, but also from within.  There are great 
differences in the economic, class, ethnic, and religious make-up and identities inside 
each country.  The indigenous in Chiapas, where I have done research, identify 
themselves with different ancestors, political and social movements, and overall interests 
than those of the wealthy Mexican elite.  A broad range of valuable scholarship has 
focused on Latin America in specific detail.
12
  The goal here, however, is to find general 
conditions under which peace, stability, and economic progress can be advanced.  This 
does not mean the findings here will be generalizable to every case study or sub-group.  
All peoples living in Latin America will not equally benefit from the public goods or 
even define public goods as I operationalize them here.  In fact, this dissertation 
contributes to international relations, comparative politics and Latin American studies for 
generating future research that can address these points.  Do the indigenous groups in 
Ecuador, for instance, experience public goods or do they, particularly more than other 
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 The political, social, and economic research on specific Mexican, Central and South America, and 
Caribbean characteristics are too dense to detail here.  However, a few notable pieces are the following: 
Van Cott (2008); Stokes and Cleary (2006); Yashar (1999).  
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societal groups, experience public bads?  This would be an interesting follow-up research 
question to address. 
Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation is broken down into nine chapters.  The second chapter offers an 
overview of the literature and theory pertinent to this research project.  Although one 
chapter cannot adequately cover these rich bodies of thought, I focus on the most relevant 
literature dealing with hegemonic stability theory, bureaucratic politics models, and 
diplomacy.  Chapter 3 outlines and describes the specific methods upon which this 
research project relies.  Chapter 4 measures U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs 
quantitatively.  The purpose is to examine the extent to which the United States 
intervenes in the first place.  In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I develop three main case studies and 
four mini-case studies to demonstrate the variance in U.S. foreign policy and the 
explanatory power of my theory (table 1.1).  Based on qualitative methods, these case 
studies conclude that under the certain conditions noted above, the United States can 
provide various types of public goods.  However, as the variance in U.S. foreign policy 
demonstrates in each case study, the United States often fails to meet these conditions.  
Chapter 8 aims to identify the conditions under which Latin America can develop its own 
public goods table 1.2).  Drawing upon interpretive methods, this chapter finds that 
regional initiatives that exclude the United States can create the critical space
13
 for 
successful alternative conflict and economic policies.  Table 1.1 details the causal logic 
of the chapters that rely on mainstream qualitative research methods.  Each case study 
demonstrates what I call either a “pathway to peace” or a “pathway to instability.” 
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 I use the term “critical space” to stress the use of critical methods.  Although I explain more throughout 
this study, critical methods do not rely upon the conventional use of variables, but, applied here, the space 
under which discourse, ideas, and policy become legitimated, justified, and implemented.   
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Table 1.1. Case studies, pathways, and variables 
Case studies Pathways Independent variables Dependent variables 
 
Case study 1 (Pre-
Cold War): Central 
American Court of 
Justice (1908- 
1918)  
 
 
Pathway to peace 
(1907) 
 
 
 
 
Pathway to 
instability (1918) 
 
 
Multilateral 
diplomacy: State 
Department-Mexico-
Central America  
 
 
Economic interests: 
U.S. foreign policy 
privileges bond 
holders over peace 
 
 
Public goods: 
Reduction of 
conflict through 
world’s first 
supranational court 
 
Public bads: 
Destruction of court 
and regional 
instability 
 
 
Case study 2 (Cold 
War): The Tale of 
Two State 
Departments   
 
 
Pathway to peace 
(1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
Pathway to 
instability (1981-
1990) and (2004) 
 
 
Multilateral 
diplomacy: State 
Department victory in 
bureaucratic war for 
diplomacy with 
Nicaraguan junta  
 
Marginalization: State 
Department loss in 
bureaucratic war for 
multilateral 
negotiations  
 
 
Public goods: 
Avoidance of illegal 
invasion; path to 
regional 
negotiations and 
peace 
 
Public bads: U.S. 
illegal intervention 
and political terror 
lead to regional 
instability in 
Nicaragua and Haiti  
 
 
Case study 3 (Post-
Cold War): U.S.  
financial interests 
and foreign policy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pathway to 
instability  
(present) 
 
 
 
Pathway to Peace 
and stability 
(1938, 1951, 
2003) 
 
Financial interests: 
Foreign policy 
privileges U.S. 
financial capital over 
development 
 
Removal of financial 
interests: U.S. foreign 
policy privileges 
diplomacy over U.S. 
economic interests 
   
 
Public bads:  
Instability in LAC 
by limiting 
economic policy 
choices 
 
Public goods: Peace 
and stability in 
Mexico, Iran, and 
Argentina, 
respectively  
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Table 1.2. Case study, critical space, policy alternatives 
 
Case study Pathways Critical space Policy alternatives  
 
Case study 4: Latin 
American power 
initiates and 
supports La 
Declaración De 
Orinoco and 
UNASUR 
 
Pathway to 
economic       
progress (2005-
2007) 
 
 
 
 
Pathway to peace 
(2010) 
 
 
Alternative 
monetary fund: 
Opens space for 
alternative 
economic policies 
 
 
 
Alternative regional 
organization: Opens 
space for alternative 
conflict resolution 
strategies  
 
 
Public goods: Break 
from orthodox 
neoliberal economic 
policies for 
sustainable 
development  
 
 
Public goods: 
Decreased conflict 
between Colombia 
and Venezuela   
 
Table 1.2 above explains the value of critical space and how it can lead to alternative 
conflict resolution and economic policy.      
Conclusion 
The goal of this introductory chapter was to complete the following: 1.) Explain 
the research problem and questions; 2.) justify the research topic’s undertaking; 3.) 
explain its importance in academic literature and foreign policy making; and 4.) outline 
the organization of the research project.  The research problem is introduced in the form 
of a dilemma:  On the one hand, Latin American countries rely on the United States for a 
number of benefits; on the other, the United States has the potential to create public bads.  
This dissertation, therefore, asks two challenging questions: Under what conditions can 
the United States maximize its abilities to create regional public goods and, and if it fails 
to do so, under what conditions can Latin American countries create their own?  This 
dissertation finds that the United States Department of State is capable of being a vehicle 
16 
 
for public goods, but often fails to do so.  Therefore, Latin Americans can create their 
own collective goods through “flexible regionalization.”  Addressing these two questions 
are of particular importance since U.S. foreign policy affects the lives of the people 
throughout the Americas.   
In addition to positing a valuable research question, this dissertation contributes to 
both the academia and public policy.  This is accomplished by: 1.) Challenging 
established academic literature; 2.) emphasizing a pivotal role for diplomacy; 3.) bringing 
ideas and inter-bureaucratic competition to the study of North-South relations and the 
creation of public goods; 4.) advancing an interdisciplinary approach to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations; and 5.) offering sound 
policy advice for both the United States and Latin America.  As a result of the above 
mentioned, this dissertation will be a valuable study for international relations, 
comparative politics, Latin American studies, and policy analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to engage in a discussion of the academic 
literature relevant to this dissertation.  Hegemonic stability theory (HST) has been one of 
the most widely discussed theories in international relations.  Economists, neo-realists, 
Gramcian theorists, and other scholars continue to draw upon the concept of hegemony to 
explain a wide range of international behavior such as war and peace, economic develop, 
and state cooperation (Golub 2004; Lal 2004; Ferguson 2004; Maney, Woehrle and Coy 
2005; Frundt 2005; Hinnebusch 2006; Dosch 2007; Bussman & Oneil 2007; Fukuyama 
2008; Coyne and Ryan 2008; Pirama 2011; Goh 2011).  Albeit scholars fail to agree on 
the degree to which HST can explain international phenomenon, it remains a central part 
of international relations scholarship.  As a result, literature reviews regarding HST have 
been repeated elsewhere.  Although my purpose here is not to repeat those accounts, I 
offer a brief overview and analysis on the literature to the extent to which it relates to this 
dissertation. This review here includes the following: 1) A general description of the 
theory; the origins of latent and conventional HST; 2) the five trends in the HST 
literature; 3) a review of other pertinent literature, particularly diplomacy and the 
bureaucratic politics model; and, 4) considering the strengths and weaknesses of the 
particular literature discussed, the required measures I will take to not only address the 
gaps in the literature, but also contribute to the field of international relations.        
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Definition of Hegemony 
The concept of hegemony has been a contentious subject of debate in the study of 
international relations.  Little academic consensus exists on not only what exactly 
constitutes a hegemonic power, but also to what extent the United States remains one.  
Although space constraints prevent a comprehensive analysis of all the scholarly 
arguments, I will draw upon the literature and theory that applies here.  Scholars and 
policy makers define a hegemon as a regional power that has the military might to 
dominate other states in the area.  “No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a 
serious fight against it,” observes offensive realist John Mearsheimer (2001), “[i]n 
essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system” (40). 
But hegemony involves more than material capabilities and military intervention.  
The United States exercises power over the Americas through its trade, aid assistance, 
and overall economic intra-hemispheric relations.  When Ronald Reagan entered the 
White House in 1981, for example, his administration conveyed clear disapproval for the 
1979 Nicaraguan Revolution.  The resultant policy was the suspension of aid and a trade 
embargo on crucial Nicaraguan exports such as sugar.  Since Nicaragua historically 
depended on exports to the United States, the embargo crippled the nation’s economy.  
Additionally, in the early 1980s Washington succeeded in stopping over $164 million in 
multilateral and bilateral credits, undermining Nicaraguan exportation by $100 million, 
and even obstructing Mexican and Venezuelan petroleum importation from ever reaching 
the country (Ricciardi 1991).  Therefore, U.S. policy towards Nicaragua demonstrated 
economic, as well as military, hegemony. 
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Charles Kindleberger (1973) and Robert Gilpin (1981) were the first academics to 
link the concept of hegemony to inter-state stability and economic openness.  Studying 
the Pax Britannica and Americana, Kindleberger (1973) found that the hegemon, or 
leader, was not only the state whose power and resources could hold the economically 
liberal world system in place, but also whose decline would actually lead to a system 
breakdown and world depression.
14
  A world leader was necessary to sustain a liberal 
economic system and a flow of credit and capital.  Since Great Britain failed to provide 
such leadership, the world fell into the Great Depression (1929-1939) until the United 
States filled its new historic role.  Both Kindleberger and Gilpin concluded that without 
the hegemonic role of the United States and institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), countries would economically withdraw from the 
world and erect disastrous protectionist policies.  In fact, Gilpin (1981) asserts that the 
Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana all “ensured a system of relative peace and 
security” (144).  Other ideas on the benefits of hegemonic stability soon followed, 
including decreasing the security dilemma, forcing state cooperation through regimes, 
and trading absolute sovereignty for peace. 
Significant for this dissertation, a hegemonic power could also provide such 
goods by solving the collective action problem.  Collective or “public” goods are 
essentially a type of positive externality that is non-excludable and non-rival.  That is, 
consumers cannot impede others from consuming the goods and the cost of extending the 
goods to another consumer is zero. A good connotes some type of satisfaction upon 
consumption; a good is the direct opposite of a public bad, which entails a type of 
                                                          
14
 It is important to note that Kindleberger (1986a) has expressed his dislike for the word hegemony; he 
prefers leadership.  The economist argues that hegemony has connotations of the use of force, whereas he 
wished to emphasize characteristics related to leadership and persuasion. 
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dissatisfaction (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2002).  Since goods are non-rival and non-
excludable, other actors remain less inclined to invest in creating the goods because they 
can enjoy them without incurring the costs.  Actors may also not invest in goods if the 
perceived costs outweigh the benefits (see Olsen, 1971, for an in-depth study on the 
collective action problem).  A hegemonic power, however, can solve the collective action 
and free rider problem by incurring most of the costs smaller and poorer states either 
refuse or cannot take on themselves.  Essentially, the hegemon compensates for the lack 
of contribution from other actors.     
However, since there is little academic consensus on what HST exactly is, it is 
impossible to consider the theory as a single body of thought.  Nonetheless, most scholars 
agree that the theory, in its most basic form, posits a hegemonic state power that creates 
collective goods for a particular region or even the world.  As a result, academics have 
continued to build upon the theory Kindleberger initially developed.  The vast research 
on HST involves both qualitative (see Golub 2004) and quantitative scholarship (see 
Bussman & Oneil 2007).  Although research programs have often challenged the 
optimistic and simple tenants of the theory’s argument, providing goods maintains the 
principal role for hegemony.  Robert Keohane (1984), albeit noting the “simplistic 
starting point” of the theory, built upon the theory’s assumptions to develop regime 
theory (39).  Regime theory attempts to explain why states create and follow the rules of 
international institutions.  Although Keohane (1984) stresses that the decline of a 
hegemon does not necessarily lead to a concomitant decline in international institutions 
and rules, he finds that the hegemon serves as the original initiator of a particular regime.  
For example, the United States is necessary to implement the institutions and conventions 
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on climate change.  Without the indispensible hegemonic role, regimes such as the Kyoto 
Protocol are bound to fail (Keohane 2010).  In fact, the theory has become so prominent 
that it has transmuted beyond political science.  Sharma and Fayyaz (2000) borrowed 
HST in order to explain and predict the compensation packages doled out to chief 
executive officers.  Sequeira (2009) further drew upon HST to explain the recent world 
economic liquidity crisis.  The popularity of HST is not a surprise. “If the theory could be 
taken at face value,” Duncan Snidal (1985) wrote over two decades ago, “it would be 
among the most powerful and general in all of international relation” (579). 
Conventional v. Latent Hegemonic Stability Theory 
Of the vast research that has been undertaken on the subject, I differentiate HST 
into two variants: “Conventional” and “latent” HST literature.  The former involves 
academic scholars who purposely and consciously research HST as a legicongruenttimate 
theory in international relations, whereas the latter group, consisting of both U.S. policy 
makers and scholars, draws upon the theory’s major tenants without consciously citing 
the theory’s name directly.  Understanding the two types of HST is crucial for not only 
this research project, but also practical foreign policy making.  Political scientists often 
neglect the latent literature, most of which is more influential in the actual decision-
making process of U.S. foreign policy.  As a result, this research calls for a slight 
departure from the conventional research and a stronger focus on the latent. 
The conventional HST literature can easily be traced back to Kindleberger’s 1973 
book The World in Depression:1929-1939.  As mentioned above, this seminal study does 
not deal with political science, but economics.
15
  Kindleberger’s main objective was to 
                                                          
15
 It is worth noting that Kindleberger later conceded that he did borrow his idea of leadership from two 
political scientists.  See Kindleberger (1986a) for more detail. 
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challenge the most common and established causations behind the Great Depression.  
The first, supported by the research of classical liberal economists such as Ludwig Von 
Mises, Allan Meltzer, and Nobel-prize winner Milton Friedman, was U.S. monetary 
policy.  These economists focused on the national monetary policies, most of which they 
concluded exacerbated and perpetuated the crisis, taken by the U.S Federal Reserve, as 
well as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930), which further deepened the depression by 
significantly curtailing free trade.  Keynesian economists advance the polar opposite 
cause: not enough government involvement, especially in increasing national and world 
demand.  For the followers of economist John Maynard Keynes, the government failed to 
significantly push the demand curve towards the right, which would have reversed the 
sharp decline in domestic, thus, international spending.  According to Kindleberger, the 
two commonly cited explanations for the Depression were quite reductionistic.  That is, 
using Kindleberger’s (1986b) own words, they were “single-rooted cause[s]” (4).     
Remaining skeptical and unsatisfied with these two prominent explanations, as 
well as a number of lesser known arguments, Kindleberger proposed an alternative model 
to understand the Great Depression.  His explanation was predicated on a world leader.  
This “leader” harbors a special responsibility to keep financial and trade flows moving in 
the midst of a recession.
16
  During the depression, however, the United States, not yet 
seeing itself as the world leader, failed to fulfill this vital role as its counterpart, the ailing 
Great Britain, did the century before. Therefore, a great depression ensued.  However, 
with its entry into World War II and its role in shaping and supporting a liberal economic 
post-war world, the United States finally supplanted the previous leader and fulfilled its 
                                                          
16
 The leader, according to Kindleberger, has a number of responsibilities, which he has added over the 
years.  For a detailed list of the leader’s responsibilities, see Kindleberger (1986a). 
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leadership responsibility.  Political Science scholars later adopted Kindleberger’s idea 
and turned it into hegemonic stability theory.    
The latent literature, on the other hand, dates much farther back than the 
conventional research.  Its origins are not so easy to trace.  Nonetheless, one can find its 
development with U.S. independence.
17
  During the war and its aftermath, the literature 
and discourse that dominated the newly independent states expressed a stark 
differentiation between the U.S. governmental system and world mission and old 
European monarchism.  Although there were great debates, many of which turned into 
violent conflicts, over the nature of U.S. foreign policy and the extent to which the United 
States should intervene in world affairs,
18
 the new country generally saw itself as a 
chosen people.  “They saw themselves as harbingers of a new world order,” writes 
diplomatic historian George C. Herring (2008), “creating forms of governance and 
commerce that would appeal to peoples everywhere and change the course of world 
history” (12). 
The primary documentation of the time confirms Herring’s account.  “The cause 
of America is,” wrote Thomas Paine in the midst of the War of Independence in 1776, “in 
a great measure, the cause of all mankind” (in Conway 1894, v).  When the United States 
finally achieved independence, the idea of being a “City upon a Hill,” made famous by 
three-time Massachusetts Bay governor John Winthrop and later used by both democrat 
and republican presidents such as John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, became deeply 
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 One should be able to find similar literature and discourse related to European intervention in Africa and 
elsewhere.  A commonly cited example is Rudyard Kipling’s 1899 poem “The White Man’s Burden.” 
However, since this research is on U.S. regional hegemony, the focus will strictly remain on the United 
States. 
  
18
 For a comprehensive historical analysis on the major debates and conflicts over foreign policy during this 
time, see Perkins (1993).  
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ingrained in foreign policy making.  A sincere belief has developed that U.S. intervention 
created regional peace, stability, and economic progress.  “The 19 years that the United 
States was in Haiti were the 19 best years of Haiti’s existence,” Ivan Musicant, author of 
The Banana Wars (1990), argues, “[w]e left that country a far, far better place than we 
found it” (in Rohter 1994, 1).  Larry Rohter (1994) of the New York Times observes:  
In at least the material sense, many of the occupied countries benefited from the 
American presence.  Highways, railroads, bridges, and streets were built; 
telephone, electrical and telegraph systems installed or extended; docks, ports and 
lighthouses modernized, and schools and hospitals constructed . . . Infant 
mortality rates fell and life expectancy rose (1). 
Even Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, authors of Bitter Fruit (1990), an 
indictment of the United Fruit Company and its corrupt influence in overthrowing the 
democratically-elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, concede that workers for 
the company “enjoyed better conditions than most farmers in Guatemala” (71).  
The need for some type of U.S. regional presence in Latin American affairs 
remains a prominent tenant in current foreign policy decision making and a great portion 
of scholarly thinking (Desch 1998; Reid 2007; Crandall 2006 and 2008).  Policy makers 
and scholars often find that, albeit conceding a number of mistakes, U.S. attention 
towards and intervention in the Americas generally produces public goods for not only 
the United States, but the region as a whole.  These public goods are quite diverse.  A 
non-exhaustive list includes democracy, civil rights, economic growth, and stability.  The 
United States, therefore, must be present not only for such public goods to accrue, but to 
curb the production of public bads such as the rise economic protectionism and 
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authoritarianism. As a result, much of this literature not only draw upon the basic tenants 
of hegemonic stability theory, but takes for given that U.S. presence is equal to a public 
good.          
Five Trends in the Hegemonic Literature 
  At the risk of a gross oversimplification, I further identify five trends within the 
conventional and latent literature: 1) Hegemonic logical economism; 2) hegemonic 
savior; 3) hegemonic domination; 4) hegemonic mismanagement; and 5) hegemonic 
myth.
19
  Although these trends offer insight into regional hegemony, they fail to capture 
the complexities involved in hemispheric relations because they often dismiss historical 
contingency, Latin American agency, and, most importantly, the competing policy ideas 
within the vast bureaucracy of the United States.  What is more, much of the literature on 
U.S.-Latin American relations often suffers from a pathological adherence to specific 
theories, methods, and ideologies.  A Marxist, for example, will only view relations 
within a Marxist ideological framework of thought.  This is equally true of scholars and 
policy makers who adhere to a neoliberal ideology such as public choice theory.      
  The first trend, hegemonic logical economism (HLE), reduces research on HST to 
a limited framework of microeconomics. “Logical economism is the reduction of the 
practical interpretive framework of political action,” Richard Ashley (1983) points out, 
“to the frame work of economic action: the reduction of the logic of politics to the logic 
of economy” (472).  This research agenda particularly relies on microeconomics 
methodological individualism.  Methodological individualism presupposes an individual 
unit of analysis that makes rational decisions based on the cost-benefit choices he, she, or 
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 Hegemonic logical economism is inspired by the work of Richard K. Ashley (1983).  Hegemonic 
mismanagement was first introduced to me by David R. Mares (2001).  The five trends are not mutually 
exclusive and, as with any literature review, do not provide a definitive and final account of the literature.   
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it faces.  The actor merely aims to maximize its satisfaction.  As Kenneth Arrow (1994) 
adds, “the individual decisions then form a complete set of explanatory variables” (1).20  
For HLE, the state serves as the unitary rational actor, behaving as an individual 
consumer in the market economy by measuring the costs, risks, and benefits related to its 
own behavior.  The state, therefore, is a utility-maximization seeker that enters into 
complex relations when such relations are within its self-interest.  This trend is amenable 
with the positivist epistemology and behaviorism because it allows a researcher to 
measure state behavior as an economist would measure the behavior of an individual 
consumer in the maze of a market economy.   
This trend has experienced a fruitful academic life.  Robert Keohane (1984), for 
example, employs self-interested methodological individualism and Coasian economics 
to demonstrate how cooperation can not only emerge under hegemonic regimes, but also 
continue during hegemonic decline.  Robert Gilpin (1981; 1988) also draws upon a 
utilitarian microeconomic approach, particularly the law of diminishing returns, uneven 
growth theory, and the rational actor model, to advance a “systemic change” theory that 
explains the rise and fall of great powers.  More recently, Thomas Pederson (2002) has 
advanced “cooperative hegemony.”  Pederson argues that the hegemon often pushes for 
regional cooperation among states.  Drawing upon rational choice and methodological 
individualism, Pederson aims to explain why a hegemonic power would put its resources 
and power behind a specific regional order.  A hegemonic power shares its power with 
smaller states in order to form a regional group and structure, especially if the regional 
hegemon is weaker than a competing hegemonic power outside the region.  The goal is to 
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 Methodological individualism is more complex than the space allocated here allows.  For an attempt to 
capture the terms complexity through a historical account, see Udehn (2002).  
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solidify a more secure position, visa vie the smaller states, in the world.  As a result, 
regional stability occurs. 
This trend, however, suffers from serious weaknesses because it limits potential 
research by constructing states as a rational unitary actors and reducing international 
interaction to microeconomics.  Most importantly, it leaves little room for political 
philosophy and diverse methodological, epistemological, and ontological positions.  Even 
Kindlberger (1986) criticized Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984) for failing to go beyond 
the microeconomic framework of a self-interested rational actor model and including a 
more holistic philosophical approach.  The economist reminds us, “[T]here is a normative 
element in politics and/or government, [a]long with political science, there is political 
philosophy” (844).  Kindleberger continues to observe that foreign policy making cannot 
be simply reduced to the methodological individualism used to analyze the decision 
making of consumers.             
The second trend is prominent in the U.S. policy making community, as well as 
some scholarly research, and tends to dominate the latent literature on HST.  The 
hegemonic savior trend constructs the United States as a beneficial hegemonic power 
whose influence generally benefits the rest of the hemisphere.  Within the informal HST 
literature, scholars and policy makers draw upon the major tenants of HST without 
formally using its name.  Adherents to this approach exercise a taken-for-givenness that 
U.S. engagement in Latin America produces a public good in the form of economic 
development, democracy building, and stability.  In fact, U.S. engagement often rescues 
Latin American countries, particularly from themselves, from a wide range of bads such 
as dictatorship, economic statism, and irresponsible leaders.  In Forgotten Continent, 
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Economist Michael Reid (2007) laments that the United States has not taken more of an 
interest in Latin America in the post-Cold War world.  Unfortunately, according to Reid, 
U.S. policy makers have been “unwilling to provide the kind of external sponsorship of 
Latin American development” (296).  Echoing a similar sentiment, Latin American 
scholar Michael Desch (1998) contends that Latin America will yearn for U.S. 
engagement to the extent that the hemisphere will actually “miss the Cold War.”  Based 
on the premise that U.S. policy makers are inclined to pay less attention to their southern 
neighbors with the Cold War’s demise, Desch (1998) argues that the consistent and 
coherent foreign policy engagement of that time is much more preferable to a simple lack 
of engagement.   
In addition to influential journalists and scholars, policy makers draw heavily 
upon HST without formally using its name.  Russell Crandall (2006 and 2008), a former 
academic who now works in the Pentagon, argues that U.S. military intervention in Latin 
American affairs has led to public goods, particularly in the form of democratic 
governance.  Crandall (2006) alleges that U.S. invasions in the Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, and Panama actually benefited those countries by making them more 
democratic.  This trend, however, fails to understand that less, not more U.S. engagement 
may actually be more beneficial for Latin American countries.  Although there are certain 
policies and historical times in which U.S. hegemony has produced public goods, there 
are often benefits from U.S. neglect.  Less engagement can lead to alternative paths of 
economic development and alternative strategies for conflict resolution.  For example, 
with current U.S. attention in the Middle East, Latin American countries may experiment 
with different types of economic development than the conventional neoliberal model 
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assertively supported by the U.S. government.  What is more, neglect can actually inhibit 
the development of public bads.  As in the case of Panama, if the United States had 
neglected the country and not funded and strengthened Manuel Noriega in the first place, 
his ability to grow and develop into the powerful dictator he became would not have been 
so great and his removal would not have been necessary.  Therefore, there may be public 
goods involved in being forgotten. 
The trends that counter hegemonic savior are hegemonic domination and 
mismanagement.  The former interprets hegemonic behavior as imperialistic, aimed to 
dominate a region, whereas the latter finds hegemonic behavior as ultimately inept, 
intrinsically unable to provide public goods.  Since hegemonic mismanagement is not as 
developed as hegemonic domination, I will begin with the former.  The hegemonic 
mismanagement trend does not necessarily judge the intention of the hegemon.  Instead, 
this literature stresses that its efforts, even if well intentioned, leads to more problems 
than they solve.  Living under a hegemon actually decreases the security of states, not 
increases it.  What is more, hegemonic mismanagement avers that HST, particularly in its 
optimistic liberal form noted above (Pederson 2002), simplifies the world to the post-
World War II era and exaggerates the need of a hegemon to curb the free rider problem in 
international affairs.  Raymond Hinnebusch (2006), a proponent of this trend, observes, 
“[L]iberal HST overly generalized from and gave an excessively benign interpretation to 
a particular post-World War II episode of US leadership” (284).  Hinnebusch (2006) goes 
on to demonstrate how the world hegemon, the United States, in trying to assert its 
hegemonic power in the Middle East, has led to “intensifying the Islamic world” instead 
of creating stability (308).   
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In fact, U.S. hegemony, this trend notes, can create more instability.  David R. 
Mares draws upon the hegemonic mismanagement to quantitatively explain the 
increasing conflict in Latin America. Mares (2001) points out that the United States, in an 
effort to protect its perceived security interests, actually increases conflict by intervening 
in the Americas.  For example, if the United States believed that a Latin American 
country was threatened during the Cold War, it would intervene, dragging other countries 
into the conflict.  “[B]y forcing Latin American countries to become involved in the 
conflicts between the hegemon and recalcitrant state,” Mares (2001) points out, “the 
United States subjected those allies to conflicts that were not in their own interests” 
(79).
21
                    
Hegemonic domination has deep roots in leftist activism and scholarship.  Lars 
Schoultz is one of the most prominent scholars associated with the domination trend.
22
  
Schoultz (1987) has advanced the most comprehensive and insightful research detailing 
the hegemonic domination the United States has exercised over the Americas.  He first 
distinguishes between hegemonic control and a sphere of influence.  Although 
Washington exercises more influence over European countries than Europe exerts over 
the United States, the role of the United States entails a sphere of influence, not 
domination.  “[T]he United States is recognized as the glue that holds NATO together,” 
Schoultz (1987) points out, “this alliance-based power asymmetry is the essence of what 
is meant today by the term ‘sphere of influence’” (283). 
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 There are a large number of scholars and activists included in this trend.  Although citing them all is not 
possible, see Petras and Morley (1994) and Chomsky (1994) for more information. 
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In fact, the United States has been historically reluctant to directly intervene in the 
affairs of both Western and Eastern European affairs.  During and after the Cold War, 
U.S. policy makers refrained from intervening in crises such as those in Hungary (1953) 
and Czechoslovakia (1968).  Even in the Post-Cold War world, the United States 
remained cautious with militarily intervention.  The Clinton and Bush Administrations 
pushed for a European Community solution to the increasing conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia.  However, when the EC was unable to speak and act with a consolidated 
voice, U.S. officials believed they had, however reluctantly, to get involved (Woodward 
1995).  Relations with Latin America, on the other hand, are based on domination.  The 
United States asserts itself and intervenes in the domestic affairs more rapidly and 
aggressively than it would in other regions.  Latin America, as the cliché goes, is the 
backyard of the United States.   
Moreover, there is a cultural attitude that developed over the years.  This attitude, 
one that associates Latin America with inferior qualities and characteristics, facilitates the 
hegemonic domination.  Essentially, the industrious and advanced North Americans must 
teach Latin Americans how to be civilized.
23
  Schoultz (1998) asserts that this cultural 
attitude became our “white man’s burden” for Latin America (xvi).  “[A] hegemonic 
attitude developed gradually, so slowly that it went unnoticed until, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the notion of controlling the behavior of Latin Americans,” Schoultz 
(1998) continues to point out, “seemed as natural to U.S. officials as it did to 
Thucydides” (xvi).   
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Other scholars in this HST trend have also drawn upon culture to explain U.S. 
domination.  These scholars, however, come from the Gramscian hegemony tradition 
(Cox 1983; Gill 1993; Slater 2004).
24
  Although Gramscian and neo-Gramscian literature 
is too dense and complex to discuss here, the main idea is that the dominant social group 
exercises the cultural, moral, and leadership authority over a particular society.  As result, 
the hegemonic group or idea, such as liberal capitalism, is tacitly accepted.  This type of 
hegemony rules with consent, as well as force when one deviates away from the accepted 
mode of thinking and behavior.  David Slater (2004), employing a Gramscian post-
colonial analysis of north-south relations, demonstrates how the United States has been 
able to dominate Latin America not just with force, but tacit consent.  The United States 
has constructed and propagated the belief that it provides the superior cultural, economic, 
and moral leadership for the hemisphere.  Through the Latin American elite, this idea is 
disseminated throughout Latin America until, Slater avers, a counter-hegemonic 
movement develops against U.S. imposed hegemony. 
  The mismanagement and domination trends are clearly insightful.  Their principal 
weakness is that they fail to recognize that under certain conditions the United States can 
actually play a positive role.  For these scholars, U.S. policy incurs negative 
consequences, regardless.  For a post-colonialist like Slater, the counter-hegemonic 
movement must be against neo-liberalism and U.S.-supported capitalist institutions such 
as the WTO and IMF.  Although this may be partly insightful, Slater’s argument fails to 
explain why countries, even leftist governments, continue to use the IMF and WTO to 
their benefit.  Developing countries not only rely on the IMF for low-interest loans, but 
they also cleverly use the WTO to expose the hypocrisy of the United States and 
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European Union in areas such as farm subsidies.  The domination trend also fails to 
acknowledge the times in which Latin American countries have looked toward the United 
States for protection or how some countries have actually used the U.S. government to 
their advantage.
25
 
As for the hegemonic myth trend, HST is exactly that: A myth.  These scholars 
observe that HST is merely a glorification of the United States, as if it is inherently 
different from other states.  Isabelle Grunberg (1990) stresses the ethnocentricity behind 
HST.  U.S. scholars are simply wrong to think that the United States is inclined to utilize 
its vast resources differently than other states.  Although Grunberg is correct to point out 
that the United States often behaves in a similar fashion as other states, her argument fails 
to include the positive role the country has often exercised with its resource capacity.  
The European Recovery Plan, popularly known as the Marshall Plan, serves as an 
example.  Therefore, under certain conditions, the United States has the potential to 
provide public goods.  The objective, therefore, should be to identify these conditions.  
The Bureaucratic Politics Model 
In addition to the trends of HST, research on inter-bureaucratic politics and 
diplomacy are relevant to this dissertation.   I particularly build upon the bureaucratic 
politics model and more recent developments of diplomatic studies, both of which have 
advanced valuable research agendas.
26
  Therefore, this research not only challenges, but 
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 Although I focus on the role of ideas to the extent that they relate to diplomacy, I would be remiss not to 
note my indebtedness to the international relations literature that highlights the pivotal role ideas play in 
international relations theory.  This literature comes from too many sources to cite here, including the work 
of post-modernists, constructivists, and mainstream qualitative scholars.  For in-depth historical account of 
how ideas have developed in international relations theory and scholarship, see selected chapters in 
Burchill et al. (2009).  
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also builds upon established research agendas.  As with HST, studying the bureaucracy of 
the United States continues to be a viable research agenda.  The bureaucratic research can 
be traced back, however, to the pioneering work of Graham Allison.  Allison’s seminal 
studies on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969, 1971) strongly suggest that the rational actor 
model (which he categorizes as “model I” in describing the decision-making process) 
cannot fully explain states’ behavior.  Advancing what he calls the bureaucratic politics 
model (“model III”), Allison (1969) argues that states simply do not necessarily act 
rationally in international politics.  Governments are made up of bureaucracies, defined 
as “a network of interconnected departments and organizations designed to manage and 
administrate the operations of a state” (Genest 2004, 449).  As a result, these 
bureaucracies have an effect over the decision-making process.  Allison (1969) astutely 
observes that there is not just one “unitary actor” but, due to the complexity, 
decentralization, independence, competition, and hierarchical nature of the sprawling 
governmental bureaucracies, a host of players and personalities (707).   
Instead of coming from a clear and calculated strategic initiative, policy stems 
from the bureaucratic environment in which one group “triumphs” over the other or the 
diversity of actors are “pulling in different directions” (Allison 1969, 707).  This means 
the intentions, interests, and the relative position and power one has in what Allison calls 
“action-channels”—the channels through which players are able to influence decision 
making—all play a role.  Policy, thus, is the result of, Allison (1969) concludes, 
“bargaining games,” as well as “the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the 
action in question” (707, 708).  In fact, after the game of politics is played and power 
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struggles between bureaucratic groups have been won, the policy might be something 
totally different from what the decision-makers intended (Allison 1969, 707). 
Scholars have continued to build off Allison’s work.  His work has become so 
valuable that scholars outside the United States have aimed to apply his model to explain 
the foreign policy behavior of their respective countries (see, for example, Gámez 2001).  
Particularly relevant to this dissertation, Douglas Stuart (2003, 2008) suggests that the 
marginalization of the United States Department of State has led to a more militarized 
and unilateral foreign policy. According to Stuart (2003, 2008), the passage of the 
National Security Act (NSA) in 1947 became a pivotal turning point for the State 
Department, privileging other advisors and bureaucracies on matters of foreign policy.  
“As a result of the passage of the National Security Act,” Stuart asserts, “a nexus of three 
new agencies—the National Military Establishment (NME), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC)—displaced the State 
Department at the top of the Washington policymaking pyramid” (297).   
Stuart’s research is instrumental for international relations.  Many scholars have 
argued, often correctly, that the State Department has been the propaganda arm of the 
United States Government.  Under hawkish Secretaries of State such as John Foster 
Dulles (1953-59), the Department helped initiate the violent ousters of the 
democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh and Guatemalan 
President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán in 1953 and 1954, respectively. The Department also 
played a pivotal role justifying the Reagan Administration’s (1981-1989) policies in 
Central America.  Anti-Sandinista propaganda disseminated by the Department depicted 
the Nicaraguan government as “revolutionaries who openly embrace Marxist-Leninist 
36 
 
ideology” (U.S. State Department 1987, 3).  Nonetheless, the State Department has been 
more inclined historically than other governmental departments to employ diplomacy as a 
tool to resolve international disputes, especially through the use of multilateral diplomatic 
mediation.  Although hawkish presidents have often staffed the Department with political 
allies, this study has found that the State Department has often leaned toward diplomacy.  
This tendency has often pitted the Department against not only other agencies and policy 
makers to assert influence over the decision making policy, but also departments within 
the State Department itself.  Therefore, in order to understand foreign policy, scholars 
must explore inter-bureaucratic dynamics. 
Diplomacy 
Moreover, scholars have advanced a valuable research agenda on diplomacy.
27
  
Hans Morgenthau, the pioneering classical realist who has become associated with power 
politics, stressed a prominent role for diplomacy in international politics as early as 1948.  
He argued that diplomacy was vital for not only maintaining state interests, but also for 
initiating pacific conflict resolution.  Specifically, Morgenthau (2006) stressed the 
prominent role European diplomats played in sustaining great power peace in the 
nineteenth century.  In fact, lamenting that diplomacy had deteriorated at the end of the 
First World War, Morgenthau (2006) dedicated considerable research on not only 
detailing the tasks, instruments, rules, and significance of diplomacy, but how diplomacy 
could “be revived” (551).  Other “realists” continued to value the role of diplomacy.  
George Kennan, known as the father of containment, often privileged diplomacy over 
more bellicose foreign policy initiatives and emphasized the many successes achieved by 
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the U.S. diplomatic core.  For Kennan (1979), diplomacy, “contain[s] many positive 
aspects as well as negative ones” (91). 
Later research on diplomacy, most of which developed within the context of the 
Cold War, focused primarily on the bargaining strategy of world powers.  Thomas 
Schelling’s major contributions The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Arms and Influence 
(1966) developed game theories of self-interest, bargaining, deterrence, and what the 
author calls “compellence.”  Drawing upon economic theories and game theory, 
Schelling endeavors to explain how states not only aim to deter certain behavior, but also 
compel other states to carry out a specific behavior, the polar opposite of deterrence.  
More research on diplomacy followed, focusing principally on deterrence, compellence, 
and bargaining theory (Craig and George 1983; Bull 1977; Wight 1978; Kissinger 
1996).
28
  
  Although insightful and valuable, this research suffers from significant 
weaknesses.  First, scholars were occupied by great power politics and Euro-centric 
diplomacy.  The only times the research focused on South-North issues was when 
peripheral countries had become deeply caught up in Cold War crises, such as the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (1962) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975).  Otherwise, great power politics 
dominated the research.  In Diplomacy (1996), for instance, Henry Kissinger dedicates a 
significant amount of space to European diplomacy and diplomats such as Klemens von 
Metternichd (1773-1859) and the Congress System (1815-1914).  However, he 
contributes little to U.S.-Latin American relations, most of which are reduced to 
simplistic Cold War stereotypes.  “From Angola to Nicaragua,” Kissinger (1996) 
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contends, “a resurgent America was turning Soviet expansionism into costly stalemates” 
(787).  Kissinger fails to offer insight about the complex nature of these revolutionary 
movements.       
Second, much of this research has offered little insight into South-North relations 
due to its effort to mimic the natural sciences.  One of the most prominent and notable 
scientific approaches to the study foreign policy and diplomacy is “strategic realism.” 29  
Strategic realism is a research agenda involving the above-mentioned game theory and 
bargaining models. Although scholars who employ these methods do not form a 
homogenous group, the general movement relies on a microeconomic framework in 
which rational units engage in utility-maximization bargaining to avoid costs and gain 
benefits.  The most prominent and well-known model is the prisoners dilemma.  Strategic 
realism developed within the context of the Cold War in order to measure, explain, and 
predict the behavior of the super powers.  With the end of the Cold War, this approach 
continues to grow in influence and scope, becoming a fundamental research program on 
which much of international relations research is based today.     
South-North relations, however, are not completely reducible to this approach.  
The power differentials, just to name one reason, are far too great, particularly between 
the United States and the Central American republics and Caribbean islands.  Schelling, 
one of the pioneers behind strategic realism, concedes that his research is not always 
fungible to all contexts.  In Arms and Influence (1966), he warns: “With enough military 
force a country may not need to bargain” (1).  As a result, relying on a method that 
assumes a modicum of symmetrical power would not be appropriate for this project.  
Essentially, the raw military and economic power differentials are too great to 
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automatically enter into reciprocal and game theory-oriented bargaining structures.  In 
fact, most of the research on conflict and cooperation presupposed symmetric power 
structures, making theory development fungible for only contexts such as the Cold War 
and the Congress of Vienna.   
Finally, the diplomatic research that has been advanced dismisses the contribution 
of the poorer and weaker geographical areas of the world.  Regions considered “Third 
World” could actually offer great insight into the development of diplomacy, 
international laws, and supra-national institutions.  Being inattentive to diplomatic 
successes in Latin America and failing to recognize their positive agency in many world 
events not only marginalizes important contributions, but contributes to the negative 
essentialization many U.S. and European scholars have for the region.  However, as I 
point out in the case on the Central American Court of Justice, the world’s first supra-
national court can contribute significantly to our understanding of these subjects.               
More recently, a number of scholars have tried to revive and reinvent the research 
on diplomacy (Stearns 1996; Jentleson 2000; Berridge, Keens-Soper, Otte 2001; 
Copeland 2009; Pigman 2010).  A good starting point for this brief review can take the 
form of a question: What exactly is state diplomacy in the first place?  Diplomacy is 
conventionally defined as a source of power that allows states to carry out their objectives 
without relying on military force (Berridge 2002).  Diplomatic approaches also exhibit a 
number of essential characteristics particularly inter-state communications, official and 
non-official negotiations, and information gathering (ibid).  However, as I will show in 
the new literature, scholars not only draw upon the conventional definition, but try to 
expand and reinvent it as well.     
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As in other fields of scholarship, research on diplomacy is quite diverse and 
dense.  Although a complete review of the current research agenda on diplomacy is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, there are a number of related themes pertinent to my 
research project.  First, scholars assert that academics and policy makers must revive and 
empower diplomacy as a fundamental tool of foreign policy.  Diplomacy has attracted 
less attention over the years not only from academics, but policy makers as well.  As 
Stuart (2003, 2008) reminds us, other bureaucracies have marginalized the State 
Department, the primary agency in charge of carry out diplomacy.  As a result, this has 
led to a more unilateral and militarized foreign policy agenda.  What is more, as I 
mentioned in the introduction, there has been a militarization in post-9/11 academe. 
Research focuses on insurgency and counter-insurgency in lieu of diplomatic solutions.  
Both the academics and governmental policy makers, it can be argued, have marginalized 
the role of diplomacy.  Second, the field of diplomacy is not always reducible to the 
normal sciences.  Studying diplomacy requires a multi-methods and interdisciplinary 
approach.  It is not easily amenable to positive quantitative analysis.  As political 
economist Geoffrey Pigman (2010) reminds us, “Although its [diplomacy’s] 
effectiveness is difficult to quantify, diplomacy’s effects are felt ever more powerfully” 
(136-137).  However, this does not mean that scholars cannot identify the conditions 
under which diplomacy may work.  Scholars can study diplomacy as a major independent 
variable in creating peace (Steiner 2004).      
Moreover, diplomacy cannot be politicized.  The problems associated with 
politicizing foreign policy initiatives has become a central theme in policy-related 
scholarship (Williams 1959; Stearns 1996; Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008; Simon 
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2009).  Stearns (1996) points out that albeit the Rogers Act (1924) was able to 
professionalize diplomacy through decreasing political patronage in appointments and 
creating the Foreign Service, the politicization of diplomacy remains a dangerous 
element. “Politicization of diplomacy may be superficially gratifying to an 
administration,” Stearns (1996) asserts, “but it is rarely healthy for its policies” (53).  
Politicizing diplomacy is defined as the indoctrination of diplomats (Stearns 1996).  In 
lieu of collecting information and advancing policy advice objectively, diplomats carry 
out their duties within the constraints of a particular doctrine such as Cold War 
containment.  The information collected and policy analysis recommended are made to fit 
this parochial view of world events.  An example of politicization is the appointment of 
William Casey to head the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1980s (Bar-Joseph 
and McDermott 2008; Simon 2009).  Casey requested CIA officers to find a Soviet 
influence in Central America.  Although this was a legitimate mission, Casey followed 
stating that he did not want to know the contrary if the officers failed to find the 
information he wanted (Simon 2009).  As a result, the politicization of bureaucratic 
agencies can have disastrous consequences for the decision making process.       
Finally, scholars observe that we need to expand the scope of diplomacy.  
Diplomacy cannot parochially focus on matters of defense and security.  It requires an 
understanding of human development, alternative paths of progress and economic 
development, and the legitimate grievances and discontent felt be those in impoverished 
countries.  Copeland (2009) specifically advances a reinvention of diplomacy based on 
“guerilla diplomacy.”  This innovative diplomatic approach emphasizes diplomatic 
functions not found in the earlier research of Morgenthau and Kennan.  These functions 
42 
 
include focusing on the role of R&D, alternative forms economic development, scientific 
technology, poverty, societal discontent, and the digital divide.  Copeland’s approach, 
which I discuss later, is instrumental for addressing the post-Cold War case studies. 
Recent literature, however, has continued to dismiss the agency of developing 
countries.  Apart from a few exceptions, diplomacy is constructed as a top-down structure 
when studied within the context of North-South relations.  Additionally, there is little 
focus on the diplomatic relations between Latin American countries.  However, 
initiatives such as the CACJ, the Esquipulas Accords in the 1980s, and more recently the 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas (ALBA) can demonstrate how Latin America may not only contribute to 
diplomacy, international institutions, and regionalization, but also bypass U.S. hegemony.  
Therefore, in addition to challenging and building upon established research agendas, my 
study aims to include the pivotal role of Latin American agency.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to offer a review of the relevant literature pertaining 
to this dissertation.
30
  Drawing upon HST, the bureaucratic politics model, and 
diplomacy, this research aims to not only address the gaps and weaknesses of the 
literature, but also build upon its strengths and contribution.  Considering the literature 
review above, this will require the following: 1.) Moving beyond the state as the unit of 
analysis; 2.) privileging ideas over the rational actor model and methodological 
individualism; 3.) placing diplomacy in the forefront of analysis; 4.) punctiliously 
analyzing inter-bureaucratic dynamics; and 5.) addressing the marginalization and 
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misconceptions many scholars and policy makers harbor toward Latin America and the 
Latin Americans’ abilities to contribute to solve the world’s, as well as their own, 
problems. 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODS 
Introduction 
  The goal of this chapter is to explain and justify the research methods I use to 
address my dissertation research problem.  This study relies on the framework of 
complexity theory.  The subject of U.S. foreign policy and the provision of public goods 
and bads is complex and challenging, involving different levels of interaction among 
various competing and cooperating actors.  As a result, this research requires a multi-
methods and multidisciplinary approach in order to offer a comprehensive, yet not final 
or definitive, understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations.  Complexity theory is 
amenable to this research approach.   
This dissertation relies on a number of methodological, epistemological, 
ontological, and theoretical methods and procedures commonly not found together in one 
dissertation.  These include the following: quantitative analysis, mainstream qualitative 
methods, interpretive methods, multinational secondary and archival research, and 
ethnography.  Although relying on such a diversity of methods is unorthodox, complexity 
theory provides a facilitative framework for this dissertation.  In order to explain my 
methodological choices, this chapter consists of the following: 1) A summary of 
complexity theory; 2) an explanation of how complexity theory relates to my 
methodological approach; 3) a brief overview of the hegemonic epistemological, 
ontological, and methodological modes of inquiry in international relations; and 4) a 
detailed analysis and justification of the methodological approaches upon which this 
dissertation relies.   
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Complexity Theory 
What is complexity theory (CT) and how does it relate to the research presented 
here?  CT is far from a homogenous movement or single body of scholarship.   
Nonetheless, scholars who work with this approach agree upon a number of related 
assumptions.  First, the political, social, and economic phenomena academics and policy 
makers address have varying degrees and scales of complexity that involve emergent 
properties, complex adaptive systems (CAS) and a large number of independent and 
interdependent players.  Emergent properties are essentially the different parts of a 
system that create a collective behavior otherwise unattainable when the parts are on their 
own.  Emergence requires an understanding of smaller-scale relations that affect the 
overall collective behavior in an emergent system (Bar-Yam 2005 and 2011).  As Yaneer 
Bar-Yam (2010) points out, it entails how macroscopic behavior may arise from the 
microscopic behavior.  
 These interactions, however, are not static, but dynamic.  The actors are always 
learning, evolving, and adapting to the changing environment in which they find 
themselves.  Adaptive systems can include any range of biotic life such as animals, 
plants, and humans.  Humans learn, but even plants react and adapt to their surroundings 
by growing around all obstacles (Bar-Yam 2005 and 2011).  Different systems also have 
different levels of complexity.  A hierarchical top-down linear system that controls 
collective behavior decreases emergent behavior and ultimately leads to lower levels of 
complexity.  An example is a dictatorship that curtails individual interactions.  On the 
other hand, the United States, which is broken down into so many interacting 
subgroups—states, districts, class, and so on—is the quintessential complex system. 
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  Moreover, within an environment of complex adaptive systems there are ongoing 
balances between order and disorder.  Orderly phenomena are more knowable, 
controllable, and predictable than disorderly ones.  A commonly cited example of 
disorderly phenomena is the modeling of weather patterns by Edward Lorenz (Gleick 
1987; Mitchell 2009; Geyer and Rihani 2010).  In the early 1960s, Lorenze found that 
small even infinitesimal changes in his modeling led to major shifts in weather patterns.  
However, in Lorenz’ research design, small changes were only expected to lead to small 
alterations in pattern outcomes.  “Cause did not lead to effect. Order was not certain,” 
Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani (2010) point out, “Chaos/complexity was an integral part 
of physical phenomena” (16).  This pivotal discovery questioned common research 
designs and forced scientists to take what came to be known as “chaos theory” as a  
serious phenomena.
31
                      
Finally, the classical logic of linear models based on orderly Newtonian 
paradigms often fails to be an adequate methodological approach to capture this 
complexity.
32
  Geyer and Rihani (2010) call the Newtonian paradigm the “paradigm of 
order” (12).  The paradigm of order is based on linear and generalizable cause-and-effect 
processes that demonstrate predictable and deterministic patterns.  An example of the 
paradigm of order is modernization theory.  Modernization theory presupposes a linear 
path of economic development.  Walt Rostow’s influential book The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960) embodies this orderly linear thinking by 
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delineating five stages to growth: The traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-
off, drive to maturity, and age of high mass consumption.  However, linear predictable 
patterns failed to emerge, demonstrating the absence of predictable order.  Most of the 
cases  Therefore, complexity theory stresses that phenomena exhibit different extents of 
chaotic-orderly, uncertain-predictable, and complex-reducible behavior, much of which 
are not easily understood as predictable linear patterns.  
As a result of the above mentioned assumptions, CT researchers argue that 
phenomena under study are not always reducible to mainstream methods.   Scholars 
approach this methodological conundrum in a number of different ways.  For the purpose 
here, I identify two variants of CT. The first variant is hard CT, identified with the 
research and computer modeling of physicist Yaneer Bar-Yam.  The second is soft CT, 
associated with the work of social scientists Robert Geyer and Samir Rihani.  Both 
variants of complex theory have advanced fruitful research programs.   
Hard CT has made significant progress in understanding and explaining crucial 
global problems.  These include ethnic violence (Lim, Metzler and Bar-Yam 2007), 
education (Bar-Yam 2010), and military involvement in the post-Cold War world (Bar-
Yam 2003).  This work is carried out through advanced computer modeling and 
algorithms that allow the researchers to capture complex elemental interactions and 
explain the collective behavior that arises.  For hard CT scholars, computer simulation 
offers a more comprehensive analysis of CAS than those offered by traditional 
econometric tools and procedures.  Therefore, albeit recognizing the difficulties of 
controlling and predicting social, political, and economic environments, these scholars 
employ computer models and complex systems statistical tools as a vehicle to bypass 
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these difficulties.  Hard CT scholars then aim to explain and predict a wide range of 
phenomena, including financial management (Kemper 2004), ethnic conflict (Lim, 
Metzler and Bar-Yam 2007), and even the recent waves of protests in Egypt (MacKenzie 
2011).        
This dissertation, however, identifies more with soft CT (from herein defined 
simply as complexity theory or CT).  Albeit CT shares hard CT’s criticisms for orderly 
linear methods, it goes beyond hard CT to extend its critique to the straightjacket orderly 
scientific positivism has placed in social science research.  This is because hard CT 
scholars, particularly physicists, biologists, and other academics from the hard sciences, 
are much more inclined to regain the control and predictability of empirical research than 
scholars from the social sciences.  They rely on computer modeling, which is inclined to 
reduce research to the positivist model of research.  “[W]orld modeling falls into the very 
trap in which positivism ensnares every inquiry,” Richard Ashley (1983a) pointed out 
decades ago, “the trap of mistaking the dominant order of things for the singular, 
necessary, and objectively given order of things” (530).33      
In advancing a more penetrating critique, however, CT scholars recognize that 
predictability, certainty, and linear patterns of development are much more difficult to 
discover in research outside of the natural sciences.  Imposing scientific positivism on 
nearly every research problem we address regardless of its levels of complexity can 
hinder our ability to advance research, particularly in international relations (Tezcan 
2006).  In fact, the failure of the paradigm of order has prompted a number of CT 
scholars to question the ability to develop natural-science-like laws in the social sciences.  
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 It is important to note that Ashley (1983a) further argued that modeling did not necessarily have to go in 
the positivist direction.  However, he never expanded on this idea. 
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“Yet, the diversity and constantly evolving nature of complex systems,”  Rebecca Dodder 
and Robert Dare (2000) observe, “seems to place a limit to the amount of generalizable 
‘laws’ that can be derived through complexity” (12).  In lieu of objective laws found in 
the natural sciences, we may be able to draw valuable lessons from our research. 
Positivism and International Relations 
Although the story of positivism and how it relates to political science has been 
retold many times before, a general overview is worth retelling.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, positivism is related to the scientific method of the natural sciences.  
The scientific method stresses a number of essential characteristics.  These include null 
and alternate hypotheses, empirical testing, replicable and falsifiable research designs, 
causal analysis, methodological individualism, rational actors, predictability, 
operationalized variables and indicators, and generalizable experimental results.  A 
number of assumptions accompany the scientific method.  Those worth noting are 
objectivity and rationalism.  The former assumes that the researcher, subjects, and “facts” 
are independent from each other, whereas the latter avers that the world is knowable, 
controllable, and predictable through objective research. 
Although positivism has been a part of political science since the turn of the last 
century (Sylvan 1991; Bond 2007), the behavioral movement brought the approach to 
international relations in the 1960s.  One of the most prominent behaviorists to celebrate 
and employ the positivist scientific method was David J. Singer.  In a series of articles, 
Singer, along with Karl Deutsch, not only employed positivism, but also lobbied on its 
behalf.  In “The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to The Study of International 
Relations” (1961), Singer advanced the case for the scientific movement, encouraging 
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students and professors to “to utilize—with appropriate caution and discretion—the 
methods, findings, and models of these [other] disciplines” (334).  Three years later, 
Singer and Deutsch (1964) applied scientific quantitative methods to IR by quantifying 
the balance of power scenario in world affairs.  Designating the number of powers as the 
independent variable and international stability as the dependent variable, they found that 
an increase in the number of nation-states had a stabilizing effect on international 
conflict.  In fact, drawing upon assumptions from microeconomics and utilizing statistical 
graphs, they posited a causal chain of analysis amenable to positivism: 
Ushering positivism into the field of IR culminated in the “Great Debate” between 
science and traditionalism.  Scholars supporting each approach engaged, often 
acrimoniously, in debates over the applicability of the scientific method to international 
relations.  The intellectual exchange between Hedley Bull, who favored the traditional 
approach based on history, philosophy and the humanities, and Morton A. Kaplan, who 
supported the scientific approach, personified this debate.  Bull (1966) contended that the 
mathematical and causal logic of positivism would hinder international relations by 
undermining the substance, moral questions, and overall progress that had advanced the 
field.  Kaplan (1966), however, concluded that the traditionalists “understand neither the 
simpler assertions nor the advanced techniques employed by the newer methods” (20).  
Adherents to methodological positivism won a major battle with the publication of 
Kenneth Waltz’ seminal study A Theory of International Relations (1979), which 
solidified a positivist, structural, and causal-oriented approach to the study of 
international relations.  The book’s major appeal lied in its creation and legitimization of 
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a research agenda based on a microeconomic, thus, “scientific” approach to international 
relations.        
Although debating is commonly associated with open democratic systems, the 
debates in political science, particularly international relations, have paradoxically led to 
a rigid hierarchical and authoritarian system.  This happened for a number of reasons: 1.) 
Creating a winner-loser scenario, positivism, the supposed winner, became the dominant 
mode of inquiry, whereas traditionalism and related methodologies became marginalized; 
2.) adopting positivism, political scientists relied on a very narrow approach based on a 
limited understanding of econometrics and microeconomics; 3.) having an undisputed 
dominant method led many academics to overlook the criticisms that came from not only 
the social sciences, but the hard sciences as well; and 4.) forcing all social, political, and 
economic phenomena to fit “normal science,” research lost valuable insight that could 
have been gained with other methodological and epistemological modes of inquiry.      
Despite the disadvantages of having a hegemonic approach, positivism, 
particularly in quantitative form, came to dominate the discipline.  With the support of 
many mainstream scholars and peer-reviewed journals, particularly the influential 
American Political Science Review (APSR), the scientific approach became legitimized 
and solidified as not only the best, but the only method of inquiry for the discipline.  
Keohane, King, and Verba (1994) reinforced strict positivism in Designing Social 
Inquiry: Inference in Qualitative Research (DSI).  The authors took the templates and 
tools for quantitative analysis, specifically econometrics, regression analysis, means and 
variance testing, large-N research designs, and probability methods,
34
 and applied them 
rigidly to political science. DSI concluded that good theory and methods “depend upon 
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 For an in-depth review of DSI, see Collier, Seawright, and Munck (2004). 
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rules of scientific inference” (34).  Other messianic positivists have continued to serve as 
the “gate keepers” of the discipline.35  Prominent scholars Jeffrey Frieden and David 
Lake (2005), for instance, contend that progress in the field of international relations can 
only linked to the positivist methodological framework.  “Progress in the study of 
international politics depends on systematic, rigorous theory and empirical testing,” they 
claim, “International Relations is most useful when scholars can identify with some 
confidence the causal forces that drive foreign policy and international interactions” 
(136).   
The dominance positivists have held over the discipline fomented a 
methodological and epistemological backlash.  This backlash came from a number of 
different scholarly groups.  Mainstream qualitative scholars challenged the alleged 
superiority of quantitative methods (Ragin 2000; Brady and Collier 2004; Gerring 2004; 
Bennet and George 2005).  Constructivists attacked the materialism and rationalism 
assumptions of mainstream positivism (Wendt 1987, 1992 & 1999; Ruggie 1993).  
Interpretevists emphasized the contribution of researching influential contextual features 
such as meaning, symbolism, and “semiotic practices” (Weeden 1998, 1999, 2002 & 
2009, 81).  Post-modernists problematized the “neutrality” of the theoretical and 
ontological research in international relations, challenged the ahistorical and structural 
determinism of positivist research, and began to address crucial questions that did not fit 
the common cause-and-effect epistemological framework (Ashley 1983a, 1983b and 
1984; Ashley and Walker 1988; Doty 1993; Weber 2001; Hansen 2006).  Finally, 
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ethnographers have more recently emphasized the crucial contribution of immersion 
politics (Schatz 2009).
36
       
Even before much of the backlash took place, a number of mainstream scholars 
had recognized the limits of positivism.  Many subjects were too complex and uncertain 
to fit neatly within the scientific method framework. O’Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead (1986), for example, conceded that positivism failed to be an appropriate 
universal approach to all political phenomena under study.  In their seminal study 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, they were unable to apply “normal science” to 
capture the complexities of democratic transition.  “We believe that this ‘normal science 
methodology’ is inappropriate in rapidly changing situations,” O’Donnell and Schmitter 
point out in Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (1986), “where those 
very parameters of political action are in flux” (4).  They found that the transitions were 
outside the realm of certainty, order, and predictability, essential attributes of normal 
science.   
This seminal study was pivotal for research because it challenged the minimalist 
approach.  The minimalist approach was popular because it was amenable to the 
scientific method.  Scholars built upon Robert A. Dahl’s research Polyarchy (1971), 
which quantified and measured democracy with two primary variables: elections 
(contestation) and the chance for the opposition to win (participation).  Scholars, 
therefore, could readily quantify and run statistical methods to find if, for instance, 
economic development was an influential variable determining democratic outcomes 
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 As with most categorizations in this dissertation, the ones mentioned above come with strong caveats; I 
use these groups merely as a vehicle to grasp how the different criticisms arose.  They obviously do not 
capture the complexities of the scholars mentioned, many of whom may not agree with such categorization 
in the first place.     
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(Przeworski et al. 1996 and 2000).  There was a price, however.  The minimalist 
approach, albeit reducible to orderly science, failed to capture the complex picture of 
democratic transition and consolidation.  In addition to O’Donnell and Schmitter, this 
prompted other scholars to begin to privilege complexity over scientific methods (see 
Linz and Stepan 1996).  Criticisms of positivism and econometrics, often unknown to 
political scientists, have also come from a number of different sources, including eminent 
scholars involved in the hard sciences, economics, and policy making (Leontief 1971; 
Arthur 1990; Rihani 2003; Swann 2006).
37
  Samir Rihani, who worked on Middle East 
developmental projects for decades, recognized that many of the computer models “in 
vogue” failed to achieve most goals.  “The aura of order, predictability and control over 
long-term events were intoxicating,” Rihani (2002) points out, “[d]evelopment was seen 
as a finite and tidy process that obeyed known universal laws” (xii, xiv).  Rihani (2002) 
concludes, however, that most of the control and predictions regarding economic 
development never came to fruition.  In fact, even John Maynard Keynes questioned the 
use of econometrics and the development of economics as a natural science (see 
Moggridge 1992). 
Complexity Theory and International Relations 
Building off the weaknesses of the paradigm of order and mainstream methods, 
CT scholars have advanced valuable research programs.  A number of scholars have 
already recognized CT contribution to international relations (Won Min 2003; Rihani 
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2003; Tezan 2006; Geyer and Rihani 2010).
38
  Specifically for my purposes, complexity 
theory is amenable to this research project for a number of reasons.  First, CT recognizes 
that not all social, political and economic phenomena under study are reducible to the 
paradigm of order or the same methodological, epistemological, and ontological modes 
of inquiry.  This is crucial for my research project because parts of my research question 
are amenable to a particular method whereas others are not.  For instance, I rely on 
quantitative analysis to test for U.S. intervention in Latin America.  However, 
quantitative methods are not appropriate to deeply explore the use of diplomacy in Latin 
America, for which I rely on mainstream qualitative analysis.  Qualitative methods allows 
for an in-depth study of all the interacting variables that influence the apparatus of 
foreign policy decision-making.   
What is more, the principle factors are not fixed or static over time.  They are 
adaptive to the particular environment, using different discourse, methods, and means to 
influence policy and diplomacy for their own interests.  “As US actions in Haiti, 
Venezuela and Cuba demonstrated,Washington still had a penchant for destabilising 
governments it saw as adversaries, whether or not they were democratically elected,” 
William Leogrande (2007) astutely observes, “the cruder method of fomenting military 
coups had been replaced by financing and training civilian opponents, but the aim was 
still the same” (384).  In the removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the 
democratically-elected president of Haiti, the creative maneuvering by influential actors 
such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) was instrumental in undermining 
Haitian democracy.  Learning from past errors in trying to overthrow governments in 
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Cuba and Nicaragua, these U.S. political actors worked clandestinely with a number of 
anti-Aristide civilian operatives within Haiti, while at the same time professing to support 
the embryonic, yet fragile democracy Aristide governed (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).  
But even more importantly, the U.S. political actors aiming to overthrow democracy not 
only in Haiti, but other countries such as Venezuela, have adapted to the post-Cold War 
international environment.  They have learned how to take advantage of relatively new 
phenomena such as the rise of NGOs, human rights campaigns, governmental-sponsored 
“peace” and “democracy” initiatives, and grassroots and civil society movements.  This is 
what I call the “new intervention.”  Supporting guerrillas and direct intervention are not 
always conducive means to intervene in Latin American affairs.  However, adapting to 
the new international environment, interventionists in Washington have gravitated 
towards NGOs and civil society movements, utilizing them physically and linguistically 
through “democratic” discourse, to destabilize Latin American governments.  Therefore, 
we can not merely think of intervention in old terms, such as the invasion of the 
Dominican Republic (1965).  We have to study the new profound levels of 
interventionism, most of which is not amenable to quantitative or positivist research. 
 U.S. actors are not the only players who have learned how to be adaptive.  Current 
center-left leaders throughout Latin America have also learned from past errors and 
grown more adaptive to their domestic and international environments.  The current 
leftist movements are significantly different from those in the past.  The “socialism” 
being espoused today by figures such as Presidents Rafael Correa and Hugo Chavez of 
Ecuador and Venezuela, respectively, is far different from the communism of Cuba or 
even the socialism of Sandinista (1979-1990) Nicaragua.  Most importantly, leaders have 
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completely jettisoned the egalitarian concept against growing wealthy.  In countries such 
as Venezuela, bankers and other capitalists have done rather well economically (Roberts 
2013).  Leaders have learned from the lack of support and flight of both capital and 
skilled workers extreme socialist policies can cause.  In fact, center-left socialist leaders 
have done their utmost to not only attract foreign investment, but diversify their sources.  
For example, Bolivian President and socialist Evo Morlaes bypassed the conventional 
U.S. and European investment to attract South Korean capital to develop the country’s 
vast lithium reserves (Ripley and Roe 2013).                      
In addition to stressing the importance of adaptability, CT does not privilege one 
methodology over another. This is important because I not only draw upon a wide range 
of methodologies, but I also employ interpretive methods, a mode of inquiry that scholars 
have often marginalized in political science (see Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002).  
However, because CT challenges a one-size-fits-all approach to research, it allows 
researchers to explore subjects with a multi-methods and interdisciplinary approach, 
borrowing from the humanities as well as economics and the hard sciences.
39
  
“Consequently, complexity demands a broad and open-minded approach to 
epistemological positions and methodological strategies,” observes Robert Geyer (2003), 
“without universalizing particular positions or strategies” (16).  Tezcan (2006) reinforces 
this position: “CT is, as known, an interdisciplinary research paradigm” (9).  This 
democratic tendency is instrumental for challenging methodological limitations and 
exploring innovative approaches for understanding how public goods and bads are 
created.   
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Finally, challenging the notion of linear and orderly progression is valuable on a 
number of levels.  First, CT allows researchers to understand and highlight the problems 
associated with operationalizing historically contingent and subjective variables such as 
public goods and terrorism and running them in linear regression models.  Although I 
detail more below, it is important to note that not all variables are subject to simple 
orderly linear paradigms.  A public good in one particular time may not be considered a 
public good in another.  Second, there is no taken-for-given presupposition that research 
will inherently give way to human progress, development, and natural order.  This is 
important for studying areas such as economic development.  CT allows researchers to 
question the notion of progress and accept it for what it is: a slow, uncertain, and 
evolutionary process (Rihani 2003).  
Grounded theory and an inductive approach 
In addition to highlighting the complex nature of this research, the inductive 
approach is important to note.  A deductive research aims to test and confirm or 
disconfirm a particular established theory.  Despite drawing upon the theory of 
hegemonic stability theory, this project has, to an extent, developed inductively.  Since I 
had no theory to explain my initial research questions when the explanatory power of 
HST collapsed under the weight of analysis, I aimed to explore a wide range of 
information.  This meant drawing upon primary sources, secondary sources, in-depth 
interviews, statistical datasets, and personal experience living among the people of Latin 
America for nearly eight years of my life.   
As a result, this dissertation is based upon what has become known as grounded 
theory methodology (GTM).  Popularized by Barney Glaser and Anselm Straus with their 
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1967 book The Discovery of Grounded Theory, GTM aims to systematically study 
economic or social phenomena with the objective of creating theoretical insight.  GT, it is 
worth stressing, is not descriptive.  The approach is procedurally rigorous and endeavors 
to comparatively analyzing observations, systematically code for important information, 
identify specific cause-and-effect patterns, and create useful theory to help explain and 
possibly predict the phenomenon under study.
40
   
Grounded theory methodology informs this research in the following ways.  First, 
since this dissertation does not aim to necessarily “test” a theory, I needed to find under 
what conditions the United States could play a positive role and if these conditions rarely 
occurred, under what conditions could Latin American nations bypass the United States 
and address their own issues regarding economic development and conflict resolution.  
This meant approaching these questions inductively.  Furthermore, thinking 
comparatively through in-depth comparative case studies, I found that certain variables 
affected the patterns and caused variance in U.S. foreign policy approaches.  Finally, 
after systematically coding and discovering these patterns, I was able to develop 
theoretical insight which is both academically significant and policy relevant.                    
Quantitative Section 
I now aim to explain the specific methods upon which this research relies.  To 
begin with, studying U.S.-Latin American relations, one basic question emerges: To what 
extent has the United States been historically involved in Latin American affairs in the 
first place?  Scholars and activists from both Latin and North America have historically 
                                                          
40
 There is a wide range of literature to understand not only ground theory methodology, but the rich debate 
within the movement.  See Straus and Corbin (1990) and Glaser (1990) for more information.    
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observed U.S. interventionism in Latin American affairs.
41
  The true extent of 
interventionism, however, is difficult to know.  This research cannot merely rest on the 
assumption that U.S. simply always intervenes, regardless of how prevalent and 
commonplace it has become.  As a result, I address this question by measuring U.S. 
intervention in Latin American conflict with a quantitative research design.  Since this 
part of my research only aims to measure U.S. presence, linear regression remains the 
most suitable technique. 
Subjects: The specific subjects on which I rely are my own personal modifications 
of the Correlates of War Project (COW) and UCDP-Prio Armed Conflict Datasets.  
Readjustments of established datasets have, with justification, become accepted in the 
political science community (Thies 2005).  Drawing upon the datasets, I have coded for 
two dichotomous qualitative variables—U.S. intervention and non-intervention—in 123 
Latin American conflicts.  Additionally, I code for two independent variables: 
Presidential party (republican and democrat) and geographical location (Mexico, Central 
America/Caribbean, and South America).  The goal is to measure the influence these 
variables exercise over the dependent variable, U.S. intervention. 
Conflict is strictly defined as an inter-state or insurgent-driven dispute that results 
in at least one death.  A protest, however, would not be considered.  U.S. intervention, 
defined by U.S. physical presence in support for at least one side of the conflict, includes 
both instances in which the United States enters a conflict that has already begun, as in 
the case of Mexico’s early battles with France, and the United States initiates the conflict, 
as in the invasion of the Dominican Republican in 1965.  Since the objective is to only 
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measure the U.S. intervention, however, I see no reason at this point to differentiate 
between the different types of intervention mentioned above, which would require in-
depth research and coding adjustments that time constraints do not allow.  However, 
further research is necessary to explore the above-mentioned differentiation.
42
   
Readjusting the coding and measuring variables, it is important to note, is not an 
easy task.  I draw upon primary and secondary literature in Spanish as well as English, 
along with personal interviews, to adjust the datasets for U.S. intervention.  The 
readjustment, however, is clearly not the final say.  This research project welcomes 
criticisms to improve the never-ending coding process. The readjustments, nonetheless, 
were necessary.  U.S. datasets remain reluctant to honestly code for U.S. intervention, 
particularly in conflicts that may link U.S. policy to unjust human rights abuses or even 
support for terrorist activities.
43
  For example, the COW dataset codes the Nicaraguan 
1980s war as an intrastate conflict.  However, archival documents, secondary literature, 
the International Court of Justice case Nicaragua v. the United States (1984), and 
memoirs from Nicaraguans on both sides of the war clearly show that United States 
played an integral role.   
Furthermore, many datasets rely on such specific and parochial definitions that 
fail to capture the scope of intervention.  Pickering and Kisangani (2007), building on the 
definition of intervention originally advanced by Pearson and Baumann (1993), code 
military intervention as “regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc) of one 
country inside another” (2).  This definition, however, fails to capture the depth and 
scope of U.S. intervention such as the use of CIA operatives and the training of irregular 
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soldiers in and out of U.S. soil.  Additionally, relying on this database would convey the 
false impression that the United States did not intervene in a large quantity of conflicts in 
which it actually did.  Therefore, readjustments were necessary for this research.             
Procedures: The first objective of the quantitative methods is to correlate U.S. 
intervention with Latin American conflict.  To test the probability of U.S. intervention in 
Latin American conflict, I rely specifically on logistic regression.  The second is to 
measure the significance of the three independent variables (party, geographical location, 
and time) on U.S. intervention.  To measure the significance, I rely on linear regression 
methods, including the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.   
Contribution: This study is contributive because I add a pivotal dimension to the 
conflict data: U.S. intervention.  Although COW and UCDP-Prio Armed Conflict are 
established datasets, they fail to include significant information for Latin American 
scholars.  Paul Hensel, researcher and data collector for Issues Correlates of War 
(ICOW), and John Tures (2000) observe that COW misses pivotal data such as U.S. 
intervention in the 1885 and 1906 Central American conflicts.  This part of my research 
aims to not only measure U.S. intervention, but also begin a trend to recognize and code 
for U.S. involvement in Latin America, something scholars outside Latin American 
studies have failed to do.    
Qualitative Methods 
 Mainstream qualitative methods allow an in-depth analysis into the emergent 
properties and complex interaction in not only foreign policy decision making, but also 
the effects these decisions have on Latin American countries.  The methods upon which I 
draw are associated with a number of mainstream qualitative research scholars 
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(Goldstone 1991, 2006; Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005).  First, I rely on John 
Gerring’s definition of a case study.  According to Gerring (2004), a case study is defined 
as the following: “[A]n in depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) 
where the scholars aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” 
(341).  A “bounded phenomenon” involves any specifically-defined spatial entity such as 
a war, revolution, or crisis, as with Graham Allison’s (1969, 1971) seminal study of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.  Gerring (2004) continues to differentiate the case study method 
from the way in which researchers analyze the cases themselves.  The case study method 
is not ethnography or process tracing, which are “subtypes” of cases, but the way we 
define and analyze the case (Gerring 2004, 342).  This differentiation is crucial because 
the case study method, therefore, can employ a number of different vehicles for analysis 
(e.g. process tracing, ethnography, archival research, interpretive methods) depending on 
the researcher’s needs, goals and questions.   
For the purpose here, I draw upon case studies, but analyze them differently.  The 
specific methods I use to conduct a case study approach are the following: comparative 
historical analysis (CHA), process tracing and congruent testing, multi-national archival 
and secondary research, ethnography, and finally interpretive methods.  First, CHA is 
different from an in-depth historical text or world history such as From Colony to Super 
Power (2008), George C. Herring’s tome on U.S. foreign policy.  Instead, CHA relies on 
a small-N case-based research method in order to explain variation in historical events 
(Goldstone 1991).  By drawing upon a number of selected cases, my research goal is to 
explain the conditions under which the United States can provide public regional goods.  
Therefore, this part of the dissertation is to address the why-question.  The why question 
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is based more on positivist methods because it aims to discover, confirm, or falsify causal 
inference.  The case method, at least applied here, does not endeavor to advance universal 
laws or ahistorical explanations, but trends and patterns that are possibly generalizable to 
other cases.  “The essence of a comparative case study is to identify patterns rather than 
just a single-case phenomena,” Bruce W. Jentleson (2000) points out, “[t]he uniqueness 
of every case is to be respected, but the emphasis is on developing more general 
conceptual formulations, middle-range theories, and policy lessons” (15). 
The two methodological vehicles I use to trace out certain patterns of causations 
are process tracing and congruence testing.  Process tracing involves in-depth historical 
research that leads to tracing out complex causal processes and linking these causes with 
specific historical outcomes.  Process tracing also aims to demonstrate that human 
behavior, under certain conditions, is at times consistent and predictable, not always a 
mere random event (Goldstone 1991).  Congruence testing involves identifying 
congruent patterns among the cases.  Theda Skocpol (1979), for example, found 
congruent patterns between the revolutions in China, Russia, and even “liberal” France, 
demonstrating that these cases, which appeared quite historically different, had congruent 
patterns of causality (Goldstone 2003).  Together, congruence testing and process tracing 
allow the researcher to gain insight into her subject under study.  George and Bennett 
(2005) point out that the goal of the congruence method is to identify the variance in the 
independent variables and, thus, dependent variable in a set of cases.  Therefore, the 
researcher does not need to rely on a great amount of historical data.  Process tracing, 
however, does require a great deal of historical information and assists in the in-depth 
exploration, testing, and deciding if causal explanations are spurious or valid. 
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Moreover, I rely on what I call “multinational archival and secondary research.”  
The point is to differentiate my research from those scholars who rely primarily on U.S. 
centric and English-based sources. A multi-national approach is crucial because this 
research requires theoretical scholarly literature, secondary sources that provide the 
relevant historical background information, and primary sources of information that 
include official governmental documents, public speeches, personal interviews, court 
decisions, and international agreements and treaties.  I utilize this approach not only for 
the mainstream qualitative part of the research, but for the quantitative, critical, and 
policy recommendation chapters as well.    
Relying on primary and secondary sources from Latin America, opposed to only 
those from the United States, has certain methodological advantages.  First, albeit US 
sources are integral, they have their own biases.  Archival and secondary sources from 
Central and Latin America offer a counter balance to the official US agenda.  One 
example is El Salvador’s interpretation of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty (1914), which 
differs significantly from that of the United States.  The treaty allowed U.S. military 
bases in Nicaragua’s part of the Gulf of Fonseca, a move El Salvador perceived as a 
national threat.  Second, the archival research gives the Central and Latin Americans 
agency.  Ignoring the pivotal role of Latin American policy makers or simply blaming the 
United States for Latin American problems would fail to offer a comprehensive 
understanding of the subjects.  Third, a multi-national approach is instrumental for 
controlling for confirmation bias.  Scholars have noted that social science qualitative 
research often falls in the trap of selecting historical secondary information that confirms 
the particular theory of the researcher (Lustick 1996).       
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Most importantly, relying on both Latin American and U.S. primary and 
secondary sources allows this research to capture marginalized information, history, and 
voices that U.S. academic scholarship has overlooked and ignored.  The U.S. academic 
literature on Latin America, especially in the field of political science, to which I belong, 
is often inattentive to the contribution Latin Americans have made for peace and 
prosperity.  In fact, most of the academic literature either harbors a negative 
essentialization of Latin America or overlooks Latina America’s accomplishments all 
together.  As I demonstrate in the case of the Central American Court of Justice, 
however, the judicial work of this little-known supra-national institution is quite 
impressive, with the ability to advance our understanding of the development of 
international institutions, laws, and cooperation.
44
  Therefore, my methodology takes a 
necessary multinational approach to capture Latin American regional successes in 
conflict resolution, economic development, and political negotiations.   
Ethnography is prevalent throughout this dissertation as well.  Ethnography, 
however, is not an easy method to operationalize.  For the research presented here, I rely 
on the conceptual definition advanced by Edward Schatz (2009).  According to these 
researchers, although ethnographic scholarship is currently fraught with rich and 
necessary internal debate, there are two principal characteristics associated with 
ethnography.  The first is participant observation.  This specific type of observatory 
research depends on the researcher’s immersion in the environment under study and 
allows her or him to generate and gather contextual knowledge.  For example, scholars 
are often interested in institutional and incentive structures.  Instead of researching under 
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 Common international relations text books such as Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches by Robert Jackson and George Sorensen completely ignore the CACJ.  I have yet to find a text 
book that acknowledges its existence.     
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the assumption that all actors operate under the same structures, participant observation 
can offer insight into the contextually contingent incentive and structural conditions 
under which people work and live.  The second is “sensibility,” a type of an “emotional 
engagement” that allows the researcher to understand the meaning of people’s political 
and social reality (Schatz 2009, 6).  Ethnography has advanced fruitful research programs 
by addressing questions and gleaning information that mainstream political science 
methods are unable to reach.  Enrique Desmond Arias (2009) demonstrates the success of 
ethnographic methods in understanding the link between myth and democracy in 
Argentina, collecting data on peasant collective action in El Salvador, among many other 
studies.          
Ethnography influences this dissertation in many ways.  Most importantly, my 
experience living, working, researching and teaching in Central America and Mexico has 
made me sensitive to the following overlooked, yet significant, problems that pervade 
mainstream news outlets and U.S. political science institutions, particularly at the 
research 1 level: U.S. centric and English-based biases; unfair knowledge production in 
North-South relations; the marginalization of voices; the asymmetrical power structure 
and lack of objectivity involved in academic research; biased and offensive coding for 
quantitative methods; the de-legitimatization of legitimate movements; the 
legitimatization of U.S. policy foreign policy; left-wing as well as right-wing ideological 
imperialism; conflicts of interest in research funding; and the devaluing of alternative 
modes of inquiry in order to understand Latin American Studies.   
Although I develop the particular points in the chapters in which they appear, a 
clarifying example of one point is warranted.  One of particular importance involves the 
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research of terrorism.  Although U.S. academic institutions and publications offer copious 
information and coding for defining terrorism, U.S. scholars clearly privilege the deaths 
of allies over non-allies, undermining the scientific objective claims advanced by social 
science researchers.  For example, both U.S. qualitative research and quantitative 
databases describe and code the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
guerrilla group in El Salvador as a terrorist organization, but fail to extend the same 
definition and coding to United States-supported irregular movements the same status as 
“terrorism.”  For example, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)45 codes FMLN attacks 
against the Salvadoran government as “terrorism,” but fails to extend this coding to the 
private death squads that were often supported by U.S. and Latin American citizens.  The 
personal testimonies I have heard by victims, however, have rendered me more sensitive 
to the bias in U.S. scholarship.  I cannot minimize the importance of ethnography, in this 
research project.      
In addition to mainstream quantitative and qualitative methods, I also employ 
interpretive methods to analyze my final cases.  Although an interpretive approach, as 
with other methodological traditions, do not form a homogenous body of scholarship, 
there are a number of salient characteristics that distinguish its approach: 1) Privileging 
the study of meaning and identity over causal analysis; 2) questioning the objectivity of 
“normal science”; 3) relying on discourse and textual analysis; 4) exploring the power 
structures involved in research; 5) addressing the how-question instead of the why-
question; and 6) downplaying the role of a universal rational actor and emphasizing the 
importance of culture, interpretation, historical contingency and subjective practices; 7) 
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 GTD is a terrorism data-set project housed at the University of Maryland at Baltimore and funded by the 
Department of Homeland Security. See its website for further detail: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/ 
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analyzing hegemonic power structures and the opportunity of “space” to provide 
alternative discourse.   
Interpretive methods have been marginalized as a mode of inquiry in political 
science.  Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2002) find that political science methods textbooks 
privilege mainstream positivist methods, specifically in quantitative form, over 
interpretive methods, which attracts scant attention.  Nonetheless, interpretive methods 
have offered valuable insight, much of which cannot be attained with mainstream 
methods, into North-South relations (Said 1978; Spivak 1988; Doty 1996; Persuad 2001; 
Chowdhry and Nair 2002).  Interpretive methods inform this research particularly in 
chapter 8, but the approach influences the research throughout.  Most of the scholarship 
on regionalism has drawn upon functionalism, neo-functionalism, neo-realism, or 
economic liberalism.
46
  However, as chapter 8 demonstrates, the new rise of Latin 
American regionalization opens up critical space that allows alternative discourse, 
discussion and debate that lead to policies the hegemonic power, the United States, would 
otherwise oppose.  
Instead of relying on the conventional IR theoretical approaches, however, this 
research draws upon critical literature related to spaces.  The concept of space offers a 
different understanding of regional institutions.  Most importantly, the creation of space 
through regional institutions gives way to alternative discussion, discourse, and debate 
that lead to policy changes in economics and conflict resolution.  Space has a long 
trajectory.  Jürgen Habermas considered public space vital for the creation of democracy.  
For Habermas (1991), the development of public space, or what he would call the “public 
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 Detailing these theoretical approaches is far beyond the scope of this paper.  For an in-depth 
understanding, see Schulz et al. (2001).      
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sphere” was instrumental for democracy (54).  Within this space, civil society, not just 
the elite, could participate and influence society.  “For Habermas the coffee houses, 
salons and table society of Europe were examples of inclusive literary public spaces,” 
Ted Fleming (2008) observes, “because of their equality, critique, problematizing the 
unquestioned, accessibility and reflexivity” (2).  Although space can entail competing 
powerful political interests, it is also a place in which the voiceless can have a voice.  
Essentially, public space is an amorphous and often ambiguous place in which all societal 
members can participate, regardless of their social and economic standing.  According to 
Mustafa Dikec (2005), space “becomes the polemical place where a wrong can be 
addressed and equality can be demonstrated” (172).  The concept of opening space for 
genuine equality and even justice has led to wide range of research agendas.  Furguson 
and Turnbull (1999), for instance, demonstrate how public space was instrumental in 
facilitating debate over U.S. military occupation in Hawai’i.  Drawing upon Derrida and 
the concept of hospitality, Doty (2006) demonstrates how space opens to assist Latin 
American migrants on the Arizona border.  Despite draconian laws against migrant 
workers and immigrants, there are ambiguous spaces, often overlooked by both scholars 
and policy makers, which facilitate, Doty (2006) concludes, “practices and experiences” 
that genuinely lead to humane acts of hospitality along the southwestern borders (55).
47
  
In the development of regionalization, space allows competing ideas and discourse that 
the hegemonic power, particularly the United States, would otherwise oppose.                     
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 The literature on Habermas and public space is too extensive and dense to capture here.  See Fultner 
(2011) for more on public space and a review of Habermas’ key ideas.  
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Operationalization of definitions  
This section aims to offer operational definitions of key terms: marginalization; 
the influence of U.S. economic interests; public goods; and politicization.  Although 
these terms are not easily and readily definable and scholars can contest the definitions 
offered here, I build upon a wide range of established literature for the operationalization 
process.   
Marginalization:  Marginalization occurs when the State Department fails to have 
policy influence in a particular administration.  The ability of a particular agency to exert 
influence over policy depends on the strength it has to defeat other agencies in the inter-
bureaucratic governmental infighting.  Stuart (2003, 2008) points out that due to the State 
Department’s marginalization since the National Security Act of 1947, foreign policy has 
relied more on military policy options.  As a result, the foreign policy literature that 
highlights marginalization defines this bureaucratic phenomenon as an agency’s decrease 
in policy influence via other bureaucratic structures.  In this dissertation, the State 
Department and Secretary of State often lose out to other bureaucrats and bureaucracies 
such as the National Security Advisor and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
U.S. economic influence: Every country tries to advance its economic interests.  
However, the influence here is defined by the parochial interests of a particular sector 
that engages in lobbying efforts to create or steer policy in a way that privileges these 
economic interests over peace, stability, and economic progress for regions outside the 
United States.  For example, as Chapter 7 demonstrates, the U.S. government has 
privileged U.S. financial capital in trade negotiations.  The privilege of financial capital 
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over monetary flexibility and economic progress may serve the short-term interests of 
financiers, but work to the detriment of developing countries.          
Flexible regionalization:  Flexible regionalization is defined by a regional 
integration that does not lock member states into monetary unions or the harmonization 
of trade policies.  Flexible regionalization challenges the conventional regionalism that is 
based on a Newtonian linear concept of development.  This type of regionalism follows a 
series of “steps” that deepens integration through a free-trade area, customs union, a 
common market, and finally an economic union that, most importantly, entails a 
monetary union in which all members share a common currency.  Politically, member 
states follow a similar path in which countries harmonize political policies and create 
supranational political institutions such as a parliament. 
Conventional regionalism, however, fails to capture the diversity of needs among 
its members.  Most importantly, any type of shared currency or dollarization would cause 
members to lose their monetary independence.  Essentially, countries would not be able 
to address their specific needs.  For example, one country may need to battle inflation 
while another may need to risk inflationary policies to spur economic growth.  As we 
currently see with the economic problems in Greece, the country, being in the Euro zone, 
has forfeited its monetary independence to tackle individual issues. Greece cannot, say, 
devalue the euro.  Countries such as Sweden and Great Britain did not enter the Euro 
Zone for this reason.  The loss of monetary independence was also a key factor in the 
cause behind Argentina’s economic crisis at the turn of the twenty-first century (Ripley 
2010b).    
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Moreover, trade policies should avoid harmonization since member countries, 
particularly in Latin American regionalization, have different resources and different 
objectives.  Bolivia, for instance, is interested in developing its lithium reserves.  
However, the Bolivian government has different developmental policies and different 
trade objectives, specifically with the particular countries with and from whom Bolivia 
wants to trade and attract foreign investment (see Ripley and Roe 2011 for an in-depth 
discussion on Bolivia’s development of lithium reserves).                     
Public goods: Public goods are significantly different from general benefits.  A 
benefit can be anything.  If an individual donates money to her favorite charity, that is a 
benefit; but the particular donation is not a public good.  A public good is both non-
exclusionary and non-rivalrous: consumers cannot be denied access to the good and 
additional consumption does not reduce consumers’ satisfaction with the good, 
respectively.  Another significant characteristic of a public good in international relations 
is that the provision of goods does not necessarily stem from altruistic intentions.  The 
creation of goods is not costless.  States invest vast resources in endeavors such as 
maintaining a liberal economic order, creating a regional institution, and carrying out 
diplomatic initiatives.  Therefore, countries create public goods when they have a 
particular interest at stake.  In the case of the Central American Court of Justice (1908-
1918), for instance, the Washington had a general interest in maintaining stability in the 
region due to general economic considerations and the proximity to the United States.   
Operationalizing public goods for this particular research is, however, a much 
more difficult task.  Although a general definition can be found in the literature review, 
an operational definition is more difficult due to the fact that public goods are extremely 
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subjective and historically contingent.  Take low inflation, often considered a public 
good.  Albeit low inflation sounds desirable, as a public good, it is actually historically 
contingent.  When Argentina entered the convertibility plan (La convertibilidad) in 1991, 
the economic policy of pegging the Argentine peso to the dollar curbed hyperinflation, 
creating a public good.  However, a trade-off exists between increasing unemployment 
and underemployment and maintaining the peg and low inflation.  As the peg and low 
inflation gave way to skyrocketing unemployment and underemployment, sustaining low 
inflation quickly turned into a public bad, causing an economic crisis (see Ripley 2010b).  
Essentially, a public good today can be a public bad tomorrow.  What is more, a public 
good is subjective.  Maintaining an open a liberal capitalist system, as stressed in HST 
literature, may be a public good for some economic sectors and social groups, but not for 
others.  Indigenous groups in Mexico, for instance, may not be able to compete with 
highly subsidized U.S. food imports, causing them to use their land, a public bad.   
Scholars have tried to operationalize public goods for quantitative research.  
Bussmann and Oneil (2007) conclude, for instance, that state reliance on an alliance with 
a hegemonic power does not produce public goods measured by economic growth and a 
number of other variables.  Relying on a time-series analysis, Karen Remmer (1993) also 
operationalizes economic goods to measure democratic governance in Latina America, 
including policies related to devaluation and inflation.
48
 Although these are valuable 
studies, measuring goods constantly falls in the trap of losing historical contingency and 
subjectivity.  Devaluation, as with inflation, hinge on the economic context.  Brazil, 
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 Although Remmer (1993) does not use the word “public goods,” there is an inevitable “good” 
connotation to the variables to measure the success of democratic governance.  Remmer (1993) actually 
measures the time, or postponement, in which politicians chose to devalue, which is “largely negative from 
the point of view of the voting public” (397).  Focusing on public goods as Remmer does is not an option 
for this paper. 
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Argentina, and Venezuela have utilized significant devaluations (in Argentina’s case the 
peso lost over half its value) to their benefit (Ripley 2010b).  What is more, each country 
demonstrated that they required different economic policies depending on their particular 
situation (Ibid).  Finally, economic measurements of growth by gross domestic product 
(GDP) can also be quite cosmetic, not reflecting the scope and depth of economic and 
social benefits.
49
   
Therefore, I measure public goods within historical and environmental contexts.  
However, there are some salient features that make my research replicable and verifiable.  
These include the conditions to reduce military conflict between the respective parties 
and to create economic long-term sustainable growth.  A reduction of military conflict 
involves the cessation of hostilities between the respective parties.  Economic growth 
means setting the conditions for the appropriate combination of economic openness and 
regulation.  Although HST often stresses the need for sustaining a liberal capitalist open 
system, studies, as well as recent historical experience, suggest that economic openness 
can create sustainable growth only under certain conditions (Rodrik 1999, 2002, 2007; 
Ocampo, Kregel, and Griffith-Jones 2007).  Ripley (2010a) demonstrated that opening 
Nicaragua up to private foreign investment in the country’s public energy institutions 
created public bads in the form of blackouts, a lack of rural electrification, and higher 
rates. Due to the lack of preparatory institutional conditions, openness did not function 
well.  Therefore, although liberal capitalist openness is associated with a public good, it 
also can produce public bads, creating the need for the researcher to be more sensitive to 
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 For a study on the problems of associating economic openness with public goods, see Ratt (1992).  Ratt’s 
work demonstrates that openness became a principal cause behind the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). 
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the particular context.  This research aims to measure the hegemon’s ability to create 
these conditions. 
Politicization: I use politicization in this dissertation to explain what often 
happens once the State Department loses bureaucratic battles.  Instead of maintaining 
independent, the department becomes co-opted by the interests of others.  For 
politicization, I rely on a diversity of literature in international relations.  First, I borrow 
from the definition advanced by Stearns (1996).  Stearns (1996), who writes extensively 
on U.S. diplomacy, defines politicization as the following: In lieu of collecting 
information and advancing policy advice not only objectively, but also to fit the specific 
contextual circumstances, diplomats carry out their duties within the constraints of a 
particular ideological doctrine.  “A doctrine taken literally and applied indiscriminately,” 
Stearns (1996) warns, “produces policies that are too rigid and unrealistic” (48).  An 
example of politicization can be containment.  Although containment might have been an 
appropriate policy for Eastern Europe, it may not have been the optimal policy for 
Central America.  Therefore, politicization dictates that information collected and policy 
analysis recommended are encouraged to fit a particular parochial view of world events.  
The literature on intelligence supports this definition. Bar-Joseph and McDermott (2008), 
tracing the politicization of foreign policy intelligence back to the nominee of William 
Casey to the head of the CIA in 1981, point out policy analysts refuse to incorporate 
dissenting information into their frame work of thought and, thus, policy options.  Casey, 
as director of intelligence, even refused to listen to information that contradicted the 
Reagan Administration’s policy in Central America.  He did not want any information 
demonstrating that there was no Soviet involvement in the area (Simon 2009).  
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Unfortunately, the politicization of foreign policy often has dire consequences for those 
countries involved.  As Steven C. Roach (2006) points out in his study of the 
International Criminal Court, “[p]oliticization, therefore, can be understood as 
constituting both a cause and effect of imperialism” (8). The Politicization, as the mini- 
case study on Haiti demonstrates, produces real and disastrous public bads for the 
countries involved in U.S. negotiations.
50
               
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was not only to explain my methods, but also justify 
their use.  I rely on a wide-range of methods in order to capture a more complete picture 
of the relations between the United States and Latin American countries and Latin 
American countries among themselves. In Chapter 4, quantitative methods are used to 
measure the extent to which the United States interferes in Latin American conflict.  
Chapters 5 through 7 rely on mainstream qualitative methods to find the conditions under 
which the United States can produce public goods and bads.  Finally, chapter 8 relies on 
interpretive methods to identify the conditions under which Latin Americans can bypass 
the regional hegemony and create their own public goods.  Although more research is 
necessary to explore this complex topic, the methods chosen for this research project 
provides a solid starting point.        
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 It is important to note that this dissertation incorporates a number of mini-cases in order to demonstrate 
the explanatory power of this research approach.  
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CHAPTER 4 
U.S. INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This dissertation engages in an analysis of relations between Latin America and 
the United States.  It further analyzes the conditions under which Latin American 
countries can bypass the United States and address their own economic and strategic 
concerns.  However, to justify and advance this research agenda, there must be an 
underlying assumption that the United States is heavily involved in Latin American 
affairs to begin with.  Although the policy and academic literature on United States-Latin 
America relations suggests that U.S. involvement is historically extensive, the degree of 
this involvement has never been tested.  Measuring U.S. involvement in Latin American 
is a crucial initial step for this dissertation.  Albeit there may be cases of interference, 
these cases may not be indicative of the overall pattern of relations that have taken place, 
and continue to take place, for the last two hundred years.  As a result, a central research 
question emerges: What is the exact extent of U.S. involvement in Latin American 
affairs?   
This chapter aims to address this question with a quantitative research approach.  
In order to measure U.S. intervention in Latin American conflict, however, a re-
adjustment of established datasets was necessary since no comprehensive dataset existed.  
Drawing upon personal modifications of the Correlates of War Project (COW) and 
UCDP-Prio Armed Conflict Datasets,
51
 I have coded for dichotomous qualitative 
variables—U.S. intervention and non-intervention—in 123 Latin American conflicts.  
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 For data modifications, see page 5.  More specifically, I rely upon the COW MID3 Dataset 1816-1992 
and UCDP v.4 1946-2008 for this chapter. See Ghosen et al. (2004) and Themnér and Wallensteen (2012), 
respectively.   
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Using logistic regression, I aim to measure the following: 1) the probability of the United 
States to intervene in Latin American conflicts; the level of significance of presidential 
administrations (i.e. republican and democrat); and the level of significance of 
geographical location relative to the United States (i.e. Mexico, Central America/the 
Caribbean, and South America).
52
  The objective here is not to decide whether the United 
States caused conflict, which would be a complex research effort beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  The objective is to test the common perception, which is ubiquitous 
throughout Latin American nations, that the United States, particularly under more 
hawkish republican presidencies, is always inclined to interfere in hemispheric affairs 
when the least bit of conflict occurs.  For this research, my study posits the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant correlation between Latin American conflict and 
U.S. intervention. 
Hypothesis 2: U.S. intervention is more likely under republican presidential 
administrations than those led by democrats. 
Hypothesis 3: U.S. intervention is evenly distributed throughout Latin America. 
Measuring variables and events is not an easy task.  First, conflict is defined as an 
inter-state or insurgent-driven dispute that results in at least one death.  A protest, 
however, would not be considered.  U.S. intervention is defined by U.S. physical 
presence in support for at least one side of the conflict.  U.S. intervention includes both 
instances in which the United States enters a conflict that has already begun, as in the 
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 Coding separately for Mexico is justified since it is the only country to border the United States by land.  
Central America is coded with the Caribbean countries because the five of the six republics have Caribbean 
coasts.  El Salvador is the outlier.  However, for future research, I plan to code Central America and the 
Caribbean separately. 
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case of Mexico’s early battles with France, or initiates the conflict, as in the invasion of 
the Dominican Republican in 1965. 
Results and Discussion 
Coding for U.S. intervention, however, has produced fruitful results.  First, the 
data suggests a significant logistic correlation between Latin American conflict and U.S. 
intervention: 73 coefficient intercept.  Graph 3.1 below shows this relationship.  This 
means that there is a significant probability that if there is conflict in Latin America, the 
United States will be involved.  Although this does not suggest that the United States is 
the cause of the conflict, such a high level of significance does question the idea that the 
United States is a regional agent of peace and stability. 
Graph 3.1. Conflict in Latin America 
 
 
In order to explain U.S. intervention, I analyze two influential factors: the 
presidential party at the moment of the conflict and geographical location relative to its 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
Democrat Governments 
Conflicts in Latin America 
US Intervention 
Non-US Intervention 
81 
 
proximity to the United States.  Running logistic regression, I aim to determine if these 
two independent variables—party and geography—have a significant effect on the 
dependent variable—U.S. intervention in Latin American conflict.  Table 3.1 shows the 
overall results.  
Table 3.1. Measures of probability of U.S. intervention 
Probabilities of US Intervention in Latin American 
conflicts(Logistic Regression) 
Independent variable Model 
Constant 2.1396 *** 
 (0.5361) 
Party  
    Democrat
a
 -- 
    Republican -0.2169 
 (0.4493) 
Geography  
     Central America &       
     Caribbean
a
 -- 
     Mexico -0.4729 
 (0.9087) 
     South America -2.0995*** 
 (0.5062) 
  
Log-likelihood -65.84412 (df=4) 
AIC 139.69 
Cases 123 
a 
Reference category 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
.  p <  .01, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Note. Personal data constructed data from COW 
and UCPD-Prio 
 
First, presidential party is not significant.  This means that democrats are just as 
likely to be involved in Latin American conflict as their political counterparts, the 
republicans.  Graph 3.2 shows the results for republican and democratic intervention and 
non-intervention in Latin American conflicts.  These results are important because they 
82 
 
challenge previous research that has found republicans more likely to support 
intervention in Latin American affairs than democrats. 
Finally, geography is significant.  Coding for three separate regions—Mexico, 
Central America/Caribbean, and South America—the results suggest a strong 
significance level for Mexico and Central America/Caribbean.  That is, the United States 
is more likely to intervene in a conflict in these first two areas than in South America.  
Graph 3.2 shows the differences between regions.  It is also important to note that there is 
no significant difference between Mexico and Central America/Caribbean.  These results 
are important for several reasons.  First, although many scholars have observed that 
proximity was a variable, it has not been tested quantitatively.  Second, Latin American 
policy makers in regions close to the United States must factor U.S. intervention into 
their policy analysis.  
Graph 3.2. U.S. intervention and non-intervention in Latin America          
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Graph 3.3. U.S. intervention in Latin America according to region  
 
Additionally, there are only three outliers that fall below studentized residuals -2 
of the regression line.  These are three Central American conflicts in which the United 
States did not intervene.  Graph 3.4 presents these outliers.  Currently, there is no 
theoretical research explaining these outliers.  Future research is necessary.  To establish 
the exact probabilities and quantities of interest of the independent variables, I rely on 
Zelig package (Imai et al. 2004).  In the 95% interval confidence, the U.S. has between 
32% and 60%, 44% and 96%, and 74% and 96% probabilities to intervene in South 
America, Mexico, and Central America/Caribbean, respectively.  Figure 3.2 shows the 
lines of probabilities. 
With these results, the following conclusions can be advanced.  First, the data 
suggests the following: 
  Hypothesis 1: There is a significant correlation between Latin American conflict and 
U.S. intervention (confirmed). 
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Hypothesis 2: U.S. intervention is more likely under republican presidential 
administrations (rejected). 
Hypothesis 3: U.S. intervention is more likely in regions closer to the United States 
(confirmed).
53
 
Figure 3.1. Variance in U.S. intervention in Latin America 
 
Figure 3.2. Probabilities of U.S. intervention in three areas 
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More importantly, these results suggest pivotal points for not just this dissertation, 
but for international relations, Latin American studies, among other academic disciplines.  
First, studying relations between Latin America and the United States is an important 
endeavor.  What is more, the new dataset and these findings generate ideas for future 
research.  With a significant correlation between Latin American conflict and U.S. 
intervention, more independent variables need to be explored.  For instance, does the 
amount of a Latin American country’s mineral wealth influence the causal relation 
between U.S. intervention and conflict?  What about trade?  Are countries more engaged 
in trade with the United States experience less or more intervention?  This paper, 
therefore, creates endless opportunities for research and a better understanding of U.S.-
Latin American relations. 
Conclusion    
This first chapter aims to quantitatively measure U.S. interference in Latin 
American conflict since the independent countries gained independence in 1811.  The 
objective here is not to decide whether the United States caused conflict, which would be 
a complex research effort beyond the scope of this dissertation.  The objective is to test 
the common perception, which is ubiquitous throughout Latin American nations, that the 
United States, independent from causing conflict or not, is always present when the least 
bit of conflict occurs.  This perception, at least according to the results presented here, is 
well-founded.   
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CHAPTER 5 
PRE-COLD WAR CASE STUDY: THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE (1907-1918) 
Introduction 
In 1907, the United States and Mexico actively encouraged the creation of an 
adjudicating international institution to assist the independent Central American 
republics.  Without hesitation, a year later the Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) 
was constructed in Cartago, Costa Rica.  With $100,000 dollars donated by steel magnate 
Andrew Carnegie, builders spared no expense to erect a magnificent court building.  In 
fact, when an earthquake wrecked the area of Cartago a year after the Court was 
established, Carnegie returned to donate a small portion of his fortune to reconstruct the 
building again, this time in San José, the capital of Costa Rica.  The court building, 
similar to its predecessor, was magnificent.  As one observer commented in 1918, the 
court was a “beautiful building intended for its palace” (New York Times 1918).   
But the CACJ constituted more than just an impressive piece of architect.  With 
the goal of minimizing violence between the Central American countries, the five 
republics—El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras—signed the 
General Treaty of Peace and Amity and the Supplement Treaty (1907), cementing one of 
the first steps towards a world in which states relied on an international organization as a 
tool of diplomacy instead of war.  In 1908, The American Journal of International Law 
praised the court’s inauguration: “Thus, for the first time in the world’s history, we see a 
court sitting in judgment of nations, parties litigant before it” (836).  
The CACJ, however, has attracted scant academic attention.  In the most 
prominent books and articles on Latin and Central America, authors, albeit mentioning 
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the court’s rise and demise, refrain from offering an in-depth analysis.54  The historical 
articles that have focused on the CACJ after its demise in 1918 have also advanced 
negative depictions of the court’s utility.  In 1932, Manley O. Hudson (1932), the 
prestigious international law professor at Harvard, opined: “the Central American Court 
of Justice was doomed to failure from the outset” (785). 
Pessimism about the court, or even the lack of research on it, has some 
justification.  Historically, the efforts at integration have led to dismal results.  The 
United Provinces of Central America, an 1823 federal republic established by the five 
present-day countries, completely disintegrated in 1840.  The countless attempts that 
followed to cobble together agreements, initiate conferences, and finally reconstitute 
ultimately failed.  Even the martial effort of pro-unionist Justo Rufino Barrios, the 
Guatemalan president who actually died for his cause in battle against El Salvador, failed 
dismally to unite the republics.  Why would a supra-national court be more effective than 
previous efforts?  The CACJ, however, was different.  Preceding the League of Nations 
(LON), Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and the United Nations (UN), the Court merits a more 
significant and positive place in academic research.  Its creation not only demonstrates 
the progressive intellection of the signatory members, but also a general concern and 
belief that international governmental organizations (IGOs) could play a central role in 
peace and diplomacy.  Before the Court shut its door on May 25
th
 1918 and ended its 
short existence, it was able to successfully adjudicate three major legal disputes, address 
six individual civil rights cases involving Central American citizens, and commission a 
number of peace-seeking missions throughout the region.  There has been very little 
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interest, however, into studying and learning from the processes and decisions of the 
Court.    
Although more scholarly research is needed, this article attempts to help fill the 
gap in the literature.  Focusing on the inception of the court in 1907 to its demise in 1918, 
this study suggests the following: 1) the Court served as a significant yet rocky step 
towards a more stable region; 2) it provided an important outlet for diplomatic exchanges 
and grievances; 3) the arguments brought before the Court, as well as the concomitant 
rulings, had the potential to contribute to the development of regional institutions and 
international law; and, 4) relying on a multilateral diplomatic approach to solve 
intractable conflict, the United States can help create regional public goods.  I conclude 
by explaining not only why the Court’s continuance was of the utmost importance for 
Central America, but also that the United States, concentrating on its own parochial 
short-term economic gains instead of long-term interests, finally failed to provide 
regional leadership in sustaining the Court. 
The United States and Central America 
The CACJ cannot, however, be understood on its own.  The United States, the 
hegemonic power in the Americas, played an instrumental role not only in creating the 
Court, but historically shaping regional politics as well.  Although Washington had 
periodically focused on the region—the United States did recognize the Central 
American Federation and even entered into a trade treaty with the union in 1825—
diplomats often ignored the isthmus until the mid- 1800s (Longley 2009).  However, as 
the United States sought the creation of an isthmus canal, feared European intervention, 
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and expanded closer to the region through the military conquest, Washington took a more 
serious and consistent interest in the area. 
One of the first prominent diplomats to recognize the importance of the isthmus 
was John M. Clayton, secretary of state under U.S. President Zachary Taylor (1849-
1950).
55
  Although Clayton held the position for only a little more than a year due to 
Taylor’s death, foreign infiltration in Central America motivated the secretary of state to 
engage Great Britain, which had already colonized present-day Belize and the Caribbean 
Mosquito Coast, strategically important areas of Central America.  The Mosquito Coast, 
located on the Atlantic side of the isthmus, takes up not only the southern coastal part of 
Honduras but nearly the whole of Nicaragua’s outlet to the Atlantic Ocean.  Clayton 
made great efforts to protect the area from further influence.  When Great Britain flirted 
with the idea of creating an isthmus canal, Clayton initiated a treaty with British diplomat 
Henry Lytton Bulwer.  The resultant Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) promoted the initial 
steps to halt Britain’s expansion in both the Atlantic Mosquito Coast and the entire 
isthmus.  The treaty stipulated that neither Washington nor London would “exercise any 
dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central 
America.”56   
U.S. diplomats continued to see the strategic importance of Central America.  
William H. Seward, Secretary of State under Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson 
(1861-1869), feared regional instability as a way for European powers to interfere in the 
isthmus.  Additionally, he saw a pivotal area for U.S. business interests.  After the 
American Civil War (1861-1865), Seward understood the importance of Central America 
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as a trade route linking the southern part of the United States with Latin America.   The 
secretary of state lobbied for more engagement in the isthmus, “to protect the interests of 
commerce” (New York Times 1965, 1). 57  In fact, Seward advocated the idea of economic 
union with Mexico and Central America over fifteen years before Secretary of State 
James Blaine proposed it in 1881.  The more pressing issues of post-Civil War politics, 
especially Reconstruction, however, took priority over the contentious subject of 
economic union with Latin American countries. As a result, the idea lost priority in 
governmental policy circles until Blain resurrected the concept of union and 
messianically for it when he became secretary of state under President James A. Garfield 
(1881-1881).                
Diplomats were not the only ones to understand the strategic importance of the 
isthmus.  William Walker, a Tennessean filibuster, invaded Central America a number of 
times as early as the mid 1800s.  Cornelius Vanderbilt, looking for a route between the 
Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, financed Walker’s expeditions.  Walker was so 
successful that he became president of Nicaragua (1856-1857) until an alliance of Central 
American forces, coupled with Vanderbilt’s decision to stop monetarily funding the 
filibuster, pushed him out.  The uniting of Central American forces, particularly those 
from Cost Rica and Nicaragua, demonstrated that the republics could come together for 
common interests.  After being captured by the British and subsequently handed over to 
the Honduran government, a firing squad killed Walker in 1860 (for more information on 
William Walker, see Scroogs 1916).  
Military strategists further highlighted the regional importance of Central 
America.  The publication of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 by 
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Alfred T. Mahan ([1890] 1989) emphasized the imminent need for not only an isthmus 
canal, but also military bases.  Mahan’s writings significantly influenced future policy 
makers such as future Secretary of State James G. Blaine and a young Theodore 
Roosevelt, whom Mahan befriended at the Naval War College in 1887.  Although the two 
often disagreed on a number of issues such as the size of battleships, Mahan’s research 
shaped the future president’s perception on Central America (Seager II and Maguire 
1975; Turk 1987).  The Influence of Sea Power, originally published in 1890, compared 
the Central American isthmus and Caribbean islanders to the area of the Mediterranean 
during the rise of the Roman Empire.  Essentially, Central America and the Caribbean 
would be strategically important for military and commercial superiority for Washington 
as the Mediterranean Sea and its islands were strategically important for Rome.  The 
strategic areas, therefore, had to be controlled by future U.S. administrations in order to 
dominate the Americas.   
  Mexico also had its own strategic interests. The Mexican government opposed 
regional instability and the expansionist policies of pro-Central American union 
enthusiasts.  Mexico feared a tightly-united Central America next door, especially with 
powerful Guatemalan leaders at its helm.  President Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-1885), 
with whom Mexico continually experienced border conflicts, emerged as one of the most 
formidable opponents against the Mexican government due to the president’s messianic 
efforts to unite the isthmus.  Barrios envisioned himself as the leader, natural “savior” 
and “protector” of a united Central America, and militantly tried to achieve that goal 
(Jeneral 1878).  In fact, the Guatemalan government, in a direct attack on the Mexican 
government’s authority, supported uprisings in indigenous-populated state of Chiapas, 
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contributing to internal Mexican instability (Mares 2001).  In order to curtail Barrios’ 
ambitions and dreams of a united isthmus, Mexican President Porfirio Díaz sent troops to 
Guatemala and El Salvador to assist anti-Central American unionists (Salisbury 1989).  
The Mexican government, albeit successful in undermining any pro-unionist tendencies 
and curtailing the unrest in Chiapas, still failed to achieve regional stability. Therefore, 
mediation with the United States appeared to be the only viable alternative.  Mexico also 
saw the CACJ as a buffer zone against increasing U.S. expansion.  Mexico lost half of its 
land with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 in the aftermath of the 
Mexican-American War (1846-1848).     
In addition to the United States and Mexico, Central Americans had self-interest 
in ending war and creating stability.  Central America had become embroiled in 
intractable conflict since independence in 1821.  Although the region gained its 
independence from Spain with little violence, conflict and war followed the years after 
independence.  Even under the legally-united Federal Republic of Central American 
(1823-1840), the different regions became embroiled in heated conflict over ideological 
clashes, regional borders and power struggles.  Although the conflicts were quite 
persistent and bloody, no one ruler or political faction was able to take power and create 
stability.  One of the deadliest and longest conflicts engulfing the isthmus took place in 
Guatemala in the 1830s.  Guatemalan strongmen José Francisco Barrundia, who was 
supported by liberal political factions, engaged in a power struggle with Rafael Carrera, 
who was supported in turn by conservatives and indigenous groups.  The conflict 
continued until Barrundia, in a last ditch effort to finally defeat Carrera, invoked the 
support of Francisco Morazán, the president of the ailing Central American Federation.  
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In 1938, Morazán, with the assistance of roughly 1,000 troops, rode into Guatemala and 
squelched the Carrera-led guerilla rebellion (Lynch 1992).  Morazán, taking control of 
the region, however, failed to impose peace and order.  He ruled with repression and 
brutality until Carrera, who also employed “terrorism and a demonstration of savagery,” 
gained control of Guatemala City; this disorder gave the other republics the opportunity 
to declare their independence, marking the end of the federation (Ibid 380).  After 
breaking into separate nations, regional conflicts not only persisted, but grew into full-
scale wars.  A succession of Central American wars in 1863, 1876, 1885, 1906, and 1907 
engulfed the region.     
The Spirit of International Arbitration and Regionalization  
Self-interest, however, was not the only political force to create the CACJ.  A 
certain value for replacing bellicosity with diplomacy, armaments with supra-national 
organizations, and war with judicial settlement existed.  The Pan-American Conference 
(1889-90), The Hague Conventions (1899), and various South and Central American 
conferences embodied this spirit of peace.  Although these conferences were blemished 
with obvious self-interest on the part of the different countries involved, participants 
deeply believed that they could pave a way for peace.  
The Pan-American Conference took place in October of 1889 after the persistent 
urging of Secretary of State James Blaine.  Blaine, lobbying the U.S. government for a 
hemispheric conference since his first stint as Secretary of State under President James A. 
Garfield (1981), saw the United States as the natural protector of the American 
hemisphere and his work was a diplomatic effort to undermine European interventionism 
in the Americas.  The United States was “the natural protector of the integrity of the 
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Central American territory,” he declared right before the Pan-American Conference 
convened (Lafeber 1993, 33).  Although a principal objective of the conference was to 
ward off European intervention, the convention embodied the idea that peace could be 
achieved through means other than war and conflict.  The Secretary of State’s vision, 
therefore, included the creation of inter-American institutions, the harmonization of 
political policies and trade practices, and the general strengthening of the relations 
between countries throughout the hemisphere.  Many Latin Americans also shared 
Blaine’s vision.  Matías Romero, a Mexican diplomat fearful of European intervention, 
lobbied Washington to intervene when the French attacked Mexico in 1862.  Romero 
argued that the French were in violation of the Monroe Doctrine (Schoonover 1986).   
Romero, however, was apprehensive of U.S. power and influence over the 
conference and region as a whole. He recognized that both countries’ interests were often 
at odds.  Romero (1898), for example, attacked Washington’s efforts to settle the border 
disputes between Mexico and Guatemala, noting that the attempt was discarded due to 
being “unfavorable to the rights of Mexico” (627).  Nonetheless, as the second vice-
president to the Pan-American Conference, Romero saw international institution 
building, in lieu of war, as a way to reach peaceful coexistence in the hemisphere.  He 
also witnessed Blaine’s flexibility not only to comprise on important conference issues, 
but allow Latin Americans to advance their own ideas to solve hemispheric problems 
(Healy 2001).  Romero, therefore, participated actively on the Mexican side.  He initiated 
a number of ideas, including a customs union and inter-American commission for trade 
statistics in order to tighten hemispheric relations (Marichal 2002).   
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Exactly ten years later, The Hague Convention marked a historic time for 
international relations.  Initiated by Nicholas Czar II, The Hague Conventions entailed a 
number of meetings and concomitant treaties that would offer, using the Russian 
Emperor’s words, “The maintenance of general peace, and a possible reduction of the 
excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations” (Avalon Project n.d.b).  The 
different treaties established various principles regarding the “Laws of War,” including 
the peaceful settlement and arbitration for international conflicts, the codification of laws 
during land wars, and the adaptation of maritime warfare principles.
 58
 
 
 
Critics have leveled credible objections against The Hague Conventions and the 
first Pan-American Conference.  First, critics of the Hague Convention questioned its 
utility.  Few international institutions actually materialized, organizational procedures 
marginalized smaller states, and there was simply no international executive force to 
enforce the rules of the established treaties and agreements.  “It did not even approve a 
U.S. proposal for a court of neutral nations to arbitrate disputes,” laments prominent 
diplomatic historian George C Herring (2008), referring to the original convention.  As 
for the Pan-American Conference, many Latin American skeptics perceived it as a 
vehicle for U.S. imperialism.  Prominent Latin Americans such as Cuban nationalist José 
Martí, who actually participated in the conference, feared U.S. military adventurism into 
Latin American affairs (see Fernández Retamar 2006).  
Furthermore, international institutions have come under attack by many 
prominent academics. “Realist” international relations scholars have developed a large 
and influential body of literature that challenges the liberal ideas concerning the utility of 
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supranational institutions such as the United Nations and League of Nations.  Although it 
is not possible to consider realism as a single-body of thought and space constraints do 
not allow for an in-depth analysis here, one essential point on which they agree is that the 
principal problem with the international system is anarchy (for an in-depth study on the 
variants of realism, see Doyle, 1997, 41-195).  Unlike the domestic sphere, which has the 
policing capabilities to make citizens comply with domestic laws, the international sphere 
lacks any comparable bodies to control or even monitor the behavior of states.  There is 
simply no governing body or force that can compel states to comply with international 
treaties, laws, and institutions in the first place.  International institutions, therefore, do 
not have the authority to enforce their own rules.  “International politics,” Hans 
Morgenthau ([1948] 2006), one of the pioneers of classical realism, reminds us, “cannot 
be reduced to legal rules and institutions” (18). 
David R. Mares (2001), drawing upon the realist premise, stresses the increasing 
reliance on negotiation and conventions, supported by both regional and extra-regional 
actors, but the paradoxical increase in bloodshed.  “Between 1826 and 1889 at least 50 
conventions among Latin American states forswore the use of force to resolve disputes,” 
Mares (2001) laments, “[y]et this was the period of the bloodiest wars” (48).  
International relations scholar Robert Keohane offers an even more critical review.  
Although Keohane believes institutions can be useful in facilitating cooperation among 
countries (see Keohane 1984 and Keohane and Nye 2011), he finds that Latin America 
has historically failed at contributing to supra-national institutional building. “Latin 
American countries are takers, instead of makers, of international policy,” Keohane 
(2000) claims, “[t]hey have relatively little influence in international institutions” (211).   
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Although criticisms against The Hague Conventions, Pan-American Conferences, 
and Latin American institutions in general are legitimate, they suffer from serious 
weaknesses.  First, criticism fails to consider the success of diplomatic efforts and 
international institutions.  These successes often attract little scholarly attention, whereas 
the failures draw more scrutiny.  The League of Nations is a common case.  Scholars 
often cite the League’s failure to stop Benito Mussolini’s Italy from invading Ethiopia, 
then known as Abyssinia, in 1935 (For a study on the inability of international 
institutions to facilitate peace, see Mearsheimer 1994/1995).  However, the League’s 
success in not only negotiating conflict between Colombia and Peru (1932-1933), but 
also taking over Leticia and returning the disputed area to Colombia after the ceasefire 
negotiations, attracts scant attention.  As with the League of Nations, many scholars note 
the ultimate demise of the CACJ, but neglect its successes and potential importance for 
international law and institution building.        
More importantly, criticism fails to contextualize the internationalist zeitgeist 
surrounding the rise of international institutions during the turn of the twentieth century.  
Peace organizations and trans-national movements became a ubiquitous presence in the 
turn of the twentieth century.  These movements, united by their unwavering optimistic 
belief in human nature, progress, and international law, had significant influence over 
governmental policies.  The Quakers, a pacifist protestant group (Members of the Society 
of Friends) based in United States, were a principal force.  They played an integral role in 
lobbying for peace and diplomacy.  “It goes without saying that the Quakers are out in 
full force,” wrote the American Ambassador for the 1899 Hague meeting, “[t]he number 
of people with plans, schemes, notions, nostrums, whimsies of all sorts, who press upon 
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us and try to take our time, is enormous” (Best 1999, 623).  Such peace movements swept 
the globe.  Austrian activist and novelist Bertha von Suttner played a prominent role, 
lobbying governments to support the initial Hague Conference and to create the Nobel 
Peace Prize, which she won in 1905 (Haberman 1972).  
The spirit of trans-nationalism and supra-national institutions took hold in Latin 
America as well.  Latin American women, alongside their North American and European 
counterparts, played a principal role in the formation of pan-American and supra-national 
conventions.
59
  Activists such as the Brazilian scientist Constance Barbosa Rodrigues, a 
major participant in the Third Latin American Scientific Congress (1905), and Chilean 
educator Amanda Labarca, the president of Consejo Nacional de Mujeres and an activist 
in a number of trans-national congresses, helped facilitate the development of inter-
American relations (Miller 1991).  They believed increased relations could create better 
cooperation among states.       
The Central Americans involved in the creation of the CACJ viewed the Court as 
a child of the peace movement and an extension of the earlier international conventions.  
As Manuel Castro Ramírez (1918), a Salvadoran magistrate who spent five years on the 
Court, observed, “The world was feeling the urgent need to stop the whirlwinds of war 
that have threatened the foundations of civilization.”  In his memoirs, Ramirez (1918) 
defined the CACJ as a superior expansion of the Hague Conventions, one in which all the 
Central American republics would rely on to resolve their grievances.  Other noted 
Central American legal scholars such as Alfredo Martinez Moreno (1957) and Luis Pasos 
Arguello (1986) echoed similar sentiments by connecting the CACJ with the world peace 
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movement.  They observed that the zeitgeist of peace and institutionalism injected the 
region with feelings of optimism towards ending conflict through peaceful means.                  
Although the exact extent to which the movement affected the region and 
promoted peace can never be known, it did influence a large number of both private and 
public citizens.  Famed Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío (1867-1916) was a strong advocate 
for replacing conflict with international institutions.  He traveled and lectured the 
Americas for the cause of peace.  “Señor Darío is now in this country on a lecture-tour,” 
commented the New York Times on one the poet’s many visits, “in the interests of 
international peace” (Fay 1942, 642).  Other Central Americans such as Honduran 
diplomat Carlos Gutiérrez Lozano and jurist Mariano Vásquez, who later became an 
outspoken supporter of the CACJ, published and lectured on the instrumental role of 
trans-national relations and institutions (see Rosa Bautista 2005).  These influential 
Central American activists lobbied strongly for the creation of inter-American 
conventions, supra-national institutions and international law in order to modify the 
bellicose relations between states and create the conditions to advance more pacific 
coexistence.  In fact, Central American governments had already begun to initiate 
regional institutional building prior to the CACJ.  In 1889, the same year as the First Pan-
American Conference, the Central American republics came together in San Salvador for 
the Third Central American Congress.  This third effort to hammer out regional peace 
agreements culminated in the Provisional Union Pact of Central American States.  With 
twenty seven written articles, the Union’s goal was to create the National Executive and 
other adjudicating bodies to curb the escalating conflicts between the republics (Dieta 
Centro-Americana 1889).  Although these initiatives failed to reconstitute the union, the 
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Central Americans’ consistent labors to create and sustain supra-national bodies not only 
reflect a belief in pacifism through international institutions, but also helped set the path 
towards the creation of the CACJ.           
In addition to dismissing the international zeitgeist of peace, criticism fails to 
explain how Latin American countries were able to take advantage of internationalism to 
defend their sovereignty and independence against the growing power of the United 
States.  Initially, the young, newly independent Latin American nations looked towards 
the United States for protection against not only foreign powers, but also themselves.  As 
early as 1822, El Salvador, in fear of Mexican expansion after the coronation of Emperor 
Agustín Iturbide, requested U.S. annexation (Bancroft 1887).  Nicaragua also looked 
towards the United States for help balancing not only Mexico, but also the encroaching 
power of Great Britain, which robbed Nicaragua of the Mosquito Coast, Nicaragua’s 
outlet to the Atlantic Ocean (Zamora 1995).  Nicaragua requested US aid and 
intervention to curb Great Britain’s penetration into the country.  Latin Americans, 
however, grew increasingly more apprehensive and skeptical of their northern neighbor’s 
intentions and expansionism.         
During the time of the first Pan-American Conference, there were a number of 
conventions that reflected this apprehension.  These initiatives aimed to control U.S. 
influence.  El Congreso Jurídico Sudamericano (1889), held exclusively between South 
American states in Montevideo, had the principal objective of creating not only inter-
state bodies to facilitate the development of inter-American laws and stability, but also 
international investment regulation restricting Washington from interfering into their 
domestic politics.  Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat who wrote El derecho 
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internacional teórico y práctico in 1868, played a significant part in this Latin American 
internationalism. A number of South American countries wrote his “Calvo Doctrine,” a 
doctrine of non-intervention, into their national constitutions to limit U.S. interventionism 
(see Calvo 1868).  In fact, the documentation of the inter-American conferences also 
emphasized the growth of U.S. militarism (Ramírez 1871).  The United States, once 
viewed as a potential protector, progressively became perceived as the principle threat.
60
     
Central America was not different from its South American neighbors.  The 
republics also tried to use regional agreements and conventions to resolve disputes, 
specifically without U.S. intervention.  The Matus-Pacheco Convention (1896), named 
after the Nicaraguan and Costa Rican representatives Manuel Coronel Matus and 
Leónidas Pacheco respectively, succeeded in defining the gelatinous borders between 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
61
  With the 1823 Costa Rican annexation of Guanacaste and 
Nicoya, two tracks of land that had previously been parts of Nicaraguan territory, border 
disputes erupted (see Bolívar Juárez 2011).  Initiated and mediated by El Salvador, the 
Convention finally succeeded in defining the contentious borders.  This convention was 
instrumental for Central American conflict resolution because it compensated for the 
failure of a previous attempts initiated by foreign powers.  The United States and Great 
Britain had previously initiated the Webster-Campton Convention (1892) to address these 
issues.  However, the convention was tainted by obvious US and British interests, 
particularly canal building and British interests in Nicaragua’s Pacific coast.  Nicaragua 
ultimately rejected the convention for these reasons.   
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Central American governments continued to initiate local agreements to resolve 
their own conflicts.  Nicaraguan liberal dictator José Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) sought a 
number of regional agreements to strengthen Central American union and fend off 
expanding U.S. intervention.  Building upon the tenuous Central American solidarity that 
persisted despite years of internecine conflicts, Zelaya was even able to establish, at least 
on paper, the Central American Tribunal through a series of conferences that took place 
in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto in 1902.  Although the Corinto treaties failed to 
establish anything concrete, it did show that the republics still had not only a strong sense 
of Central American identity, but also a desire to create some type of regional integration 
in order to settle their own disputes.  This desire, along with the mediation of Mexico and 
the United States, culminated in the creation of CACJ.       
The Court Begins 
In a telegram dated May 7, 1907, Secretary of State Elihu Root extolled the 
creation of the Central American Court of Justice.  “[T]he United States will be 
represented on this important and auspicious occasion,” he wrote to Louis Anderson, 
Costa Rica’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to the Court’s inauguration, “which 
marks so great a step toward permanent peace, progress, and prosperity” (U.S. 
Department of State 1908).  The Central American signatory republics expressed their 
praise as well by promptly sending congratulatory and appreciative telegrams to 
Secretary of State Root, President Theodore Roosevelt, and the President of Mexico.  
“The names of Roosevelt and [Porfírio] Diaz will always be remembered,” the Foreign 
Affairs Minister for Cost Rica, Don Luis Andersen, said addressing the Washington 
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Conference, “with gratitude by the humble citizens of those countries” (Scott 1908, 121-
143).   
Although Root’s diplomatic adulation may appear unrealistically optimistic, the 
creation of the CACJ gave the participatory nations something to cheer about.  Only a 
year earlier, the republics were embroiled in the Second (1906) and the Third (1907) 
Central American Wars.
62
  Although the Central American conflicts had a number of 
causes such as disputes over borders and unionism, the last two wars were essentially 
regional power struggles between Zelaya and Cabrera.  Since Nicaragua and Guatemala 
do not share borders, the conflicts engulfed El Salvador and Honduras, creating further 
regional bloodshed.  What is more, at the time of the Court’s creation, Honduras had just 
attacked Nicaragua.  In the beginning of 1907, the Honduran military attacked the 
Nicaraguan border town Los Calpules, killed two Nicaraguan soldiers, and occupied the 
area for three days until the Nicaraguan army drove them out (Barbosa Miranda 2010).    
Taking into account the historical fighting, convening all the republics in 
Washington for the Central American Peace Conference (1907) was a major 
accomplishment.  The signing of the treaties in Washington (1907) and the physical 
creation of the Court (1908) were further steps in the direction towards diplomacy and 
peace.  Even Zelaya (1907), a vociferous opponent of U.S. imperialism, lauded the 
diplomatic efforts of President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Root, and Andrew Carnegie 
for engaging the region and overseeing the creation of the CACJ.  Although Central 
Americans still remained skeptical of U.S. intentions, Washington’s efforts did elicit 
some good will from the republics.  The United States, due to its productive role in help 
convening the Central American republics, became the guarantor of the Court.   
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Unlike other agreements preceding the CACJ, the treaties binding the Central 
American republics together were more progressive and special for several reasons.  
First, the CACJ was the first international court of justice to which states would actually 
suspend their sovereignty and submit all complaints for judicial review.  This step is 
significant because since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the beginning of the modern 
state system, countries have jealously guarded their sovereignty and been reluctant to 
allow an international body to judge their actions.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
which borne out of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, failed to become a world court or 
even arbitral supranational body due to the bickering of the member states (Kirgis 1996). 
The Central American Court, however, achieved the status of being the world’s first 
court.  “Inside the international arena there is nothing that resembles this Court,” wrote 
Brazilian internationalist and legal scholar Joaquín Tabuco to the Nicaraguan 
representative in 1908, “it is not only completely original, but also a type of institution 
that will endure” (Arguello 1986, 16).  
In addition to being the first international court, the unprecedented scope of the 
Court’s jurisdiction represented a strong sense of solidarity between the signatory 
republics.  Not only did the adjudicating body exercise juridical rights over the five 
signatory republics, but also authority over external conflicts between a Central American 
country and another country outside the region.  Article IV of the CACJ stipulated: “The 
Court can likewise take cognizance of the international questions which by special 
agreement any one of the Central American Governments and a foreign Government may 
have determined to submit” (American Journal of International Law 1908a, 232-233).  
This article is significant because it expanded the extent of the Court’s jurisdiction, which 
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meant any and all conflicts among the republics would be under the CACJ’s purview, and 
recognized the need to modify foreign intervention in the isthmus.     
Moreover, individual citizens had the right to submit complaints to the Court.  If a 
Central American citizen believed her or his rights related to those laid out in the treaties 
were in violation, she or he could turn to the CACJ.  “This court shall also take 
cognizance of the questions which individuals of one Central American country may 
raise against any of the other contracting governments . . .,” Article II concerned Central 
American citizens, “and provided that the remedies which the laws of the respective 
country provide against such violation shall have been exhausted or that denial of justice 
shall have been shown” (Ibid 232-233).  The six cases brought to the by individuals did 
not rule in favor of the individuals. The CACJ stated that Central American citizens 
needed to exhaust their judicial rights in the local courts before the CACJ could rule in 
their favor.   Nonetheless, the fact that the court mentions “denial of justice” for 
individuals in an international treaty is extremely progressive.  Treaties merely focused 
more on “high politics”—questions of immediate state security—when countries entered 
into agreements.  The Hague even failed to seriously take up the issue of human rights 
until the 1980s, almost one hundred years later. Article III of the CACJ, however, 
continues to support individual rights: “It shall also have jurisdiction over cases arising 
between any of the contracting governments and individuals, when by common accord 
they are submitted to it” (Ibid 232-233). 
Finally, the Court, if it had survived, could have been a source of international 
law.  Lacking an international legislative body, international law is principally created by 
five sources: the customs and practices established by state behavior; international 
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treaties and conventions; principles of international law generally recognized by nation-
states; international judicial rulings; and, for additional support, the teaching and 
publications of judicial scholars.  The Central American republics created the CACJ to 
solve specific regional issues and establish acceptable norms of behavior.  In fact, the 
Central American magistrates had the autonomy to develop the articles and laws with 
little interference from Mexico and the United States.  Many of the issues addressed, 
however, were common among states far beyond not only the Central American region, 
but also the limited time-frame in which the Court operated.  These problems included 
respecting established borders, the principal of non-intervention, treaty engagement, and 
the security dilemma.
63
  Therefore, the Court’s decisions and Central American 
republics’ behavior had the potential to shape international law and set precedents for 
future cases and practices. 
The First Case and the Court’s Accomplishment 
The first case brought to the CACJ entailed a reoccurring problem among not 
only the Central American republics, but states in general: the interference of one state 
into the domestic politics of another.  Less than two months after the Court officially 
opened on May 25
th
, 1908, Honduran President Miguel R. Dávila accused the 
governments of Guatemala and El Salvador of intervening in its domestic affairs.  The 
government complained first that El Salvador had given disposed Honduran president 
General Manual Bonillo (1903-1907) exile and had been training both Salvadoran and 
Honduran guerillas to help him invade the country.  Honduras specifically cited 
Salvadoran General Fernando Figueroa and Honduran General Pedro Romero of not only 
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training the forces alongside the border with El Salvador, but also invading Honduran 
territory in Choluteca.  The government continued to accuse Guatemala of also training 
exiled Honduran forces on its territory in Santa Barbara to assist the invaders from El 
Salvador (Carranza Ernesto 1908).  The overall motive behind the defendants’ behavior, 
Honduras noted, was their enmity for the new Honduran government.  Based on the case 
submitted to the CACJ on the part of Honduras, both El Salvador and Guatemala viewed 
President Dávila as too friendly towards Nicaragua, their enemy at the time.  The goal 
then was to overthrow the Honduran government in order to install Bonillo   As a result 
of this clandestine activity,  Honduras rested its case on the idea that the republics’ 
actions were not consistent with the articles of the CACJ conventions, which stipulated 
non-intervention and neutrality.   
Nicaragua sided with Honduras in the diplomatic debate.  Having strong relations 
with the Honduran government at the time, Nicaragua was fearful of the interventionist 
behavior of Guatemala and El Salvador.  Two months after Honduras, the Nicaraguan 
government submitted a similar complaint.  Drawing upon the same argument of 
Honduras, Nicaragua advanced its own evidence demonstrating that both El Salvador and 
Guatemala were in clear violation of the conventions for harboring exiles.  Nicaragua 
specifically cited the presence of General Bonillo and Honduran revolutionary Augusto 
C. Coello in El Salvador where they was gathering force with the intent to overthrow the 
Honduran government (Madriz 1908).  Nicaragua concluded that both El Salvador and 
Guatemala must cease their support for illegal revolutionary activities.    
El Salvador and Guatemala, however, denied the accusations.   Both countries, 
first, simply noted that there was a clear the lack of evidence in the Honduran 
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government’s official complaint.  “Never has my Government known such intentions,” 
the Guatemala government stated over the accusations (Defensa 1908, 30).  Guatemala 
further argued that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to review the case, noting that 
Guatemala’s behavior within its own territory was a matter of state sovereignty (Ibid).  
The Court did not have the right, therefore, to regulate the country’s domestic policies.  
The government concluded its defense by averring that it simply did not have enough 
Honduran exiles to invade the country in the first place.  “The Hondurean exiles living in 
this Republic are very few,” the Guatemalan diplomatic cable read, “and they live, not 
under the protection of the Government, but on their own resources or personal work” 
(Ibid, 35).  El Salvador echoed the same argument.  The government refused to recognize 
that it was assisting Honduran and Salvadoran rebels.  In fact, the Salvadoran government 
pointed out, if it had wanted to invade Honduras and overthrow Bonillo, it could have 
done it already and succeeded.  On the contrary, El Salvador concluded, it was firmly 
keeping the faith of neutrality (Demanda 1908).       
The Court’s initial complaint was a crucial test.  Geographically strategic, 
Honduras had been the only Central American country sharing land borders with the 
other warring republics.  Guatemala and Nicaragua historically meddled in the country’s 
affairs in order to impose a government sympathetic to their side of the conflict.  In fact, 
Article III of the Convention recognized that, due to the country’s strategic geographical 
position, Honduras had experienced the most conflict.  This issue was at the very essence 
of the first case.  After General Manuel Bonilla had lost power in Honduras in1907, both 
El Salvador and Guatemala perceived a threat in the new government, one of which they 
connected to the interests of Nicaragua in the regional power struggle (Ibid).  War, as in 
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the previous decades, appeared inevitable.  Could the Court create conditions for peaceful 
settlement?      
The CACJ proved competent to settle this sensitive dispute between the three 
republics.  First, the CACJ provided official diplomatic channels through which each 
state could advance arguments and an official inter-state body that would collect, 
organize, and review them.  In fact, the first case’s primary documents show that the 
Court had facilitated the communication between the countries involved.  There were 
hundreds of telegrams between the republics trying to settle the dispute (see Honduras v. 
Salvador and Guatemala 1908).  Prior to the Court, the region lacked diplomatic 
channels to review complaints.  The republics relied only on intermittent conferences 
sponsored by the United States, Mexico, or each other.  The CACJ, however, promoted 
the communication and diplomatic negotiations that allowed for the mediation of the 
conflict.  Although the Court observed that Honduras did not advance substantial 
evidence, the CACJ judges conceded that the defendants had to alter their behavior 
towards Honduras.   
Many scholars, however, have underestimated The Court’s role. Thomas L. 
Karnes (1976), one of the last U.S. scholars to discuss the Court, wrote, “[The Court] 
ruled that El Salvador and Guatemala were not responsible for aiding Honduran 
revolutionaries; governments could not be held liable for acts of faction” (195).  Albeit 
Karnes (1976) recognized that the Court, “acted promptly and decisively,” he notes that 
the Court was essentially a failure (195).  His depiction of events, however, not only fails 
to take into account the mandate the Court leveled against El Salvador and Guatemala, 
but also their positive response to ameliorate the crisis.  The Court ordered following: 1) 
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To halt any interference in the internal affairs of Honduras; 2) disarm any revolutionaries 
aiming to enter Honduran territory with the intent to destabilize the government; 3) 
prevent any preparation of movements within their territories that intend to destabilize 
Honduras; 4) discharge any service officers that are Central American emigrants and 
maintain vigilance over them; 5) and decrease their number of armed forces, especially 
those aligned at the frontier with Honduras; 6) remain neutral, as required in Article II of 
the Washington Convention (American Journal of International Law 1908b, 840).        
The initial case proved to be a success.  First, it assisted in averting war.  
Previously, war immediately engulfed Central America when power struggles emerged.  
El Salvador and Guatemala, however, changed their behavior toward Honduras.  Both 
reluctantly agreed to withdraw troops from the border and not contact Honduran exiles, 
conforming to the demands outlined above (Defensa 1908).  The revolutionary 
movements in Honduras subsided.  President Dávila weathered the revolutionary storm.  
Second, the case gave Central America, the Court, and the idea of internationalism a 
moment of credibility.  Media outlets and scholars following the Court’s first case lauded 
its ability to act and mediate conflict (See, for example, New York Times 1918). 
Moreover, the case suggests that supra-national institutions, under certain 
conditions, can modify state behavior.  Contra realism, increasing diplomatic channels, 
communication, and international regimes can reduce tension and possibly war.  The first 
case, therefore, gives credibility to institutional liberal scholars.  As with realism, 
institutional liberalism is not a homogeneous group.
64
  However, the theory’s importance 
here lies in its emphasis on international institutions and regimes.  Liberal scholars 
                                                          
64
 The research on international liberalism is quite vast. See Doyle (1997, pp. 205-301), for an in-depth 
analysis. 
111 
 
observe that albeit there is an absence of international authority, institutions can 
nonetheless promote cooperation through the process of integration in supra-national 
bodies such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  Although the CACJ had never been close to the depth and scope of the 
organization and union mentioned above, it did provide an important framework which 
proved to facilitate regional mediation and the reduction of tension among participants.  
Central America was on the right path to an ever closer union.                 
The most important accomplishment of the Court, however, was that it created the 
conditions under which the Central American republics could negotiate settlements 
without the interference of foreign powers.  Only two years earlier, the Central American 
republics stepped aboard the USS Marblehead to have the United States mediate a 
conflict (Salisbury 1989).  However, the first case was managed completely by the 
Central Americans themselves.  The CACJ, therefore, was a success not only for 
negotiating peace, but also for keeping Washington out of their affairs.  
U.S. Intervention: The Bad Neighbor Policy 
Unfortunately, the Court did not control U.S. intervention for long.  When Zelaya 
considered inter-oceanic canal deals with Japan and Germany, President William Howard 
Taft (1909) became incensed.  In fact, the president attacked Zelaya in his first annual 
message to congress.  Washington wanted to be the sole power in the region.  In 1909, 
the Taft Administration supported a group of local conservatives to overthrow Zelaya and 
sent the marines to protect the rebels.  The “Knox note,” named after Secretary of State 
Philander C. Knox, gave the direct order for Zelaya and his officials to step down (see 
Knox 1910).  Washington did not stop with Nicaragua.  In 1911, the United States also 
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intervened in Honduran politics and removed President Dávila, whom the Court saved 
just years before, and installed former President Manuel Bonilla.           
Washington lost any regional good will it originally earned overseeing the 
creation of the CACJ.  First, several Latin American newspapers negatively covered the 
story, depicting Zelaya’s removal as another “yanqui” intervention (see, for example, El 
País 1909).  Furthermore, the Nicaraguan population loathed the government the United 
States installed. President Taft even had to dispatch 26,000 American troops in 1912 in 
order to protect President Adolfo Díaz from revolt.  When Elliot Northcott, a U.S. 
minister, toured Nicaragua, the antipathy he felt from the Nicaraguans shocked him: 
“[T]he natural sentiment of an overwhelming majority of Nicaraguans is antagonistic to 
the United States” (LaFeber 1993, 219).  
Washington initiated a series of meetings with Nicaraguan officials in order to 
ensure that future governments would not flirt with the idea of constructing inter-oceanic 
canals.  These meetings resulted in the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.  Signed between 
President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and General 
Don Emiliano Chamorro on August 5, 1914, the treaty granted the United States the 
exclusionary rights to construct a canal and the right to build navy bases in the Gulf of 
Fonseca with a lease of 99 years (Republic of El Salvador 1917).  The Bryan-Chamorro 
Treaty became a source of contention for the other republics, as well as Mexico, which 
perceived the agreement as continued expansionism into the Americas (Serrano 1994).  
With Mexico unable to advance a formal complaint to the Court, the two principle 
plaintiffs against the treaty were Cost Rica and El Salvador.  They both brought two 
individual cases to the CACJ.  Nicaragua was the sole defendant in both cases.   
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El Salvador vs. Nicaragua 
On August 28
th
, 1916, El Salvador advanced a complaint against Nicaragua 
before the CACJ.  The government’s paramount concern focused on the 99 year lease of 
a U.S. naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca.  El Salvador’s complaint was twofold.  First, 
allowing the presence of a U.S. naval base constituted an imminent threat to the state of 
El Salvador.  In fact, El Salvador even went so far as to classify the naval base a 
“menace” (New York Times 1917).  Second, the Gulf of Fonseca, the water area in which 
the agreement would establish the base, had co-ownership between the two countries, as 
well as with Honduras.  Therefore, the government of El Salvador argued that, 
attributable to this co-ownership, Nicaragua had no right to enter into an accord with a 
third party without its consent (Republic of El Salvador 1917).  
El Salvador’s complaints had intellectual roots, reflecting not only the use of 
international law at the time, but also the potential to develop future international law.  
First, El Salvador, through the Chargé d’ Affaires Dr. Don Gregorio Martin, built its case 
from two preceding territorial disputes: the Agadir crisis and the Magdalena Bay case.  
The former involved the international protests on the part of Great Britain and France 
when Germany sent a gunboat to the Moroccan coastal port of Agadir in 1911.  Since 
France had violated a previous agreement, the Algeciras Accord, Germany dispatched the 
Panther to the port in order to demonstrate its mettle against the violator.  France, 
however, objected to the foreign naval presence near its shores since it had administrative 
control over Morocco (Kissinger 1995).  To the surprise of Germany, its principle ally 
Austria, along with Great Britain, took the side of France over the Kaiser.  As a result, 
this case offered El Salvador a precedent concerning the presence of a foreign military at 
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the country’s shores.  The latter case entailed the leasing of Mexican coastal lands to U.S. 
commercial interests.  A private U.S. company secured Japan to assist in commercial 
activities in the area.  Although the Japanese government did not sponsor the aid, having 
Japanese activities so close to the United States provoked an outcry by Washington and 
the concomitant Lodge Resolution.  The United States recognized, “when any harbor or 
other place in the American continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval 
or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United 
States” (American Journal of International Law 1912, 938). 
El Salvador continued to argue that Nicaragua lacked sufficient clearance in 
nautical miles.  The Salvadoran government demonstrated that the measurements 
between the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan coasts and islands failed to meet the conditional 
fixed ten-mile route, the historically recognized length between coastal nations that 
would allow Nicaragua to claim the Gulf as its own territory.  El Salvador utilized the 
writings of Cornelis Bynkerschoek, a Dutch jurist and international lawyer who helped 
develop the law of the sea, to show that Nicaragua failed to meet the customary standards 
established in the practice of state behavior (Republic of El Salvador 1917).  As a result, 
Nicaragua was not the legal owner of the bay and did not, thus, exercise the privilege to 
establish the naval base.  El Salvador further argued that the bay was under co-ownership.  
The government asserted that after independence, the Central American republics formed 
an internationally recognized union.  Therefore, the Gulf of Fonseca constituted a legal 
“historic bay.”  This meant that El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras exercised joint 
sovereignty over the Gulf.  El Salvador cited other Historic Bays, such as those of 
Delaware and Chesapeake (Ibid).         
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Finally, El Salvador pre-empted Nicaragua’s most persuasive argument: 
sovereignty.  The Salvadoran officials recognized that Nicaragua would simply fall back 
on the argument of sovereignty, meaning that having the naval base and U.S. troops, as 
well as entering the treaty in the first place, remained Nicaragua’s natural sovereign right.  
El Salvador, however, argued the contrary, pointing out that Nicaragua had actually lost 
its sovereignty.  The presence of a foreign military on Central American soil imperiled all 
republics.  “All the lessons the sovereignty of Nicaragua, imposes a sovereign control on 
this country,” El Salvador argued, “therefore, the constitutional order that rests on the 
principle of absolute independence and on the inalienable integrity of its soil” (Ministerio 
de relaciones exteriors 1916, 9).  The overall argument was succinct: the treaty violated 
the country’s rights in the Gulf of Fonseca. “[A] naval station in those waters, by its very 
nature, necessarily compromises the national security of El Salvador,” the government 
asserted, “and, at the same time, nullifies the rights of co-ownership possessed by El 
Salvador in the said gulf” (Republic of El Salvador 1917, 18).   
Nicaragua, however, countered El Salvador’s complaint, pointing out that no 
threat had emerged with the signing of the treaty.  Nicaragua, through its representative 
Dr. Don Manuel Pasos Arana, cited U.S. foreign policy history towards the region, 
stating that the United States historically had not threatened the Central American 
republics in the first place.  Nicaragua continued by demanding proof that the United 
States had inflicted hardships on the Central American people.  In fact, the country 
asserted that U.S. influence had actually benefited the region.  “[The United States] has 
not proven to have been an obstacle to the enjoyment by those Republics of their full 
national life,” the Nicaraguan government wrote in its defense, “there are even cases in 
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which that influence has been beneficient” (Ibid, 20).  As for co-ownership, Nicaragua 
argued that it was not even co-riparian with El Salvador, but Honduras.  Furthermore, the 
previous conflicts El Salvador cited (Agadir and Magdalena) to support its complaint 
were irrelevant for Central American.  According to Nicaragua, those crises entailed the 
power politics of world powers, not small countries.  Nicaragua concluded its defense by 
citing sovereignty.  Regardless of the opinions of neighboring countries, Nicaragua 
remained a sovereign state with the rights conferred on it, including establishing a naval 
base and entering into treaties.  El Salvador did not have the right to intervene. 
The Court’s decision for this case came in a number of parts.  First, the Court had 
the jurisdiction to hear the case, a claim Nicaragua later tried to challenge.  Second, the 
Court denied Nicaragua’s defense and supported El Salvador on the grounds that the 
bases would “menace” neighboring countries and violate co-ownership of the Gulf.  
Finally, the CACJ ruled that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty violated the second and fourth 
articles of the Treaty of Peace and Amity signed between the republics in 1907.  In fact, 
the decision went to great lengths to show that a ruling in favor of Nicaragua would not 
only be inconsistent with the High Bays principle, but would also negatively affect the 
international practice of common waters.  “A change in the theory of the use of the 
common waters of the Gulf . . .,” the Court ruled, “would imply nullification of 
jurisdictional rights that should be exercised with strict equality and in harmony with the 
interests of the community” (Ibid, 57).  As a result, the CACJ held Nicaragua legally 
responsible to suspend the articles of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, which was incongruent 
with the Washington Treaty Conventions.  
 
117 
 
Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua 
Costa Rica also brought a complaint before the Central American Court of 
Justice.  The country objected to two points related to Nicaragua’s engagement with the 
United States.  First, the country objected to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty on the grounds 
that Nicaragua failed to consult the country, as stipulated by The Cañas-Jerez Treaty (or 
Treaty of Limits).  The two countries signed the treaty on April 15, 1858, under the 
guidance of the United States.  Second, Cost Rica asserted that a canal constructed 
through Nicaragua harbored the potential to affect its territory (Republic of Costa Rica 
1916).  
The Cañas-Jerez Treaty was instrumental for Costa Rica’s case.  The treaty laid 
out the regulation regarding the contentiously shared Rio San Juan.  Serving as the border 
between the two countries, the river was and continues to be commercially significant 
since it naturally connects the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean.  The treaty stipulated that 
although the river belonged to Nicaragua, Coats Rica had certain rights to navigate the 
waters.  Cost Rica opined that Nicaragua violated the Cañas-Jerez Treaty.  The treaty 
states that both countries had to enter into mutual negotiations if one wanted to alter the 
arrangement concerning the river (Pérez Zeledón 1887).
 
 Drawing upon the stipulations in 
the treaty, Nicaragua, therefore, could not enter into any agreement with the United States 
“without first hearing the opinion of the Costa Rican government” (Republic of Costa 
Rica 1916, 6).  “The gift of nature” not only gave Costa Rican vessels and merchants the 
international right to navigate through the river, but it also provided a waterway free of 
tolls and other transaction costs.  Furthermore, as in the case of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, Cost Rica also argued that the river was under co-ownership (Ibid, 25-27).  
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Therefore, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty violated the 1858 Treaty and the Washington 
Treaty because it gave Nicaragua dominion over co-owned property and imperiled Costa 
Rica’s right to navigate neighboring waters.      
The government of Cost Rica also pointed out that Nicaragua had not consulted 
its diplomatic officials.  “[The Bryan-Chamorro Teaty] could not have been carried out 
without a flagrant violation of the clear treaties actually in force,” the Costa Rican 
government asserted, “which prevent Nicaragua from entering any interoceanic canal 
agreement without previously consulting Costa Rica” (Ibid, 92-93).  The Costa Ricans 
further affirmed that U.S. President Grover Cleveland had actually accepted and 
legitimized the Cañas-Jerez Treaty.  In fact, the government received The Cleveland 
Award for signing the 1858 treaty.  “The Republic of Nicaragua remains bound not to 
make any grants for canal purposes across her territory,” the award stated, “without first 
asking the opinion of the Republic of Costa Rica, as provided in Article VIII of the 
Treaty of Limits” (Ibid, 7).  In addition to citing the treaty, Costa Rica advanced another 
argument: Nicaragua and the United States actually signed the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 
secrecy.  Costa Rican officials complained to Washington, protesting that they had heard 
of the treaty “in an informal way” and “[s]uch information has caused great surprise to 
my government” (Ibid, 92).  In fact, Costa Rican lawyers actually sifted through 
newspapers concerning the treaty and primary official documents between Nicaragua and 
the United States to support their argument.  In one instance, they found evidence of 
secrecy and the signing of the treaty in the Congressional Record of Washington D.C.  
The U.S. Senate debated and voted on the treaty without the consulting Costa Rica (Ibid, 
22).  Nicaragua, as in the case with El Salvador, offered a succinct rebuttal.  The 
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government conceded that it entered into the treaty in secrecy.  Nicaragua declared, 
however, that it did not ignore the concerns of Costa Rica.  Furthermore, as a sovereign 
country, the Nicaraguans merely exercised their right to enter into an agreement, one of 
which would not cause harm to neighboring territory nor be in “any violation of the 
existing treaties between the two nations” (Ibid, 16). 
The Court rendered its decision on May 1
st
, 1916.  The Court ruled against 
Nicaragua.  The CACJ observed that due to Nicaragua’s entrance into the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty, “existing treaties would be considered to be infringed” (Ibid, 38).  
Nicaragua could not enter into other treaties because it had signed previous treaties (i.e. 
The Cañas-Jerez Treaty).  Therefore, the verdict held the following: “The Governments 
of Costa Rica and Nicaragua are under the obligation to maintain the status quo that 
existed between them prior to the Treaty that gave rise to the present controversy” (Ibid, 
40).  
The Court’s Demise 
Nicaragua’s Minister of Foreign Relations, J.A. Utrecho, nonetheless, rejected the 
Court’s decisions.  Utrecho quickly conveyed his country’s decision to the United States.  
“[T]he powerful and just grounds which have compelled my government,” he wrote in a 
telegram, “to reach the unbreakable resolution to reject the awards rendered by the 
honorable Central American Court” (U.S. Department of State 1917c, 1111).  
Nicaragua’s decision was the first step towards the demise of the Court.  The Court 
depended on a ten year renewal by member states.  The first ten-year period (1908-1918) 
came to an end.  Displeased with the Court’s verdicts, however, Nicaragua, with strong 
U.S. support, refused to sign on for the second ten years.  The other republics expressed 
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disappointment.  Costa Rica tried to renew the Court to no avail (New York Times 1918).  
El Salvador affirmed its “deep pain” over Nicaragua’s decision through correspondence 
with both U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign 
Relations (U.S. Department of State 1917d and 1917e, 31-33).  In fact, even Guatemalan 
President Manuel Estrada Cabrera, against whom the Court ruled in the first case, later 
lauded the CACJ for working with “patriotism” and “good intelligence” on behalf of the 
Central American republics (Cabrera 1916).  
Lament spread beyond Central America.  Newspapers throughout the Americas 
deplored Nicaragua’s rejection of the verdict.  The Argentine daily la Nación 
congratulated the work of the Court and denounced Nicaragua’s behavior as “an attack 
against the basic fundamentals of international relations” (Nación 1918, 8).  The New 
York Times even urged the Wilson Administration to nullify the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty 
and rescue the CACJ.  “The Court should be saved. It has done good work,” the paper 
declared, “the loss of the treaty would not be a heavy price to pay for the preservation of 
the court and for prevention of war” (New York Times 1916, 10).                    
Washington’s failure to be the guarantor of the Court, however, meant the end of 
the CACJ.  As guarantor, the United States had the responsibility of defending the 
Court’s integrity and existence, regardless of its decisions.  Nonetheless, Washington 
failed to raise any objections against Nicaragua’s decision.  In fact, Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing believed that the Court failed to be useful in settling disputes and, thus, 
did not merit saving (Baker 1966).  Washington also felt that the CACJ judges expressed 
partisanship in their decisions and that the Court failed to serve the interests of the 
isthmus (Salisbury 1989).  As a result, Washington, focusing more on the developments 
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of the First World War, said little about the passing of the Court.  Lansing merely offered 
assurance that his country would not harm Costa Rica if the United States were to 
construct a canal.  “I am not able to perceive wherein the treaty which has been 
concluded with Nicaragua,” he wrote to Costa Rican officials, “can be thought to affect 
adversely any existing rights of the neighboring Republics” (Republic of Costa Rica 
1916, 122).  The Central American Court of Justice officially closed at 3:00 pm on March 
12, 1918.
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U.S. Foreign Policy and Financial Interests 
 The decision of Washington to support the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty and the 
destruction of the Central American Court had little to do with long-term national 
security interests or an interoceanic canal.  After the intense lobbying of U.S. financial 
interests, Washington had already chosen Panama over Nicaragua for the location of a 
canal (see Espino 2001).  The Canal’s construction (1904-1914) had already been long 
completed.  Additionally, the United States had already solidified itself as the major force 
in the region.  There was little fear of British or Russian competition.  U.S. financial 
interests were the primary force behind the treaty.  With the signing of the treaty, the 
Nicaraguan government would receive three million U.S. dollars.  However, this money 
would, in turn, go directly to U.S. financial interests, particularly the bondholders of 
Nicaraguan debt. 
Since the 1909 U.S. invasion to remove President José Santos Zelaya, 
Washington had a particular financial interest in Nicaragua.  Through military 
intervention, the United States took over the country’s customs houses and national 
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treasury.  The intervention in Nicaragua, although of little interest to the average U.S. 
citizen, attracted protest from politicians.  The U.S. Congress failed to approve direct 
action into Nicaragua since the initiative.  In fact, Senator Augustus Octavius Bacon 
(1895-1914) from Georgia sponsored a resolution against U.S. troops in Nicaragua 
(Munro 1964).  With a congressional sub-committee, Bacon, staunchly opposed to U.S. 
financial interests influencing foreign policy, traveled to Nicaragua to analyze the 
situation (New-York Tribune 1912).  U.S. intervention in Nicaragua was in essence the 
beginning of “dollar diplomacy,” a term referring to U.S. force abroad to support 
economic interests (See Munro 1964 and Butler [1935] 2003).  “The State Department 
had gone ahead with its financial projects in spite of the Senate’s refusal to approve 
them,” Dana Munro (1964) writes, highlighting the new dollar diplomacy Washington 
was exercising over Central America, “and that the power of the United States was being 
used to support private interests in profitable, speculative operations” (215). 
 By 1917, the United States had control over Nicaraguan financial activities.  In 
addition to the control of customs unions, Washington created a High Commission, made 
up of both Nicaraguan and U.S. citizens, to manage bond debt and repayment (Jones 
1933).  The overall intervention demonstrates the growing influence financial interests 
began to exert over not only foreign policy, but also the State Department.  A plan, 
orchestrated and supported by the State Department, was devised to agree upon the 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in order to pay off bondholder debt.  Nicaraguan General 
Emiliano Chamorro supported U.S. financial interests. “President Chamorro’s message 
July 31, 1917, to the National Congress of Nicaragua at the opening of its special 
session,” U.S. foreign minister in Nicaragua, Benjamin L. Jefferson, wrote back to the 
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Secretary of State, “called to pass upon the plan of the Department of State for the 
settlement and reorganization of Nicaragua’s indebtedness” (U.S. Department of State 
1917a, 1097).  With a U.S. puppet government in charge, Washington could exert total 
control.  “I have referred and to leave the balance of the three millions for the 
arrangements which would have to be made, in accordance with the Department of 
State,” Chamorro recognized, “by virtue of the former contracts with the bankers which 
gave to the latter the right to be paid with said money for the amounts loaned to the 
former government” (U.S. Department of State 1917b, 1098).                          
Conclusion: Lament and Foreshadowing 
The Central American Court of Justice demonstrates the possible steps the region 
can take to facilitate peace.  It also shows how the United States may engage in a Better 
Neighbor policy.  The Court’s closing, however, was both telling and unfortunate. The 
Court’s closing was telling because it characterized future relations between Washington 
and the rest of the Americas.  The United States has historically focused on immediate 
interests, whether political or financial, at the expense of long-term stability, especially 
regarding international institutions.  Washington ignored the sentiments of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) members when it invaded the Dominican 
Republic in 1965.  The invasion discredited the organization and became, in the eyes of 
many Latin Americans, an emblem of imperialism (Longley 2009).  In 1986, Washington 
also flouted the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling against U.S. involvement in the 
domestic affairs of Nicaragua.  The ICJ, in response to Nicaragua’s complaint, ruled that 
U.S. policy violated Nicaraguan sovereignty, the country’s right to engage in maritime 
commerce, and humanitarian law stipulated in the Geneva Conventions.  According to 
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the verdict, Nicaragua advanced substantial evidence demonstrating that Washington 
trained Nicaraguan exiles (la Contra) in guerilla warfare and intervened in its sovereign 
territory by mining the deep-water sea port in Corinto (Vanden 1991).  Only three years 
later, the United States invaded Panama against the wishes of not only the OAS, but also 
regional allies such as Mexico and Brazil.  
The closing of the Court was unfortunate because the CACJ achieved major 
accomplishments.  First, contra realism, the Court represented a triumph for 
internationalism and international institutions.  The internationalist movement fought to 
minimize war through international laws and institutions.  The CACJ succeeded in this 
regard.  Instead of sending troops into enemy territory, the parties sent lawyers and 
representatives to the Court.  The CACJ broke the common practice of war and forged 
the initial step in the direction of peace and stability.  This success is also important 
because it serves as a reminder that international institutions, under certain conditions, 
can minimize conflict by facilitating communicative channels and bringing parties 
together.  Furthermore, the Court addressed contentious issues in international relations.  
Treaty engagement, sovereignty, non-intervention, the law of the sea, and border 
conflicts are all common disputes.  The negotiations, settlements, and verdicts among the 
Central American republics could have helped forge international law and the customary 
practices between states. In fact, similar conflicts have continued to persist between the 
Central American republics, especially over Río San Juan, the contentious border 
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.  A recent case (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua 2011) in the 
ICJ is currently dealing with many of the same issues surrounding the river, such as 
sovereign territorial rights.  Although the ruling does not cite the Central American Court 
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of Justice, the judges could have drawn upon the initial case in order to guide their 
decision-making in the current dispute.   
Finally, this particular period in Central American history is crucial for obtaining 
a comprehensive understanding and balanced perspective of the region.  The Central 
American nations are often pejoratively known as “Banana Republics” that remain mired 
in poverty and war.  However, this period counters the more negative historical narratives 
and images of the region.  The Central American republics came together to create a 
functional and effective supra-national institution that could have served as a model for 
other world regions embroiled in conflict.  We cannot continue to allow academic and 
policy research to neglect this crucial part of Central American politics.  
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CHAPTER 6 
COLD WAR CASE STUDY:  THE TALE OF TWO STATE DEPARTMENTS 
AND THE 1979 NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 
Introduction 
 This Cold War Case study demonstrates how State Department-led diplomacy has 
the potential to create public goods.  As the first part highlights, when diplomacy is 
prioritized, the United States can play a more positive regional role.  This prioritization of 
diplomacy took place during the beginning years of the Carter Administration (1977-
1981).  Prioritizing a diplomatic approach not only helped create regional peace and 
stability, but also avoided an illegal invasion supported by the National Security Advisor.    
However, the second part of this chapter shows that when more influential bureaucratic 
agencies and players are able to marginalize diplomacy, the United States creates public 
bads, including regional instability, political terror, and an illegal war.  The 
marginalization of diplomacy as a foreign policy tool took place during the second half of 
the Carter Administration and throughout the Reagan Administration (1981-1989).  
This chapter includes least-likely and most-likely case studies.  Least-likely cases 
help demonstrate the explanatory power of theories.  A least-likely case study serves as a 
case in which the theory is least likely to function (George and Bennet 2005).  The 
second part of this chapter, which compromises of the Reagan Administration’s two 
diplomatic initiatives with Nicaragua, serves as a least-likely case study.  Although the 
Reagan Presidency and the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution has attracted a wide-range of 
scholarly attention, the genuine diplomatic exchanges have received little emphasis.  In 
fact, most of the literature depicts the Reagan Administration’s policy as a 
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bureaucratically homogenous approach.
66
  However, there were great bureaucratic 
struggles over Washington’s foreign policy approach to Nicaragua.  State Department-led 
diplomacy, which would appear unlikely in such a conservative president’s 
administration, had the potential to decrease conflict and create peace.  Diplomacy, 
however, was marginalized by more influential bureaucratic players.  The Carter 
Administration’s diplomatic approach to the 1979 Revolution, on the other hand, serves 
as the most-likely case study.  Although I later emphasize Carter’s more bellicose 
approach to Nicaragua and foreign policy in general, the role of diplomacy during his 
administration would seem more likely than in the Reagan Administration.  In order to 
demonstrate the explanatory power of this research, I end with a mini-case study that 
shows how on-the-ground diplomacy could have averted an illegal U.S. invasion of Haiti 
in 2004.               
The Failure of the Alliance for Progress 
In the 1970s, when the Sandinista guerilla movement continued gaining popular 
support throughout Nicaragua, Washington grew more apprehensive.  Since Cuba 
experienced a leftist revolution in 1959, the principal policy of the United States, 
regardless of the political party in charge of the White House, was to stem the tide of 
revolutionary movements.  During the Cold War, all foreign policy initiatives toward 
Latin America revolved around this task.  The federal government poured billions of 
dollars worth of resources into a project known as the Alliance for Progress (1961-
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1973).
67
  Initiated by President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963), the overall goal of the 
Alliance was to make revolutionary movements less attractive, create popular support for 
the United States, and demonstrate that capitalism, not communism, could deliver 
economic and social benefits.  In the words of President Kennedy, “To build a 
hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out 
their lives in dignity and freedom” (in Watson 2012, 49).   
Although this partnership between the United States and Latin American nations 
has attracted a wide range of scholarly attention, it is worth noting that the Alliance, 
along with other diplomatic and foreign aid programs, failed to achieve its objective.  The 
initiative did not garner wide-spread support for Washington.  The Alliance also failed to 
create domestic stability and halt the growth of revolutionary guerrilla movements 
throughout the region.  Even the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian (n.d.) 
notes, “The Alliance did not achieve all of its lofty goals.”  In fact, since the Alliance’s 
inception, scholars on Latin American studies have highlighted the program’s failure.  As 
early as 1963, Edmundo Flores of Princeton’s Center of International Studies emphasized 
a key characteristic the Alliance lacked: Land reform.  Flores (1963) points out that 
Washington had failed to carry out comprehensive reform due to its alliance with the 
more conservative elements in Latin American society, particularly the economic and 
political elite.  Flores (1963) concluded that any land reform carried out by the Alliance 
had involved “unproductive land” or “uninhabitable areas” (8).  Land reform that could 
produce genuine economic development and social stability, such as the reform that was 
initiated in Guatemala in the early 1950s, would be immediately undermined by 
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Washington due to the economic interests of U.S. investors and the Latin American elite 
(Flores 1963; Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990).  These influential groups would not allow 
progressive governments to encroachment upon their immediate interests for long-term 
social and economic benefits.
68
  In addition to a lack of genuine economic reform, 
political reform failed as well.  Democracy never flourished under Washington’s 
initiatives.  By the 1980s, almost every Latin American country was ruled by an 
authoritarian regime.
69
                    
Nicaragua stands out as a failure for the Alliance of Project and other pro-
Washington aid programs.  The United States government gave up to $50 million worth 
of loans to the country under the initiative; the Inter-American Development Bank 
injected another $50 million; and private U.S. companies invested roughly $75 million 
dollars in the 1960s, making Nicaragua the highest recipient of U.S. investment (LaFeber 
1983).  Despite Washington’s persistent efforts to stem the tide of leftist Latin American 
revolutionary movements, the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty (1936-1979), the 
Nicaraguan family that ruled the country for over forty years, looked inevitable as the 
guerilla forces took more strategic areas and culled more popular support.  The Carter 
Administration’s disapproval of Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1974-1979), the last 
member of the family to rule the country, was genuine.  Due to Somoza’s human rights 
abuses, the president cut off aid in 1977, indicating that his administration was flexible to 
a change in regimes (Lynch 2011).  
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To Invade or not to Invade: The State Department v. The National Security Advisor 
Carter, however, did not desire a new government with both anti-Washington and 
Marxist sentiments.  Within his administration, an internal bureaucratic debate on the best 
path to manage the revolution ensued.  The staunch interventionist side of the debate 
came from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.  Brzezinski advised the 
president that the revolution should be stopped by any means available, including 
unilateral military action.
70
  The U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance agreed with 
intervention and the need to control and steer the revolution in a more pro-Washington 
direction so that the administration did not “lose” Nicaragua.  Vance’s support for 
intervention, however, came with specific reservations.  The Secretary of State concurred 
with Brzezinski but only to the extent to which U.S. intervention could be legitimated 
under the aegis of the Organization of American States (OAS) and carried out 
multilaterally.  Essentially, Vance did not want to go it alone.    
As with a number of policy issues, Vance and Brzezinski failed to arrive to a 
mutual agreement.  Although the contentious foreign policy debates between the State 
Department and the National Security Advisor during the Carter Administration have 
already been explored in both academic and policy literature, there is little scholarship 
not only on the administration’s effort to invade Nicaragua, but also the results that could 
have occurred if Carter had privileged Brzezinski’ unilateral option over Vance’s 
multilateral approach.  In fact, Vance fails to even mention the effort to seek OAS 
approval for a 1979 Nicaraguan intervention in his 1983 memoir Hard Choices.  This 
study, therefore, focuses on the Administration’s diplomatic effort to gain support for an 
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invasion, or as the Carter Administration called it, a “peacekeeping presence” (U.S. 
Department of State 1979, 4), the bureaucratic struggle, and finally Carter’s decision to 
privilege the advice of the State Department over that of the National Security Advisor.   
 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance personified the value and objective of the 
purpose behind the United States Department of State: To advance diplomatic solutions, 
multilaterally if possible, to resolve conflict throughout the world.  Although diplomacy 
cannot resolve all international issues peacefully, multilateral diplomacy must be 
considered initially because it often serves as the most efficacious way to address world 
issues.
71
  “Whenever possible, we must practice a new kind of diplomacy,” Vance (1983) 
stresses as a way to address foreign policy issues, “an inclusive diplomacy of working 
together with others to achieve common goals” (434).  Brzezinski, on the other hand, has 
found diplomacy and the State Department to be an inadequate means for addressing 
foreign policy challenges.  The former National Security Advisor’s efforts to bypass the 
Department of State and his disdain for many of the Department’s agencies demonstrate 
his intolerance for diplomacy.  “The Policy Planning Council in the State Department,” 
Brzezinski (1986) contends, “is not the right vehicle because all too often the State 
Department tends to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy” (243).  Brzezinski 
essentially claims that the NSC is the correct vehicle to formulate policy, not State 
Department-led diplomacy.   
By 1978, The Carter Administration was calling for a multilateral peacekeeping 
mission in Nicaragua.  On June 21, 1979, Vance made his case at the OAS.  Before the 
regional supranational body, the Secretary of State stated that his aim was to create “an 
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OAS peacekeeping presence to help establish a climate of peace and security” (in Arnson 
1989, 311).  The initiative failed to gain any support; for the vast majority of Latin 
American states voted against such a mission.  The failure to persuade other Latin 
American countries, even allies such as Brazil, which was ruled by a center-right military 
dictatorship, served as an impediment to U.S. policy.  The overall objective of the Carter 
Administration was to create a legitimate coalition to at least control the revolution and 
gear the movement towards a less radical direction.  Carter’s aim was to not only 
undermine the broad-based revolution and its independence from U.S. interest, but also 
create a regime of “Somocismo without Somoza” (Vanden 1991).  In this model for a 
new Nicaraguan government, the new regime would be made up of former national 
guardsmen who would support U.S. geostrategic and economic interests.  “Some 
National security forces must remain to maintain some order after Somoza’s departure,” 
Lawrence Pezzullo, the U.S. Ambassador wrote, “[o]therwise the vacuum we all wish to 
avoid will be filled by the FSLN” (in Kornbluh 1990, 324).   
After the OAS rejection, a bureaucratic dispute ensued.  Brzezinski viewed a 
unilateral invasion as the optimal strategy.  He strongly lobbied Carter to advance an 
intervention regardless of the OAS result.  “We have to demonstrate that we are still the 
decisive force in determining the political outcomes in Central America,” Brzezinski 
warned the President, “and that we will not permit others to intervene” (in Pastor 1987, 
162).  The State Department, however, aimed to avoid the mistakes of prior 
administrations.  It did not want to isolate the new Nicaraguan government and escalate 
hostilities, as Washington did in the case of Cuba in the aftermath of the 1959 
Revolution.  The Eisenhower Administration, failing to meet Castro and taking a strong 
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stance against the revolution, pushed Castro and other top Cuban officials into the hands 
of the Soviets.
72
   
In the end, the president privileged the approach of Vance over the unilateral 
interventionist approach Brzezinski.  He heeded the multilateral call of the Department of 
State.  In lieu of taking the unilateral intervention option, the president opted for a 
diplomatic path.  For the Secretary of State, this would be the optimal option; going in 
alone without the assistance of other Latin American nations would have been disastrous.  
Such an intervention would not only alienate Nicaragua, but also much of Latin America.  
After the State Department won the bureaucratic battle, the guerrillas were able to take 
Managua on July 19, 1979.  The administration further advanced diplomatic overtures 
through the carrot-and-stick technique supported by Vance.  Carter not only offered the 
ruling junta $90 million in recovery aid (Linsenmeyer 1989), but also invited the five 
principle member of the new ruling Junta to the White House.  U.S. Ambassador to 
Nicaragua, Lawrence A. Pezzullo (1979-1981) further supported the diplomatic 
overtures. He believed a diplomatically engaging the Sandinistas was the optimal strategy 
to sustain influence in the country (Gutman 1988).   
The Administration’s policy toward Nicaragua was based upon privileging the 
diplomacy of the State Department over the hawkish advice of the NSA.  The argument 
that Carter’s decision for diplomacy may be attributable to his personality or religiosity is 
tenuous.  Carter, contrary to conventional wisdom and common depictions of his 
character, failed to be a persistent human rights advocate or even dove on foreign policy 
issues.  On most issues, he privileged hawkish national security policies over human 
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rights concerns.  In Asia, he openly supported the Cambodian genocidal regime of Pol 
Pot and the Khmer Rouge because they were at war with Vietnam, our communist 
enemy.  What is more, Carter maintained strong relations and support for perennial 
Indonesian dictator Suharto (1968-1998) despite his record of egregious human rights 
abuses and genocide.  The president set up a “Bilateral Working Group” and other 
initiatives to provide economic aid, export credits, and overall support for the regime 
(U.S. Department of State 1978, 32).  Scholars and human rights activists have 
documented the genocidal policies of Suharto in East Timor, a small archipelago area that 
gained official independence from Indonesia in 2002.
73
  In fact, many scholars have 
challenged the view that Carter was as human rights-oriented and dovish as conventional 
wisdom has described him (see Aronoff 2006).      
It is also worth noting that although Carter indicated that the Secretary of State 
and State Department would play a more prominent role in foreign policy decision 
making, that role diminished throughout his presidency.  “I intend to appoint a strong and 
competent Secretary of State,” the president-elect stated to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1976.  For the first years, Carter’s kept his promise.  The State Department 
was not marginalized.  Secretary of State Vance and under Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher still had the President’s ear and, thus, influence over policy.  The State 
Department and diplomacy, however, fell out of favor.  Growing more cynical and 
skeptical over the motives of the Soviet Union, particularly after the invasion of 
Afghanistan in December of 1979, the president became more hawkish toward foreign 
policy (Nebow and Stein 1993).  Diplomacy, as a result, appeared less attractive than the 
militarist approach of the NSA.  As Brzezinski (1983) later noted, the Policy Review 
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Committee, set up initially by Carter to function under Secretary of State Vance, would 
finally fall under the National Security Advisor’s influence.  Brzezinski, an experienced 
and aggressive bureaucratic player, took advantage of Carter’s skepticism.  He would use 
his agency, the Special Coordinated Committee, to influence policy making and become 
more powerful than Vance, usurping all policy influence (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004).  
In fact, the latter years of the Carter Administration witnessed a more bellicose approach 
to addressing the Nicaraguan Revolution.  The diplomacy advocated by Vance quickly 
became supplanted by the more hostile and militaristic approach of Brzezinski.  Carter 
personally signed a secret CIA approved document that would surreptitiously fund the 
opposition newspaper La Prensa (Linfield 1991).  He also ceased supplying aid to the 
new Nicaraguan government.  In the wake of the Sandinista Revolution, Carter also 
decided to approve military aid to the Salvadoran military, despite evidence of egregious 
human rights abuses, to stem the tide of guerrilla revolution (Ram 1983). The whole 
concept of Carter being a dove or even one who privileged human rights over strategic 
concerns has been reevaluated in scholarly literature after his presidential departure (see 
Ibid).         
  The initial reliance on State Department influence, however, raises one 
fundamental question: How did privileging State Department diplomacy over the more 
hawkish unilateral approach of the National Security Advisor and other policy makers 
actually produce public goods?  The Carter Administration did its utmost to control the 
Sandinista revolution.  As mentioned above, there were two avenues to achieve this 
objective: Multilateral or unilateral action.  The administration first attempted a 
multilateral approach.  Such a move could have incorporated participants from all over 
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Latin America, including those who were sympathetic to the revolution, such as 
Venezuela and Mexico.  With the OAS rejection, the administration had to decide to 
accept and manage the new government diplomatically or invade Nicaragua.  Although 
the Carter Administration relied upon friendly discourse such as a “commission of 
friendly cooperation” and the “mediating commission” for its intervention (Nuñez et al. 
1978, 64), a unilateral action would have been disastrous.  Brzezinski and the other 
bureaucratic hawks underestimated two crucial Latin American phenomena: The wide 
spread contempt throughout Latin America against U.S. interventionism and the 
unwavering domestic support for the Sandinista Revolution.   
First, Latin American countries from a broad ideological spectrum progressively 
grew fearful of U. S. militarily intervention.  The U.S. unilateral invasion of the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 significantly undermined U.S. regional credibility and the 
multilateral purpose of the OAS (Longley 2009).  Although the United States was finally 
able to persuade the OAS to finally vote for a peace keeping mission in a last ditch 
attempt to muster credibility after the invasion, the intervention was essentially a 
unilateral affair with roughly 25,000 U.S. troops entering into the country.  The peace 
keeping commission was hardly multilateral, consisting mostly of a handful of troops 
from a limited amount of Latin American countries.  Anti-United States and anti-
interventionism, which was already gaining ground, spread throughout the Americas and 
became a ubiquitous presence.  Richard Nixon, then vice president under President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), experienced this resentment when his motorcade 
was attacked physically and verbally during a goodwill trip through Caracas, the capital 
of Venezuela in 1958.  U.S. unwavering support for the brutal Venezuelan dictator 
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Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1953-1958), among other foreign policies, contributed to the anti-
Washington sentiments. 
Nicaragua experienced similar sentiments toward Washington and Somoza.  This 
hatred for the U.S.-supported dictatorship gave the 1979 Revolution tremendous support.  
Although the history and brutality of the dynasty, as well as the broad ideological, 
societal, and class coalition to overthrow the dictatorship, is well-documented by scholars 
(see Booth et al. 2009; Baltodano 2010), it is worth noting that these factors would have 
made a U.S. invasion a disastrous decision.  By squandering foreign aid on family 
fortunes, denying economic opportunities to non-Somocistas, squelching dissent through 
institutionalized violence, stealing foreign donations from the 1972 Managua earthquake, 
and running the country like a personal fiefdom, Somoza had marginalized most sectors 
of the country.  An extensive part of the population made up of women, teenagers, and 
men had already been fighting and dying for over a decade.  Few Nicaraguans would 
have welcomed a U.S. force that would have maintained the unpopular and dreaded 
National Guard, the military agency that kept the Somozas afloat.  As one Nicaraguan 
participant in the revolution, who later broke with the Sandinistas in the 1980s, stated “in 
1979, we were all Sandinistas” (personal communication 2002).   
A unilateral invasion, therefore, would have been disastrous.  With strong support 
for the revolution and an equally strong disdain for U.S. foreign policy, the Nicaraguan 
guerillas and population would not have accepted the intervention.  In fact, evidence 
suggests that they were prepared to fight any force that would have maintained Somoza’s 
National Guard.  As early as 1978, a civilian Sandinista junta, formed in 1977 from 
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diverse economic and social sectors of Nicaraguan society,
74
 began denouncing U.S. 
overtures for a multilateral intervention.  They accused the United States of trying to 
“infringe on the popular movement” and called the OAS “The Ministry of Yanky 
Colonies” (Nuñez et al. 1978, 64).  Other primary documents and interviews from 
Nicaragua strongly suggest that a U.S. presence would have been met with extreme force; 
the Sandinistas had been fighting for over a decade to remove Somoza and this highly 
mobilized and armed movement were not going to allow Washington, which had been 
occupying Nicaragua since the early nineteen hundreds, to undermine the popular 
revolution (see Baltodano 2010).  The State Department, by winning the bureaucrat war, 
avoided the death of not only U.S. civilian and military personnel, but countless 
Nicaraguans.  Diplomacy further avoided a unilateral military failure in Latin America 
that would have been based on gross miscalculations.  As Robert McNamara (2003), 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense (1961-1968), notes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. 
officials significantly underestimated the military buildup of Russian and Cuban soldiers 
on the island.  An invasion would have been disastrous due to the miscalculation of 
Russian and Cuban troop preparation.  Brzezinski seriously miscalculated the revolution.  
The former National Security Advisor continued to offer his support for an invasion.  
“Soviet leaders must have realized that logistical and geographical factors ordained that 
the United States,” Brzezinski (1986) claims, “would succeed in any determined military 
action and that Nicaragua itself was not worth at this time a direct American-Soviet 
collision” (96).  By merely focusing on the Soviet Union, Brzezinski overlooked the 
actual popular guerrilla movement that carried out the revolution in the first place.                  
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Missed Diplomatic Opportunities: Reagan’s Transition Team and the Manzanilla 
Accords (1981-1984) 
Once Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, his political posture toward the 
Nicaraguan Revolution was clear: To roll back the perceived communist takeover in the 
U.S. sphere of influence.  Reagan continually decried the “Marxism-Leninism” 
infiltration into Central America.  The president painted the Sandinista government as the 
“enemy” of the United States, justifying his unwavering, yet nationally and 
internationally unpopular support for the counter-revolutionary groups the Contras, 
guerrillas aiming to overthrow the Sandinistas from neighboring Honduras and Costa 
Rica.  During his 1980 speech to accept the Republican presidential candidacy, Reagan 
specifically denounced the Sandinistas.  “We deplore the Marxist Sandinista takeover of 
Nicaragua,” Reagan stated (in Leiken and Rubin 1987, 515).  Unlike the outgoing 
president, Ronald Reagan was prepared to use force in order, as he famously and 
repeatedly stated, “to make the Sandinistas cry uncle.”  The Sandinistas never refrained 
from rhetoric as well.  Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega (1985-1990 and 2007-present) 
referred to Ronald Reagan as “worse than Hitler” (in Rushdie 1987, 55).           
  Although scholars of all disciplines have written endless volumes on the 
Nicaraguan Revolution and Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy, one area has attracted scant 
academic attention: The diplomatic initiatives that took place between Washington and 
Nicaragua.  The diplomacy between the two governments is important for a number of 
reasons.  First, despite the intrinsic contempt both the Sandinistas and the Reagan 
Administration had for each other, genuine diplomatic negotiations were advanced.  
More important for this dissertation, these initiatives demonstrate missed opportunities to 
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decrease tension and create peace.  The principle cause for the missed opportunities stems 
from the bureaucratic wars between the major players.  Conservative “hawks” in the 
administration from the National Security Council (NSC), military branches, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) successfully undermined and marginalized State 
Department attempts to conduct fruitful diplomacy.  The persistent and successful 
attempts to undermine and marginalize diplomacy caused serious problems for the State 
Department.  Instead of remaining an influential governmental body to consider and 
exercise diplomatic solutions to foreign policy issues, it lost all independence and 
integrity.  The State Department inevitably became a politicized propaganda arm for the 
victorious bureaucratic players.  In lieu of advancing alternative policies, State 
Department officials wrote reports, gave speeches, offered congressional testimonies, and 
disseminated propaganda that supported the hawkish members of the Reagan 
Administration.    
  For the purpose here, I differentiate the failed diplomatic attempts into two 
general initiatives: The Reagan Administration transition team (1981-1982) and the 
Manzanilla Accords (1984).  Most accounts of the Reagan Administration transition team 
are not very flattering.  Latin American scholars have lambasted, often for good reason, 
Washington’s policies and inflexible posture against progressive movements throughout 
the Americas (see Schoultz 1987).  Ronald Reagan, along with many of his conservative 
advisors, failed to understand that many of the center-left movements, particularly in 
Central America, were fighting for social and economic justice, not to create a Soviet 
satellite state.  However, before the Reagan Administration formed a coherent Central 
American policy, different ideas and initiatives floated around in the first year.  Many 
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members in the State Department endeavored to sustain and deepen the diplomatic space 
created by the Carter Administration.  However, unlike the previous case in which the 
State Department scored a significant win over the National Security Advisor, the State 
Department lost the first bureaucratic war over Nicaraguan policy.   
The Second diplomatic initiative took place in the small Mexican town of La 
Manzanilla, Jalisco, located in the southwestern part of the country.  The Accords 
entailed a 1984 multilateral diplomatic effort between the United States State 
Department, the Nicaraguan government, and Mexico, the principal independent 
mediator.  For the second time during the eight years of the Reagan Administration,
75
 the 
State Department, again in a non-politicized effort, set out to do what the department is 
intended to do: Negotiate multilateral accords to decrease regional tension and create 
positive peace.  The diplomatic efforts supported by then-Secretary of State George 
Shultz, however, were completely marginalized by other members of the administration.  
The State Department lost the bureaucratic war over Central American policy.  As a 
result, the illegal war, by both domestic and international standards, continued until the 
Sandinista ruling party lost the Nicaraguan presidential elections in 1990.
76
   
Reagan’s Transition Team 
State Department diplomats began negotiations with the new Nicaraguan Junta in 
the initial year of the Reagan Administration.  Lawrence Pezzullo, the Nicaraguan 
Ambassador (1979-1981) and Carter-Administration leftover, strongly favored 
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diplomatic negotiations over coercion, force, and the suspension of economic aid.  As 
mentioned above, many diplomats feared alienating the new Nicaraguan government in 
the same fashion as the Eisenhower Administration did with Fidel Castro after the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959.  Thomas Enders, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
(1981-1983), also stressed a diplomatic route opposed to military force or support for the 
Contras, the counter-revolutionary group based primarily on the borders of Honduras and 
Costa Rica that aimed to overthrow the Sandinista government throughout the 1980s.
77
  
In fact, clandestine support for the counter-revolutionaries enjoyed scant support in the 
Department of State.  “In actuality, support for the rebels was hotly disputed and had 
little or no support among those State Department officials,” writes Roy Gutman (1988), 
author of Banana Diplomacy, a punctilious account of U.S. policy towards Nicaragua 
under the Sandinistas, “with whom Enders had relations and mutual respect” (64).  Even 
the hawkish conservative Secretary of State at the time, Alexander Haig (1981-1982), 
who barely lasted a year at his post, was reluctant to support the counter-insurgencies.  
As a result, there was a movement within the Reagan Administration to initiate 
diplomacy as a policy tool.   
Both Enders and Pezzullo traveled to Managua in order to negotiate with the 
Sandinistas.  The objective of the talks was to highlight a number of pivotal points, 
particularly U.S. acceptance of the following: a.) the revolution’s triumph over the 
Somoza dictatorship; b.) Nicaragua’s non-alignment movement (neither aligned with East 
nor West); and c.) the 1947 Rio Treaty, which reconfirmed that Washington would 
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abstain from using force against the country (Gutman 1988).  The diplomats, however, 
communicated their concern about a number of other points.  Most importantly, these 
included the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops and Nicaraguan support for the 
growing guerrilla movement in El Salvador.  As Enders stressed in a letter to President 
Ortega, “The continued use of Nicaraguan territory to support and funnel arms to 
insurgent movements in the area would pose a surmountable barrier to the development 
of normal relations between us (in Leiken and Rubin 1987, 527).  Despite legitimate fears 
between both countries, the initial advancements by the State Department were met with 
optimism by the new Nicaraguan junta.  Enders conceded that Washington viewed the 
revolution as irreversible.  “We recognize that the defeat of Somoza is an accomplished 
fact” Enders reinforced (in LeoGrande 1992, 120).  Daniel Ortega, leader of the Junta and 
later president of Nicaragua (1985-1990; 2007-present), found Ender’s proposals and 
concerns “reasonable” (in Ibid 120).        
Despite the diplomatic overtures, powerful bureaucratic players were able to 
undermine and discredit diplomacy as a policy option.  Hardliners included the Director 
of Central Intelligence William J. Casey (1981-1987), Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger (1981-1987), U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick 
(1981-1985) and National Security Advisors William P. Clark, Robert C. McFarlane 
(1983-1985), and John Poindexter, among others throughout the administration.  Even 
before diplomatic avenues were exhausted, hardliners were able to convince the president 
to completely cut off $7 million of aid.  The Sandinistas learned that aid the 
administration would not renew aid during Ender’s negotiations (LeoGrande 1992).  
Cutting off financial relations with the new government brought about protest from 
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diplomats.  From the point of view of Pezzullo and Enders, eliminating aid severed 
Washington’s ability to apply leverage over the Nicaraguan government; essentially, aid 
could be used to alter the Sandinistas behavior (Gutman 1988).  Pezzullo even apologized 
to Sergio Ramírez, a Sandinista junta member who later became the Nicaraguan vice 
president (1984-1990).  “Look, I’m sorry,” Pezzullo lamented, “this is not the way it was 
supposed to be” (in Gutman 1988, 37). 
Moreover, administration hardliners had already begun to encourage, organize, 
and support the counter-revolutionaries in Honduras.  Supporting a counter-revolution, 
however, was a policy that U.S. diplomats in Managua reconfirmed Washington would 
not exercise.  In fact, President Reagan himself never gave the green light for a number of 
these hard-line initiatives.  The CIA Chief of Latin America Duane “Dewey” Clarridge 
had already traveled to Honduras to give the Honduran government the tacit support to 
assist in trying to overthrow the Sandinista government.  Clarridge, however, did not 
even have presidential approval for his initiatives (Ibid).  Instead, Clarridge, a close 
confident of Casey, was more of a lobbyist within the administration for the hard-line 
approach against the new Nicaraguan government.  “But Dewey cut corners and rammed 
things through,” one U.S. official close to intelligence remarked, “he crossed the line 
from being a professional intelligence officer to being an advocate” (in Ignatius and 
Rogers 1986, 234).      
The first round of diplomatic overtures failed due to the bureaucratic wars that 
marginalized the State Department initiatives.  When Ronald Reagan took over the White 
House in 1981, the president had not formulated or crystallized a formal and consistent 
Central American policy.  According to the deputy director of the CIA at the time, Robert 
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Gates, there was “no agreement within the administration . . . on our real objectives” (in 
Scott 1997, 243).  Within this atmosphere, struggles ensued over policy.  Powerful 
figures, as the case of National Security Advisor Brzezinski before them, successfully 
denigrated the State Department’s diplomatic approach and did their utmost to undermine 
diplomatic advances.  National Security Advisor William Clark was tired of the State 
Department’s “candy ass approach” one aide stressed (Gutman 1988, 136).  Another 
Washington insider referred to the State Department as “cookie pushers” (Ibid, 135).  In 
addition to Clark, Casey and soon-to-be National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane 
demanded a “harder action” compared to Ender’s diplomatic approach (Ibid, 71).  The 
deputy director of politico-military affairs Oliver North (1983-1986) bluntly stated that 
he opposed any talking “with the enemy” (Ibid, 209).  In the book In Our Own Backyard, 
William LeoGrande (1992) observes that Enders had experienced the most difficult time 
with diplomacy not in Nicaragua, but in the United States.  “When Enders returned to 
Washington,” the author writes, “he found that selling the deal to the rest of the 
administration was than selling it to the Sandinistas” (20).  Gutman (1988) further points 
out that, not only bureaucrats, but also the whole CIA, “outflanked” Enders and his 
diplomatic initiatives (72).  The hardliners in the NSC, CIA, and other agencies were able 
to use Reagan’s lack of formal policy and the vast bureaucracy to completely wage war 
on the State Department, marginalize any diplomatic initiatives, and finally control 
policy.  In the end, although Enders tried his utmost to steer foreign policy, he finally 
recognized that the NSC held the most influence (Gutman 1988).   
U.S. diplomats were not the only ones concerned with the diplomatic struggles.  
To the surprise of many members of the Nicaraguan Contra resistant movement, the CIA 
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completely usurped control over the development and direction of the counter 
insurgency, demonstrating the extent to which the hardliners controlled policy.  Even 
Contra members complained about the CIA’s virtual takeover of their operation.  Justiano 
Pérez, a prominent member of the Sandinista resistant group called the Legion of 
September Fifteen and supporter of the Indigenous Struggle against the Sandinistas has 
written extensively on the virtual take over by the CIA.  In Los Albores de la Resistencia 
Nicaragüense, Pérez (2006) discusses how then-CIA director William Casey and other 
agency operatives imposed Enrique Bermudez, a former National Guardsman for 
Somoza, as head of what later became known as “the Contra.”  Pérez (2006) points out 
that instead of strategizing against the Sandinistas, Bermudez was much more concerned 
with consolidating power.  His initial attacks were not against the government in 
Managua, but the independent grass roots Contra initiatives.  “The first attacks of the 
FDN were not against sandinismo,” Pérez (2006) writes, “[but] against the Legion” (60).  
The Contra under Bermudez created “black lists” and utilized the “same procedures and 
habits of the old G.N. [Guardia Nacional]” (Pérez 2006, 60).  Essentially, instead of 
allowing an organic and legitimate movement to develop against the Sandinistas, the 
hardliners in Washington not only controlled U.S. policy, but also imposed its own 
counter-revolutionary version of a movement, one with little credibility.  In fact, Collin 
Powell reflects Washington’s desire to impose Bermudez as the head of the Contra 
operation. “Colonel Enrique Bermudez, military commander of the contras, Powell 
(1995) writes, “impressed me as a true fighter, ready to die for his cause” (328).  Powell, 
who worked as a top military advisor to Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and later 
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became National Security Advisor to the president (1987-1989), failed to understand the 
lack of legitimacy and support Bermudez and the Contra had in the region.                          
For all the State Department’s faults,78 the agency did try to initiate diplomacy.  
Even the Sandinistas themselves appreciated the diplomatic overtures, recognizing that 
they had also missed diplomatic opportunities advanced by Enders.  “[Nicaraguan 
President] Ortega welcomed Ender’s visit as a momentous occasion,” Gutman observes 
(1988, 69).  Regardless of how skilled diplomats were in the vast governmental 
bureaucracy, they never were able to exert enough influence over the Reagan 
Administration’s foreign policy.  If they had, both the Nicaraguan government and State 
Department officials admit the early years of U.S.-Nicaragua relations could have gone in 
a different direction.  In fact, the new Nicaraguan junta was meeting the demands initially 
laid out by Washington.  As the first Secretary of State for the administration, Alexander 
Haig later wrote in his book Caveat, “The flow of arms into Nicaragua and thence into El 
Salvador slackened, adding, “a signal from Havana and Moscow that they had received 
and understood the American message” (in Smith 1987, 91-92).  Enders also admitted 
that the Sandinistas had halted the inflow of weapons into El Salvador (LeoGrande 1992).  
Enders believed that a two track approach—pressure and diplomacy—was the optimal 
way to address the new revolution (Leiken and Rubin 1987).  The plan appeared to be 
working in the early years.  Nonetheless, the hardliners in the administration decried 
diplomacy.  As they had predicted, once the hardliners were able to sabotage diplomacy, 
they could take a more bellicose approach.  As Gutman (1984) points out, once 
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diplomatic talks broke down in 1981, “the administration’s energies went into a build-up 
of military pressures” (4).   
The Manzanilla Accords 
  The second diplomatic opportunity came with the Manzanilla accords in Mexico 
in 1984.  The replacement of Alexander Haig by George P. Shultz as Secretary of State in 
July of 1982 had two important meanings.  The first meaning demonstrated the general 
acceptance of the State Department in the world: A messianic hawk and a former military 
general like Haig did not fit in well at the more diplomatically-minded State Department 
filled with Foreign Service Officers.  Although Haig did initiate diplomacy during his 
short tenure, his hawkish views rose to the surface.  For example, Haig once remarked 
that, given the orders, he could turn communist Cuba into “a fucking parking lot” (in 
FitzGerald 2000, 169).  As acclaimed journalist Francis FitzGerald (2000) would note, 
“this was not what Baker, Meese, and Deaver wanted to hear from the secretary of state” 
(169-170).  The second and most important meaning for this case study is the wide-
spread optimism Haig’s replacement inspired in both the United States and Nicaragua.  
Many influential figures involved in foreign relations were content with the change. Even 
members of the Sandinista government viewed the replacement of Haig, a hardliner, with 
optimism.  Augusto Zamora, the Nicaraguan international lawyer who helped bring the 
United States to the International Court of Justice during the 1980s, demonstrated a 
cautious optimism when Shultz took over.  “The change in the Secretary of State created 
hope, although minimal,” Zamora writes (1996), “for a change in U.S. foreign policy 
towards Nicaragua” (239).  This optimism, however, came with a healthy incredulity.  
Nicaraguans, U.S. politicians, and activists who protested Reagan’s approach knew that 
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Shultz was still a republican ideologue.  Nonetheless, with criticism of Haig mounting in 
the U.S. press and the administration itself (see Der Derian 1987), the State Department 
required an individual who could fill a more diplomatic role. 
Shultz, nonetheless, continually made his contempt for the Sandinistas clear.  
“They are not democratized,” he once declared in a news conference, “[t]hey continue to 
support subversion in neighboring countries” (in Pear 1988, A6).  However, with 
growing dissatisfaction with Reagan’s handling of the Nicaraguan problem growing in 
the United States, a diplomatic course was more appropriate than of coercion.  Powerful 
politicians such as the Speaker of the House Tip O’Neil (1977-1987), Congressman 
Edward P. Boland (1953-1989) and senators John Kerry (1985-2013), Tom Harkin 
(1985-present), and Christopher Dodd (1981-2011) served as roadblocks by voting and 
protesting the hard-line agenda of supporting the Contra and taking a militaristic stand 
against Nicaraguan.  The Kerry Committee report, which resulted from a number of 
congressional hearings on the illegal Contra war, found that members of the State 
Department actually paid contras who were involved in drug trafficking (see Cockburn 
and St. Sinclaire 1998).  Additionally, a number of embarrassments such as the illegal 
mining of Nicaraguan ports and increasing information that the Contra was a weak band 
of drug-dealing thieves wasting U.S. tax-payers dollars further complicated matters for 
the Reagan Administration.  As a result, genuine multilateral negotiations were 
resuscitated by both Washington and the Nicaraguan government. 
The Manzanilla accords began in Mexico in June of 1984 after Secretary of 
Shultz gave a surprise visit to Managua as sign that the State Department wanted to 
continue talks.  Although many scholars and policy makers were skeptical of the 
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negotiations (see Gutman 1988, 211-213), the multilateral talks created space in which 
each side could not only discuss its grievances, but also advance genuine dialogue and 
solutions.  “For the first time,” Sergio Ramirez, who would become the Nicaraguan vice-
president in 1985, stated, “we’re talking with the U.S. and not just listening to the U.S.” 
(in Russell et al. 1984).  Another United States official reflected Ramirez’ optimism:  
“You can say we've taken the first step toward improving relations” (in ibid 1984).  By 
the fourth talk (there were nine in all) a representative in the Mexican Foreign Ministry 
declared that the negotiations had addressed “substantive issues” (in Orme 1984, A26).   
The Manzanilla talks, initially carried out by U.S. Special envoy Harry 
Shlaudeman and the Deputy Foreign Minister for Nicaragua Víctor Tinoco, highlighted 
many of the previous issues discussed in earlier diplomatic negotiations.  The Sandinistas 
continually focused on Washington’s support for the Contra, whereas Washington 
stressed Cuban and Russian influence in Nicaragua, as well as Sandinista support for the 
Salvadoran guerrillas.  The Nicaraguans were particularly concerned with the “low-
intensity war” the United States had waged against the country (Tinoco 1988, 30).  
Essentially, through the proxy Contra groups on both sides of Nicaragua (Honduras and 
Costa Rica), Washington had created a low-scale war against the Sandinistas.  Despite 
profound differences, throughout the negotiations both sides made valuable contributions.  
The State Department advanced support for the underlying tenants of the Contadora 
Group, which later became the base for the Esquipulas Peace Agreements II.
79
  Both the 
Contadora Group and Esquipulas II came from regional Central American and Latin 
American initiatives after the 1981 round of diplomatic initiatives failed to produce 
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concrete results between Washington and Managua.  Although they experienced varying 
degrees of success, both agreements highlighted important points.  Most importantly, the 
Contadora Group and Esquipulas II called for regional initiatives to settle the conflict that 
plagued Central America.  Since the other Central American governments were involved, 
they shared their disapproval with Soviet and Cuban military advisors in the area as well 
as support for leftist guerrilla insurgencies.  Governments from both Central and South 
America, however, conceded that the conflict was a Central American problem.  U.S. 
direct and indirect intervention, the agreements stressed, was not the solution.  Central 
American countries must negotiate among themselves.  Regional negotiations still meant 
strong stipulations for the Sandinistas, particularly assuaging regional fears of exporting 
revolution and increasing the country’s military build-up.   
During and even after Manzanilla, Secretary of State Shultz remained partial to 
the diplomatic ideas behind the regional agreements.  The Sandinistas understood Shultz 
approval and hoped the diplomacy would open for space for dialogue on these issues 
(Zamora 1996).  The Sandinistas had even met a number of commitments such as 
creating zones of negotiations with the Contra factions and amnesty for Contra guerrillas 
(Tinoco 1988).  In fact, Shultz lauded the Contadora Group and Esquipulas Peace 
Agreements.  The Secretary of State even went as far as to lobby on their behalf in the 
administration.  “It’s got a good thrust to it; it starts a process that will, with hard work, 
lead to democracy in Nicaragua,” Shultz (1993) said to Reagan, “[a]nd to our relief and 
astonishment, its measures have simultaneity—so it’s a victory” (960).  The State 
Department was prepared to negotiate on the same fundamentals upon which the 
Contadora Group was based (Shultz 1993).     
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Although there were nine talks throughout the Manzanilla Accords, the 
negotiations failed to decrease conflict and create peace.  The State Department suffered 
a similar fate as it did in 1981.  The anti-diplomacy hardliners remained capable of 
marginalizing diplomatic efforts.  First, instead of having career diplomats in charge, the 
hardliners in the CIA, Department of Defense, and National Security Council were able 
convince the president to put Harry Shlaudeman, a special envoy, as the initial and 
premiere negotiator.  Although Shlaudeman reported to the State Department, the 
Nicaraguans considered him a hardliner who would support the militarized part of U.S. 
policy (Envío 1990).  Furthermore, the hardliners made sure to monitor Shlaudeman’s 
effort by sending staffers from the NSC to report back to them (Shultz 1993).  More 
importantly, although Shultz (1993) points out that he won a bureaucratic battle by 
getting the Manzanilla Accords off the ground, the State Department had progressively 
lost the president’s ear and, thus, influence during the negotiation process and even more 
so after President Reagan won reelection the 1984 presidential election.  “He [Shultz] 
seldom got the presidential support to which he felt entitled,” Robert W. Tucker (1993) 
writes in Foreign Affairs, “against bureaucratic aggressors in the Defense Department, 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council” (143).  In his 1993 
memoirs, Shultz supports this assessment.  He writes that hardliners such as CIA director 
William Casey and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger did their utmost to “stop it 
[negotiations] in mid-flight” (417).  “The very idea of a negotiation with Nicaragua 
unnerved them,” Shultz (1993) concluded (417). 
The Secretary of State could not have been more correct.  Although he personally 
flew to Managua prior to the talks in order to demonstrate the administration’s 
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seriousness, the hardliners had already planned against his initiatives. Constantine 
Menges, a White House aide, initiated a meeting with McFarlane in order to undermine 
any of Shultz’ attempts (Krauss 1991).  Casey, Kirkpatrick, and Weinberger stood 
alongside the others against diplomatic approaches.  Weinberger completely denigrated 
the State Department’s suggestions to hold diplomatic negotiations as an attempt to 
“dignify Nicaragua” (in Ibid 11).  In fact, the National Security Council, according to a 
leaked document to the Washington Post, had lobbied the other Central American 
countries to forego signing the Contadora proposal (Rosset and Vandermeer 1986), a 
major effort to subvert not only diplomacy, but Central American solidarity as well.  The 
Manzanilla talks were marginalized as a foreign policy tool before they had even begun.                       
Unfortunately, the Sandinistas were counting on Shultz, as well as other State 
Department bureaucrats more amenable to negotiations, to gain more policy influence.  
Top Nicaraguan governmental officials were quite aware of the bureaucratic wars that 
transpired in the administration.  President Ortega, as well as other regional sympathetic 
parties such as Cuba, held a theory that by the second administration, the diplomatic 
camp would exert greater political influence and power over the administration than the 
hard-liner camp (Gutman 1988).  Ortega had greatly miscalculated.  Even before the 
Manzanilla Accords developed, hardliners had created a National Security Decision 
Directive that severely limited the State Department from advancing productive 
diplomatic steps (Shultz 1993).      
 The foreign policy scenario during the Reagan Administration (1981-1989) 
resulted in a complete marginalization of State Department-led negotiations.  The 
continual loss of bureaucratic wars and the concomitant impotence of diplomacy 
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rendered the State Department impotent in influencing foreign policy.  Instead of creating 
genuine opportunities for peace and stability, the U.S. Department of State became co-
opted by the very political interests it had challenged.  As a result, the State Department 
was reduced to merely rationalizing, justifying, and propagandizing for the more 
militarized policies carried out by Washington.  For example, the State Department 
would disseminate misleading information concerning the Nicaraguan government 
through propaganda pamphlets such as the White Papers.  Published by the State 
Department, the White Paper provided false information on Nicaragua, including the 
country’s military build-up, Soviet infiltration, and political repression.  A journalist for 
the conservative daily the Wall Street Journal discovered misleading information.  The 
intelligence officer and author of the Paper, John Glassman, later conceded that there 
were gross “mistakes” and “misleading” information (Sklar 1988, 68).  Furthermore, 
when the Nicaraguan government took the United States to the International Court of 
Justice in 1984 and won the decision in 1986, the State Department propagandized for the 
hard-line approach.  The Secretary of State argued that the Court failed to exercise 
jurisdiction, though Washington’s own allies and adherence to the United Nations clearly 
indicated differently (Zamora 1996).  The ICJ case highlighted key problems with the 
Reagan Administration’s approach to Nicaragua, such as the illegal U.S. intervention in 
the country’s affairs, support for human rights abuses, and the mining of the Port of 
Corinto, a northern coastal area of the country, by the CIA.
80
   
Further Missed Opportunities: Haiti 2004  
  This would hardly be the last time diplomacy failed due to bureaucratic wars.  
More recently, political interests within Washington marginalized a seemingly successful 
                                                          
80
 For the ICJ decision, see Nicaragua v. United States of America (1984).  
155 
 
diplomatic approach in Haiti prior to U.S. intervention.  The 2004 U.S. invasion of Haiti 
to remove the democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991-1996 and 
2001-2004) further demonstrates the explanatory power of missed opportunities due to 
the marginalization of diplomacy.
81
  A former priest who preached liberation theology, 
Aristide was popular with the small Caribbean Island’s poor.  The president and his 
Fanmi Lavalas party, however, became despised by the small wealthy elite.  A number of 
Aristide’s pro-poor programs such as the subsidization of rice ate into the business elite’s 
profits (BBC Worldwide Limited 2002).  As a result, anti-Aristide movements, many 
supported by Washington, flourished.  The two most influential movements were the 
Patriotic Movement to Save the Nation, a conservative political party created by 
supporters of former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1986), and the Democratic 
Convergence.  Both parties aimed to topple President Aristide in violent coups.  The 
pressure exerted by these reactionary forces created severe instability for the country’s 
relatively new and fragile democracy.
82
  
Despite these difficulties, the U.S. ambassador to Haiti Brian Dean Curran (2000-
2003) aimed to solve the political disputes diplomatically.  Starting in 2001 with tit-for-
tat negotiations, Curran endeavored to hammer out a deal to which both pro-Aristide and 
anti-Aristide forces could agree (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).  Building upon the 
diplomacy of Curran, U.S. diplomat Luigi R. Einaudi further tried to stabilize the country 
with negotiations.  Working through the OAS, Einaudi tried to pressure both sides to 
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come to an agreement.  In fact, through the mediation of the fifteen-member Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), negotiators were able to get Aristide to accept an electoral 
compromise to create peace (Fatton 2005).  Most importantly, Aristide agreed to a new 
set of legislature elections that would have given the opposition a chance at power 
sharing in the Haitian government (Voice of America 2004).  Jamaican Prime Minister 
P.J. Patterson further supported the agreements.  Speaking for CARICOM, he adamantly 
supported Aristide as the legitimate president, protested the illegal insurgency to remove 
a democratically-elected head of state as a dangerous precedent, and backed the 
agreement to save the fragile democracy (Singh 2004).  Diplomacy coming from a 
number of angles had the potential to decrease conflict and create peace.   
Top officials in Washington and a proxy non-governmental organization (NGO), 
however, marginalized these genuine diplomatic attempts.  The first set of actors to derail 
diplomacy compromised of conservative top officials in the State Department and 
National Security Council that had a political agenda to remove any center-left leaders in 
Latin America.  Assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich 
(2002) and Roger Noriega (2003-2005) made clear that the Bush Administration would 
no longer support the democratically-elected president.
83
  Instead, Reich and Noriega, 
both of whom had various positions in the administration, aimed to halt negotiations and 
remove Aristide. “The crime is the Clinton administration supported him [Aristide] as 
long as it did,” Reich stated, marking “a change in policy” (in LeoGrande 2007, 359-
360).  This change in policy meant an end to diplomacy.  Reich, Noriega, and other neo-
                                                          
83
 Otto Reich in particular has a dubious reputation in Latin America.  He was involved in the Iran-Contra 
Affair, unethical behavior in the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, such as 
buying and intimidating journalists, and support for the 2002 illegal coup against the democratically-
elected president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez (see Conkling and Goble 2004 for more information). 
157 
 
conservatives actively encouraged and financially supported the opposition so they no 
longer needed to engage in negotiations (Fatton 2005).  This support for the opposition 
directly undermined the on-the-ground diplomatic initiatives.  “What you had was the 
constant undermining of the credibility of the negotiators,” Einaudi lamented (in 
Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).  The diplomat even went as far as to “associate” the 
violence that occurred throughout Haiti to the United States and France (Extrait du Haiti 
Info 2004).   
The second group to undermine diplomacy was the International Republican 
Institute (IRI).  The IRI, which drew upon support from Washington, worked through 
Haitian businessman and ardent Aristide opponent Stanley Lucas.  The IRI, which had 
already supported the illegal coup against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez 2002, 
often takes a political approach to foreign policy.  Instead of supporting democracy, the 
institution attempts to undermine center-left governments. The conservative group 
surrounded itself with wealthy Haitian business associates who were fervently anti-
Aristide.  As Curran was trying to create flexibility on the side of the Aristide opposition, 
the IRI, through Lucas, was sending the opposite message: Do not negotiate, for we can 
remove Aristide from power (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).  In fact, interviews with 
opposition figures confirm that Lucas actively urged them not to negotiate with Aristide 
and his supporters (Ibid).  Support for the opposition, therefore, was coming not only 
from Washington, but also the IRI.  In the end, the opposition discovered that it did not 
have to negotiate, rendering Curran’s, Einaudi’s, and CARICOM’s attempts futile.  With 
acts that continued to destabilize the government, including an outright rebellion against 
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Aristide, Washington had a pretext to invade in February of 2004: Take Aristide to safety 
and restore stability.    
As with the Cold War case above, more powerful and influential groups 
marginalized on the ground diplomacy conducted in Haiti.  In addition to bureaucratic 
players, a new phenomenon played an instrumental role: A counterfeit NGO.  Although 
the IRI claims to be involved in building democracy, the organization, which receives 
funding from the U.S. government, has become so powerful that it played a significant 
role in undermining formal diplomatic channels.  Furthermore, this case demonstrates the 
intra-bureaucratic fighting that happens within departments.  Instead of bureaucrats from 
outside competing agencies such as the CIA, powerful bureaucrats from within the 
Department of State marginalized diplomacy.  This means that U.S. diplomatic initiatives 
will face serious obstacles since insiders try to undermine them.  The result of the case on 
Haiti demonstrates that, as Curran later lamented, “an amateur crowd was in charge in 
Washington” (in Ibid).   
The destruction of diplomacy and removal of the Haitian president created the 
most horrific public bads throughout the country.  Instead of restoring stability, political 
instability and terror took hold.  Governmental institutions such as the central legislature 
and municipalities were completely dismantled (Annis and Ives 2011).  Thousands of 
regime dissidents were killed or exiled (Ibid).  A study by the University of Miami 
continued to follow the chaos in Haiti, finding that the removal of Aristide failed to 
restore any semblance of order.  In the aftermath of the coup, instead of stability, 
“summary executions” were commonplace by police.  Furthermore, impoverished 
neighborhoods demanding democracy were often viewed as “enemy territory” in which 
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people “must kill or be killed” (Griifin 2004, i).  As a result, as the case studies 
demonstrate, diplomacy serves as an instrumental variable for international politics.  
Although the United States can provide public goods, the public bads can have disastrous 
effects for the countries involved.                       
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CHAPTER 7 
POST-COLD WAR CASE STUDY: U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Introduction  
The last few decades have witnessed the growth of free trade initiatives between 
Latin American countries and the United States.  These initiatives have included the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) with Chile and Colombia, and a number of other pending bilateral initiatives.  
Further support for trade agreements came in the form of the Trade Promotion Authority, 
often known as “Fast Track,” which the U.S. Congress approved in 2002.  Fast Track 
solidifies trade initiatives by precluding congressional committee changes to the trade 
bills that go through the House and Senate.  The post-Cold War world has ultimately 
been favorable for trade between the United States and Latin America.   
Creating and sustaining economic openness is a key characteristic for hegemonic 
stability.  As mentioned earlier, economists, political scientists, and policy makers 
emphasize a pivotal economic role for the hegemonic power.  The hegemon sustains an 
open economic system based on liberal capitalist principals when all other powers fail to 
take on the responsibility.  The hegemon that accepts this role, in turn, keeps the flow of 
capital moving, inhibits the erection of protective trade barriers, and serves as a lender of 
last resort.  One of the principle reasons the Great Depression (1929-1939) lasted so long, 
Kindleberger (1973) stresses, stemmed from the lack of a hegemon that would take on 
this herculean task.  Great Britain, the world hegemon at the turn of the twentieth century, 
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failed to continue its vital role and the United States neglected its new responsibility.  In 
the aftermath of World War II, however, the United States, through the Bretton Woods 
system (1944-1971), accepted this leadership role and led most of the world in a liberal 
capitalist direction.
84
  As a result, liberal capitalist stability ensued.     
Although the Bretton Woods system no longer exists, the United States still 
continues its role as the hegemon that sustains a liberal capitalist system.  Through the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of State, 
Washington continues to support an open system both regionally and globally.  In 
addition to the above mentioned trade initiatives, the United States sponsors free trade far 
beyond the Americas.  Washington proposes, negotiates, and signs trade agreements with 
countries as diverse as South Korea, Mongolia, and Estonia.  What is more, the United 
States remains the principal financial supporter of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the international institution designed to sustain and regulate the world open liberal 
economy.  The United States donates up to 12% of the WTO budget.  Only Germany, 
Great Britain, and France come close, giving 8.8%, 4.8% and 4.4%, respectively.
85
 
The United States is instrumental for maintaining a relatively open international 
economic system.  Few states have the resources and influence to financially sustain such 
a system and provide the leadership to coordinate and convince members to participate.  
Moreover, the United States helps solve the inevitable collective action problem that 
occurs internationally.  In addition to having scant resources, many states will act as free 
riders in the international system.  That is, if the public goods of an international liberal 
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system cannot be denied to its members, states will forgo investing into the maintenance 
of the system since they are able to reap benefits without incurring the costs.  Washington 
helps avoid this conundrum.  It is also important to note that increased trade has led to 
tangible benefits.  A small country such as Nicaragua, for instance, has significantly 
increased its exportation to the large U.S. market since the implementation of the 
(CAFTA-DR) in 2006, a unilateral trade deal that decreases trade barriers between the 
two countries.
86
  Exports to the United States, without including textiles-dominated free 
zones that have developed throughout the country, have experienced and annual increase 
of 10.8% since 2006, an increase many Nicaraguan economists attribute to CAFTA-DR 
(Díaz Rivas 2011).            
Despite the benefits of liberal trade with the United States, aspects of the 
agreements have come under attack.  Criticism of trade agreements between the United 
States and Latin America has become widespread in academic, policy, and activist 
literature.  Criticism has focused on the role of U.S. farm subsidies, IMF structural 
readjustment policies, environmental impacts, and other trade-related issues.
87
  The role 
of capital flows and the repatriation of funds, however, has historically attracted less 
attention in academic and policy research.  “Unlike many topics in international 
economics,” Christopher Neeley (1999) points out, “capital controls—taxes or 
restrictions on international transactions like stocks or bonds—have received cursory 
treatment in textbooks and scant attention from researchers” (1).  International economic 
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crises in Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Argentina (2001) and other areas of the world, 
however, have gradually shifted focus on the influential role of volatile international 
capital flows and challenged the conventional wisdom regarding the benefits of 
unregulated capital transactions.  The successful use of capital controls by Malaysia, 
Chile, Colombia, and other emerging economies has forced economists and policy 
makers to rethink the extent to which countries should liberalize their economies.  Capital 
controls, economic policies that counter complete financial liberalization and regulate the 
domestic and international flow of international financial capital, may be beneficial 
policy tools that allow countries to avoid and recover from domestic and international 
economic crises.   
Although there is never a consensus on the benefits of economic policy, an 
ideologically diverse group of world economists, scholars, and policy makers have now 
recognized not only the utility of capital controls, but also the inherent economic risk 
involved in uncontrolled financial liberalization.  In addition to globalization skeptics 
such as Joseph Stiglitz (2002) Paul Krugman (1998), and Dani Rodrik (2007),
88
 Jagdish 
N. Bhagwati (1998; 2004), the prominent advocate of free trade and globalization, 
concedes that financial liberalization can be detrimental for a developing country. In his 
book In Defense of Globalization (2004), Bhagwati observes a pivotal role for capital 
controls as a policy tool, particularly in light of their use in during the Asian economic 
crisis.   
The literature on capital controls, however, has focused on the extent to which 
they have effectively helped countries avert or recover from economic crises. In order to 
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measure this efficacy, the economic research has been primarily dominated by the use of 
regression analysis and economic models (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2001; Kaplan and 
Rodrik 2001; Ostry et al. 2010; Coehlo and Gallagher 2010; Magud, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff 2011).  Using the IMF’s own International Financial Statistics, for instance, 
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) employ a time-shifted regression analysis to demonstrate the 
utility of Malaysia’s use of capital controls in 1998.  According to the study, capital 
controls allowed the country to have an independent monetary policy and, in turn, 
address the Asian financial crisis more effectively than those countries that did not opt for 
capital restrictions.   
Although measuring the efficacy of capital controls through models and 
regression analysis is extremely valuable, this approach fails to take into account the 
political and economic agendas behind the decision-making processes to impose capital 
controls in the first place.  Powerful U.S. and international economic interests seek to 
influence trade deals.  These interests are more concerned with “investor rights,” rights 
that protect U.S. investments overseas.  One prominent right investors demand is the right 
to move financial capital freely throughout our globalized world.  This scenario poses a 
particular set of problems that political scientists can address better than economists 
because the issues are of a political nature; for they relate to the political agendas and 
economic interests involved.  In fact, the political questions are just as, if not more 
important than those advanced by economic research.  Although economic research helps 
suggest policy options, the political realm ultimately decides which policies are actually 
taken.  Robert Gilpin astutely recognizes the pivotal importance of politics in 
international political economy (IPE).  “[E]conomic theories alone are not sufficient for 
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an understanding of developments and their significance for economic and political 
affairs,” Gilpin (2001) asserts, “[o]ne must also draw upon ideas and insights from 
history, political science, and other social sciences” (12).  
Considering the political nature of U.S. foreign policy, one central question 
emerges: Why does the United States, against the advice of economists, prohibit the use 
of capital controls and force complete financial liberalization?  This study finds that 
although countries experience economic benefits from the opening of trade initiatives, 
powerful U.S. economic interests that influence Washington, particularly the Department 
of State, the principal governmental agency managing and negotiating trade agreements, 
decreases those benefits.  In the specific case of capital controls, influential U.S. business 
sectors with financial interests abroad support and lobby for unfettered capital controls, 
undermining the potential public goods international trade can produce.  The policy 
results, in turn, create public bads for developing countries.  These public bads are 
defined as inflexible and limited policy options to address vital economic and social 
issues.  This inflexibility fails to allow countries from taking the adequate policy tools to 
address the economic challenges in a more globalized world.                   
It is important to note first that there is nothing novel about observing the 
relations between government and economic interest groups.  What is intriguing about 
this study is how trade deals the United States sponsors and negotiates challenges the 
results of a vast body of economic research.  Economists and policy makers recognize the 
need for capital controls.  This support for capital controls extends far beyond the United 
States.  Academics and policy makers in countries as diverse as Colombia and Malaysia 
recognize the significance with controlling both capital inflows and outflows.  Therefore, 
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the subject of capital controls and parochial economic interests open debate to many 
fundamental issues related to foreign relations.  If the State Department, the foreign 
relations arm of the United States, is able to provide public goods, these goods can be 
distorted by U.S. private economic interests.  Therefore, there is a need to rethink the 
influence of such interests when the U.S. government develops trade regimes and passes 
them into law.       
Moreover, this study is important because trade agreements are legally binding.  
Powerful corporations can take signatory countries to court if they fail to comply with the 
legal stipulations of trade initiatives, regardless of whether economists argue that such 
rules are economically beneficial or not.  Currently, Pac Rim Cayman LLC, a mining 
corporation with legal representation in Reno, Nevada, is suing the government of El 
Salvador for inequitable and unfair investment treatment that is granted under the 
CAFTA accord.  The case is in process in the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Dispute, the supranational investment court that functions under the aegis of 
the World Bank.
89
  In fact, the case has been costly for the El Salvador, a country that 
needs funding for a wide-range of social and economic problems.  Estimates suggest that 
the government has lost roughly $4.3 million (Just Investment 2012). As a result of the 
legally binding aspect of trade initiatives and the concomitant potential costs, we must 
examine not only the specific policies the agreements contain, but also the powerful 
interests that support and lobby for the trade provisions in the first place.                   
 This chapter is also crucial for this dissertation because it addresses two 
fundamental questions related to hegemonic stability: To what extent is economic 
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openness a public good and at what point does openness become a public bad by creating 
and or exacerbating economic crises?  In this post-Cold War study, economics takes a 
prominent role.  Focusing specifically on capital controls, this study finds that economic 
openness fails to be beneficial when openness, solidified in trade deals, imposes 
inflexible policy requirements that do not allow countries to explore alternate policy 
options that may require restrictions on openness.  Although there are direct benefits to 
free trade agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA, specifically the inflow of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and increased access to the U.S. consumer market, this research 
finds that economic openness fails to be beneficial when openness, solidified in trade 
deals, imposes an inflexibility that does not allow countries to explore alternate policy 
options that may require restrictions on openness  
In recent history, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
has accrued more power in trade relations.  Since the Trade Expansion Act gave birth to a 
special trade representative in 1962, a number of legislative bills have afforded the 
agency with increasing authority over negotiating trade initiatives.  The 1979 
Reorganization Plan No. 3, the most significant act expanding the trade representative’s 
powers, made the USTR not only the primer authority over all trade negotiations, but also 
the main presidential advisor over the subject.  Later bills only increased the bureaucratic 
influence of the USTR.  The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the 2000 Trade 
and Development Act gave the agency the principal authority to negotiate with the WTO 
and created the posts for an Assistant Trade Representative for African Affairs and 
Agricultural Negotiator, respectively.
90
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Although the USTR plays an instrumental role, the State Department is far more 
influential in trade negotiations.  First, the sheer size and scope of the State Department 
overpowers that of the USTR.  The USTR relies on only 200 plus employees with a $44 
million annual budget while the State Department has over $14 billion at its disposal 
annually (U.S. Department of State 2010).  The State Department, through a network of 
embassies and other agencies, is also the principal representative overseas in charge of 
managing and negotiating trade treaties with foreign countries.  This explains why the 
State Department not only wields more influence in trade negotiations, but also attracts 
more lobbyists.  Both U.S. corporations and progressive groups invest most of their 
resources in targeting the large bureaucratic apparatus of the State Department with the 
hope that their concerns and interests will influence particular policy initiatives.  In fact, 
the State Department has a long history assisting U.S. capitalism abroad.  The very first 
American Bondholders Council was created with the assistance of the State Department 
in the 1920s (Eichengreen 2004).  In the 1930s, Allen W. Dulles (1932) pushed to have 
the State Department the principal supporter of U.S. foreign bondholders and other 
investment.  He viewed the State Department, with its many agencies, as the natural 
protector of U.S. investors.  It is no wonder why both supporters and detractors of capital 
controls currently address the Secretary of State before the secretaries of other 
departments.  The State Department’s instrumental role helps explain why U.S. financial 
and corporate interests seek its assistance globally.             
What are Capital Flows and Controls? 
Capital controls are various types of restriction on the inflows and outflows of 
both international and domestic capital that enter and exit the home economy.  Capital 
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controls are a contentious subject because they counter the conventional economic 
wisdom that financial liberalization, defined as the removal of all barriers to the flow of 
financial capital, is the most efficient way to invest and allocate international capital (see 
McKinnon 1973 and Shaw 1973 for their influential research).  The flow of capital, 
opponents of capital controls aver, must be based predominantly on market forces and not 
governmental regulation.  Investors and depositors should be allowed to repatriate profits 
out of the home economy freely.  Likewise, lending and borrowing institutions should 
decide their own policies such as interest rates.  Countries with sound and healthy 
financial systems and institutions will be rewarded whereas those without will be 
punished.  Any regulation against financial liberalization, therefore, creates distortions 
and inefficiency not only for investors, but also developing countries.  For example, 
implementing capital controls only delays much needed financial reform and 
transparency in developing countries’ economies.  Capital controls then have the 
potential to foster local corruption and undermine already weak financial institutions 
(Johnson and Todd 2003).  Capital controls also have a negative effect over the economic 
health of the home country.  Opponents observe that the trade of assets is necessary in 
times of crisis in order to avoid decreasing national consumption.  After the 1980 
earthquake ruined parts of southern Italy, for instance, the country borrowed abroad, 
creating a current account surplus, to sustain its level of consumption and help rebuild 
(Neeley 1999).  Countries also borrow (and countries lend) to invest in the production of 
goods and services.  Obstructing this process can have dire results for the population of 
the country that imposes these restrictions. 
170 
 
Moreover, implementing capital controls often fail to have long-term effects.  
Although the policies may control the flow of capital in the short-term, opponents 
observe, finance experts easily learn how to circumvent the government restrictions.  
Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) emphasize this point in their research 
on Chile.  Although a number of policy makers and economists have lauded Chile’s use 
of capital controls, particularly the unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), Gallego, 
Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) have found that the benefits of capital controls 
are short lived, “of a temporary nature” (23).  “The speed at which the URR loses its 
effectiveness,” their models conclude, indicates that economic fundamentals will start 
deteriorating shortly after the URR has been introduced if the central bank fails in doing 
its job” (23).       
Economists identify two types of capital flows that policy makers try to regulate: 
Real and financial assets (Neely 1999).  Real assets refer to the international buying and 
selling of tangible items such as factories, equipment, and land.  This capital is known as 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  Financial assets, on the other hand, entail non-tangible 
assets such as securities, equity, bank deposits, loans, stocks and bonds.  A country’s 
capital account records both financial and real assets.  Along with the current account, 
which records other transactions such as import and export purchases, the capital account 
makes up a country’s balance of payments (BOP).  The BOP records all the transactions 
of values between the residents of one country and the rest of the world.                
Economists have considered FDI a more valuable and stable form of capital 
investment.  Investing in tangible assets, FDI facilitates technological transfers, invests in 
job creation, and remains in the host country longer than portfolio investment.  What is 
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more, investors of real assets are not able to pull their money out of a domestic economy 
so easily.  Essentially, most FDI is long-term investment.  The positive externalities of 
FDI, however, should not obscure the potential problems investment in real assets can 
cause.  Scholars have noted that FDI can have dire effects in developing countries, 
including environmental degradation, dumping of products, and unfair competitive 
advantages.  For example, Ratt (1992) demonstrates that large FDI inflows from the 
United States into Mexico during the regime of Porfirio Díaz (1884-1911) significantly 
contributed to the decrease of Mexican landholding.  Members of the peasantry, 
middleclass, and the business elite could not compete with the massive purchasing power 
of U.S. transnational corporations.  As a result, those who lost their land, businesses, and 
overall competitive edge to U.S. competition within Mexico contributed to the impetus 
behind the Mexican Revolution that began in 1911.  Nonetheless, FDI has been a desired 
form of investment.  With adequate domestic regulation, FDI has the potential to create 
domestic benefits in the form of job creation, economic growth, and technological 
transfer.  “Countries favor FDI, among other reasons,” international economists Ayan 
Kose and Eswar Prasad (2012) point out, “because it usually involves flows that are 
relatively long term and not subject to rapid reversals associated with changes in investor 
sentiment.”   
Financial assets, however, are much more volatile.  Most of these assets are in the 
form of portfolio investment, referring predominantly to money markets, stocks, and or 
bonds.  A significant portion is also invested as bank deposits by both international and 
domestic clients.  Investors can remove this capital much easier than those who have 
invested in FDI.  In fact, long-term portfolio investment can also leave a country rapidly 
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by merely paying a small fee.  International investors are not the only ones who can 
withdraw their money quickly.  Nationals can also remove investments.  If residents view 
a political crisis, many are inclined to withdraw their money from local accounts and 
deposit their assets abroad into banks considered more stable and less risky.  Often called 
“speculative attacks” in economic literature, a country can experience a significant 
decrease in international and domestic monetary reserves, precipitating a financial crisis 
that not only puts pressures on the home economy’s currency exchange rate, but also 
spreads throughout the entire country.  The Argentine government faced this problem 
when depositors tried to withdraw up to 80% of their bank assets during the economic 
crisis that destroyed the country in 2001 (see Ripley 2010b for an in-depth discussion). 
A serious economic crisis such as the one that hit Argentina in 2001 is not a 
necessary condition for investors and account holders to withdraw their money.  
Emerging economies often experience capital flight.  Capital flight is a common and 
pernicious economic phenomenon for developing countries.  It entails the massive 
outflow of portfolio capital when investors perceive the slightest uncertainty regarding a 
country’s economic and political stability (Gaggero, Casparrino, and Libman 2007).  
Economists in developing countries such as Argentina are particularly sensitive to the 
massive outflow of capital by both legal and illegal means and by both domestic and 
foreign capital (Ibid).
91
  Capital flight is especially prevalent in least developed countries 
(LDC) such as Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.  LDCs are considered risky and 
international investors have little knowledge about them.  Events as commonplace and 
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unavoidable as presidential elections and natural disasters can set off “credit panic.”  
Even if only a fraction of the investors withdraws their capital, others begin to follow in 
what has become known as the “herd mentality,” causing massive capital flight and 
financial crises.  For example, after Hurricane Mitch, Cost Rica had to significantly 
increase interest rates to stem the tide of capital removal.  Investors feared they would 
lose their investments due to the natural disaster (Costa Rica 1999).  Increasing interest 
rates offered incentives for international investors even if they led to slowing down 
economic growth, the exact opposite the country wanted in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster.  Other impoverished countries such as Nicaragua experience financial capital 
flight for events as politically routine as elections.  Elections often induce panic in 
investors because the change in not only a country’s political landscape but currency 
exchange rates and financial regulation can negatively affect investors’ interests.  
“Financial markets tend to behave with increasing nervousness,” political economist 
Javier Santiso (2003) points out, “because of the uncertain political outcomes involved in 
election years” (148).  Elections can produce “changeability of currency or bond 
traders’expectations,” Santiso concludes.  Latin American countries have also experience 
severe capital due to sovereign debt increases (Pastor 1990).      
Within the economic literature, researchers have identified five fears that cause 
policy makers to consider implementing capital controls.  Magud and Reinhart (2006) 
observe the first four.  The first involves currency appreciation.  With the inflow of 
financial capital, the nation’s currency appreciates, rendering its exports less competitive 
on the international market.  I will add that this fear is related to Dutch Disease.  When 
the Netherlands, after whom Dutch disease is named, discovered large natural gas 
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reserves in the North Sea in 1959, the economy experienced a significant production 
decrease in its manufacturing sector.  The country’s currency played a pivotal role.  A 
currency’s value, as with that of any commodity on the open market, is susceptible to 
appreciations and depreciations depending on its international demand.   When a country 
exports a commodity in high demand, such as oil or natural gas, the country’s currency 
inevitably becomes in demand. This often leads to an overly appreciated currency, 
causing the country’s other internationally traded products such as textiles and 
manufactured goods to be overpriced and, thus, not competitive.  As a result, with the 
discovery of natural gas, the value of the Netherland’s currency increased to the extent to 
which it rendered exports uncompetitive on the world market, undermining the 
manufacturing sector.  The influx of financial capital can have similar effects on a 
nation’s currency, causing significant appreciations.  An overvalued currency can also 
lead to higher inflation, something that many large oil producers such as Venezuela and 
Nigeria have historically suffered.  In fact, newly demanded commodities such as lithium 
in the case of Bolivia’s current efforts to develop its vast reserves must face the inevitable 
challenge of Dutch Disease (see Ripley and Roe 2012).  
Second, there is a fear of “hot money.”  Hot money involves large quantities of 
portfolio capital that can enter and leave the country quickly.  Magud and Reinhart 
(2006) point out that policy makers harbor a distrust of this type of financial investment 
due to the problems associated with its “sudden withdrawal” (647). The fear behind this 
type of investment is that it is susceptible to the herd mentality at any sign of trouble.  
Herd mentality is best defined as the inclination of investors to buy and sell financial 
assets that other investors are buying and selling at a given time.  As a result of this herd 
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buying and selling, significant amounts of capital can enter and then leave a country 
quickly, causing significant imbalances and distortions in the country’s domestic 
finances.     
The third fear entails large monetary inflows that are not necessarily categorized 
as hot money.  Large inflows can create distortions in the country’s finances even though 
investors are in long term commitments.  They can also create “bubbles” in the economy 
since with more investment both domestic and international investment can take risks and 
artificially inflate the demand and prices of important commodities such as housing and 
other real estate assets. I will also add that investors are merely looking for higher profits 
on the international market, many of which can be found in the bond rates in developing 
countries.  With interest rates in industrial economies low, international capital has 
entered in the financial markets of emerging economies in order to reap huge profits.  
Although there are intrinsic advantages to attracting international capital, such as using 
the funds for internal investment, many policy makers fear that a huge influx of money 
could create domestic problems, particularly asset bubbles in certain economic areas.          
The fourth fear is the loss of monetary independence.  This fear is related to an 
economic phenomenon commonly referred to as the unholy trinity or tridilemma.  This 
dilemma stresses that a country cannot exercise a fixed exchange rate, monetary 
independence, and a free flow of capital simultaneously.  This fear relates to the fixed 
exchange rate.  Although policy makers may not want a complete fixed rate, they may 
opt for one that is adjusted to a basket of currencies.  Essentially, this means that although 
the exchange rate is not inflexibly fixed to one currency, as the Argentine peso was to the 
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dollar (see Ripley 2012b) policy makers may use a basket of currencies to control its 
fluctuation.  Eliminating capital controls prohibits any exchange rate controls. 
Finally there is a fifth fear economists often fail to recognize: The loss of political 
autonomy.  International investors often exert control over populations in developing 
countries during election cycles.  Although candidates and parties, usually associated 
with the political left, may offer programs and policies that benefit the local domestic 
populations, investors often threaten populations for voting for candidates not in their 
interests.  Prior to the elections of Argentine presidents Néstor Carlos Kirchner (2003-
2007) and Christina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-present), foreign capital warned of 
electing known leftists.  Nonetheless, both administrations were successful at 
implementing capital controls and winning the Casa Rosada three consecutive times.  In 
fact, the economy has developed considerably despite fears (see Weisbrot et al. 2011)             
Capital controls have many objectives, depending on the specific goal policy 
makers may be targeting.  Although all the possible policy goals are too numerous to 
detail here, there are a number of common objects emerging countries have targeted.  The 
first pressing issue involves curbing the inflow and outflow of hot money.  As mentioned 
above, hot money can destabilize a country’s otherwise growing economy.  As a result, 
policy makers have implemented capital controls in order to control this international 
phenomenon.  Moreover, countries have used controls to encourage long term 
investment.  This capital control objective aims to undermine the relatively recent trend 
in short-term investment flows.  Instead of allowing investment and profits to be readily 
taken out of the home country once short-term debt profits accrue, policy makers of 
created policies to financially penalize both domestic and international investors who 
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aimed to withdraw money from the economy in short period of time.  The concept of 
“monetary autonomy” has also been related to capital control policies.  Imposing limits 
on controls forces economies to relinquish a useful tool to address a wide range of issues 
such as international economic crises, inflation control, optimal interest rates, and 
exchange rate pressures.  The inflow and outflow of financial capital, for instance, can 
cause distortions in a nation’s exchange rate by radically shifting the demand for the 
national currency.  The free flow of capital renders policy makers impotent in controlling 
and adjusting their own exchange rates.      
As mentioned above, an often unexplored reason for capital controls entails 
autonomy in not only monetary policy, but also political policy.  Many international 
investors withdraw capital when policy makers implement progressive policies that help 
the indigent in the particular country.  For example, land reform and increasing the 
royalties from natural resources may be beneficial for the poor masses that inhabit many 
developing countries; however, investors, interested more of raw profits than the long-
term stability and development for the native population.  Capital controls, however, can 
be judiciously employed in order to sustain needed investment.  Emerging economies, 
however, have had success with capital controls.  Malaysia affectively employed capital 
controls in order to slow down and control short-term capital inflows.  With low U.S. 
interest rates in the 1990s, Malaysia, an economy that was already attracting international 
capital, attracted short-investment to take advantage of its relatively higher interest rates. 
Short-term flows skyrocketed from 1.2% to 8.9% of GDP in a short three years between 
1990 and 1993 (Koenig 1996; Kawai and Takagi 2003; Cordero and Montecino 2010).
92
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In order to curtail these inflows and exercise monetary autonomy, Malaysian policy 
makers implemented a number of capital controls, including the following: Limits on the 
speculation of the nation’s currency and the lending for portfolio investment by the 
national banks; a prohibition on securities with less than a year to maturity; and 
unremunerated reserve requirements, relatively common control that decreases foreign-
held bank interest rates through a requirement that a portion of these deposits would not 
earn interest (Cordero and Montecino 2010).         
Of course, there is always debate on economic policy.  There should be debate on 
the extent to which capital controls did contribute to assisting the countries mentioned 
above with managing the various economic issues.  However, with such an ideologically 
broad spectrum of economists and policy makers advancing the argument for some type 
of capital control flexibility, why are all trade initiatives refuse such flexibility?  Why 
does the anti-capital control group, which is smaller in number, continually have their 
ideas crystallized in trade agreements?  “The ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than 
is commonly understood,” John Maynard Keynes famously stated, “[i]ndeed the world is 
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”  However, that 
is only true if economic ideas have powerful interests behind them.  Opposed to 
measuring the strengths and weaknesses of different policies and advancing the optimal 
policy options, the U.S. government, particularly the State Department, is lobbied by 
competing interests and ideas.  The contribution of this research is focusing on the effect 
such competition has on developing countries.  Powerful U.S. economic influence has led 
179 
 
to a pathway of economic instability and crisis for developing countries.  Challenging the 
prevailing economic literature on capital controls and a host of other economic policies, 
these interest groups have vehemently lobbied the U.S. government to lock emerging 
countries into legally binding trade deals.  Although their efforts have focused on the 
Treasury and State Departments, economic interest groups have also spread their 
influence to other governmental entities such as congressional committees.   
It is important to stress that scholars have observed that financial liberalization 
has occurred due to its economic value.  Removing capital controls has developed into 
the logical next step of globalization.  Lobbying efforts by powerful interest groups are 
not the culprit, but sound policy.  Rawi Abdelal of Harvard Business School advances 
such an argument.  In his 2007 book Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance, 
Abdelal argues that in lieu of U.S. hegemony and financial lobbying, Western Europe, 
particularly the French, advanced and normalized the idea of the free flow of capital.  The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an international 
groups spearheaded by European countries in the aftermath of World War II, not 
Washington, which, according to Adelal (2007), was “irrelevant” and “indifferent,” 
pushed for more global liberalization (3).                 
Financial Interests and Foreign Policy 
The evidence here, however, arrives to a set of different central questions: If 
capital controls are not sound policy, why do countries opt to rely on them?  Why do 
economists find them, at least under certain conditions, favorable?  Finally, how do 
influential groups overpower prestigious economists to create a pathway to instability?  
To adequately address these questions, one must understand the brief history of capital 
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controls.  In the past, capital controls were not a source of contention.  Relying upon the 
control of the flow of financial capital was a policy ingrained in the Bretton Woods 
system.  The architects of the system were preoccupied with the negative effects of 
capital mobility (Cox and Skidmore-Hess 1999).  The role of capital controls and a 
modicum amount of market intervention worked alongside free market capitalism.  This 
delicate balance between intervention and free market policies, many policy makers 
believed, would help maintain an acceptable level of economic growth and, where free 
markets failed, government intervention.  John Ruggie (1982) famously called this 
balance between the free market and intervention “embedded liberalism.”  This 
compromise allowed markets to enjoy a level of legitimacy while government 
intervention would compensate for it failures through social welfare programs such as 
unemployment benefits and the G.I. Bill.  Drawing upon a Keynesian economic 
approach, intervention would also assist through spending to create economic growth.  
“The failure to strike such a compromise earlier had undermined international 
cooperation in trade and macroeconomic policy during the 1920s and 1930s,” Abdelal 
and Ruggie (2009) point out,” just as it had caused the collapse of the first era of 
globalization, circa 1870 to 1914” (151).  For Ruggie and other scholars, capital controls 
played an instrumental role.  “Governments would be permitted—indeed,” Ruggie (1998) 
stresses, “were expected—to maintain capital controls” (74). 
Over time, however, interests related to international capital began lobbying for a 
removal of governmental economic regulation including capital controls.  The first two 
countries to experience lobbying and, thus, engage in and then spread deregulation were 
the United States and Great Britain.  During the 1950s, London and Wall Street bankers 
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tried desperately to lobby against and undermine the financial regulation and capital 
controls in their respective countries (Sanford 2009).  Efforts by financial interests were 
often rejected by governments, sustaining the fundamentals of the embedded liberal 
compromise.  According to some accounts, President John F. Kennedy even called the 
idea of lifting capital controls “absurd” (Ibid 15).  By the 1960s and 1970s, however, the 
objective to create the emergence of a deregulated liberal market unfettered by capital 
controls first in London and then in New York met with growing success (Helleiner 
1994).  Although governments were supportive of the ideas behind the Bretton Woods 
System, financial lobbyists held powerful sway over policy makers.  “But elite financiers 
had access to top monetary officials, who often were former colleagues,” observes 
Sanford M. Jacoby (2009), of UCLA Anderson School of Management, “and throughout 
the 1960s they lobbied steadily for financial deregulation” (17).  By 1974, the decision of 
U.S. policy makers to eliminate previous governmental capital controls allowed New 
York to become, in the words of Helleiner (1994), “a fully liberal international financial 
centre” (301).  This meant a significant decrease in regulated the movement financial 
inflows entering and leaving the United States.           
After success within their own countries, influential financial groups began to turn 
outward.  These groups did not want to remain only within their respective countries.  
The growth of financial capital and the concomitant development and expansion of 
lobbying groups exerted pressure on the U.S. government to expand deregulatory 
financial systems.  For example, the money involved in financial capital—public and 
private debt securities, equities, bank assets, etc.—grew from $12 trillion in 1980 to $140 
trillion by 2005 (Sanford 2009).  As a result, financial lobbying groups gained more 
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power.  Affiliations such as the Business Roundtable, a business interest group formed in 
1972 by some of the most powerful corporate CEOs, began exerting strong pressures on 
U.S. policy makers. The Roundtable, economists Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch (2012) 
point out, “launched the most extensive organizational campaign of private capital since 
the formation of the Committee on Economic Development in the early 1940s” (164).  
One of the reasons for the Roundtable’s creation was to counter and eliminate business 
and financial regulations (Gindin and Panitch 2012).  In fact, the Roundtable, along with 
other business groups, was instrumental in helping Washington pass the 1974 Trade Act 
and other investor-friendly policies (Ibid).  The 1974 initiative began the momentum 
behind eliminating capital controls.  “Internationalist interests that had been frustrated by 
capital controls a decade earlier,” Ronald Cox and Daniel Skidmore-Hess (1999) write 
regarding the 1974 act, “now were able to effect changes in state structure and function 
designed to promote a more aggressive export orientation” (157).  The 1974 Trade Act 
essentially gave the United States the right to apply unilateral trade sanctions against 
nations for applying policies that counter U.S. interests in foreign trade (Amat et al. 
2003).       
Moreover, the rise of conservative think tanks, often funded by financial capital, 
flourished throughout this time period and further exerted pressure on government.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, capital-friendly think tanks such as the Heritage 
Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute used the “power of ideas” to counter 
any type of financial regulation (Sanford 2009, 18).  The Heritage Foundation even 
developed an “Investment Freedom” report that reduces freedom “points” for financial 
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regulations such as capital controls.
93
  Think tanks, therefore, not only exerted more 
pressure on government, but also legitimized the idea of expanding deregulation and 
eliminating capital controls.  Additionally, financial capital would later become a primary 
contributor to political campaigns to support deregulation internationally and 
domestically, donated hundreds of millions of dollars to congressional and presidential 
campaigns (Stanford 2009).   
Although the period of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) has become synonymous with global liberalization and 
neo-liberalism, the movement to completely remove capital controls through trade deals 
became solidified during the presidency of William Clinton (1993-2001).  With the 
passage of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994), a sweeping trade 
agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, the regulatory system 
accepted in the Bretton Woods system dwindled away.  Scholars and policy makers often 
focus on the affect NAFTA has exerted on tariffs and the import-export balance of 
member countries.  However, NAFTA actually initiated the trend on eliminating capital 
controls through unilateral and regional trade agreements.  Article 1109 stipulates the 
repatriation of funds.  That is, NAFTA member countries must freely transfer any foreign 
capital—loans, profits, and investment—across its borders without regulation.  This is in 
essence the elimination of capital controls as a policy tool.  Essentially, “investor rights” 
took precedence over a country’s own policy initiatives.  Instead of actually allowing 
sovereign governments the right to exercise their choice of policy tools, NAFTA, in the 
words of economist Robert A. Blecker (2005), “promote[d] the agendas of their big 
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business and financial interests” (6).  This has led to “the veto power of financial capital 
over national economic policies” (Felix 2001, 1).  In fact, according to IMF Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus, the Mexican 1994-1995 economic bailout stipulated that the 
government could not revert to capital controls (Ibid).  One of the primary objectives of 
assisting the country with a multi-million-dollar credit during the country’s economic 
meltdown was to avoid not only Mexico from exercising policy decisions that countered 
the international trend in international financial deregulation, but other countries from 
following Mexico’s example as well (Ibid).94 
More recently, financial groups have continued to lobby Washington, particularly 
the U.S. Department of State, for investor rights and free trade initiatives that eliminate 
the use of capital controls.  The groups lobbying against capital controls entail a wide 
range of financial interests.  These interests are partly represented on a 2011 letter sent to 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other governmental officials who exercise 
considerable influence over U.S. trade and foreign policies.  The financial interest groups 
included powerful corporation and business groups such as United States Council for 
International Business (USCIB), Organization for International Investment (OFII), The 
Financial Services Roundtable, among many others.  The letter claimed that the use of 
capital controls and restrictions on balance of payments would “have major adverse 
commercial effects on U.S. companies and American jobs, allowing other countries to 
restrict not only the flow of capital, but also goods and services imports.”95  Despite the 
legitimate concerns the letter raises, U.S. investors abroad are return seekers; that is, they 
are interested in investing abroad for profit, at times as quickly as possible.  Any 
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impediment to the free flow of capital and profits counters business interests.  U.S. 
financial interests, for instance, were able to successfully lobby for the repatriation of 
funds, which entails the ability to freely remove all profit and capital without controls, in 
NAFTA, the free trade agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the United States.  No 
wonder the U.S. Chamber of Commerce labels capital controls as “unfriendly” to U.S. 
financial interests on its website.
96
            
The objective of the letter was to counter the growing demand to allow 
developing countries to rely on capital controls as an economic tool to create and 
maintain financial stability and growth.  Earlier in 2011, over 257 academics, policy 
makers, activists, and even politicians sent a letter to Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of 
State, and other U.S. officials inveighing against free trade liberalization agreements that 
eliminated the use of capital controls.  According to the letter, research has demonstrated 
that such controls can be useful to control asset bubbles and maintain monetary 
independence.  “Given the severity of the global financial crisis and its aftermath,” the 
letter stated, “nations will need all the possible tools at their disposal to prevent and 
mitigate financial crises.”97  The counter movement launched by financial business 
groups demonstrates not only the struggle to define and implement U.S. economic 
foreign policy, but also that policies concerning capital controls are of great interest to 
financial lobbying groups.  As a result, the idea that trade liberalization and the 
elimination of capital controls exist merely because they represent the normal and 
optimal policy strategies would be naïve.  Policy is shaped by those who have the 
influence. 
                                                          
96
 For the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, see 
http://www.uschamber.com/international/asia/southeastasia/thailand  
97
 For the full letter, see Hausmann (2011).  
186 
 
Letter writing is far from the only initiative upon which financial capital has 
relied to eliminate capital controls and lobby for their interests.  Understanding the 
current pressure to accept capital controls, international capital has begun a counter 
campaign.  In addition to countering the influence of economists, lobbying has been 
encouraged on Capitol Hill.  In an article titled “Asset managers must lobby 
Washington,” John Dizard (2013) has passionately argued for individuals involved in 
financial capital to pressure the U.S. government from relaxing its strict stipulations 
against capital controls.  His paramount worry is the IMF’s endorsement of capital 
controls.  Dizard (2013) fears, quite hyperbolically, “‘Global investing’ will have become 
something for the economic historians.”  Business groups have continued in earnest.  
Internationally-oriented financial business groups line up to lobby Washington, 
particularly the State Department.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the United States 
Council for International Business, among other influential groups that have staunchly 
lobbied for unfettered capital flows not only periodically present their interests to the 
State Department, but inform officials on how to carry out investment issues (see U.S. 
Department of State 2011).  
In fact, U.S. economic interests often look towards the Department of State for 
protection, particularly in Latin America.  For example, during the infamous Metalclad 
Corporation v. the United Mexican States (1999), the U.S. Corporation went straight to 
the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City.  Although the governor and residents of San Louis 
Potosí, one of Mexico’s thirty one states, protested the toxic waste dump site in their area, 
the Embassy not only immediately took the side of Metalclad, but also failed to engage in 
any diplomacy between Mexico, the United States, and Metalclad.  The then ambassador 
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merely stated that the role of embassies was for U.S. “political and commercial interests” 
(Moyers 2002).  More recently, wikileaks demonstrate the influence of oil companies and 
manufacturing over the State Department.  U.S. Oil companies lobbied the State 
Department to convince Haiti to reject Petrocaribe, a regional initiative supported by 
Venezuela to give Latin American and Caribbean countries preferential rates on oil 
imports.  Moreover, U.S. manufacturing interests lobbied the State Department to 
pressure Haiti to forego minimum wage increases in the sector (see Coughlin and Ives 
2011).   
The result of financial influence has led the U.S. State Department, which is the 
department designed to offer foreign policy analyses, advance diplomatic relations, and 
conduct foreign relations, to lose any independence in developing and advancing foreign 
economic and security policy.  Instead of incorporating the persistent calls for allowing 
capital controls in its economic foreign reports, and the Department of State continue to 
serve as a source for U.S. parochial economic short-term interests instead of general 
long-term interests.  Despite Washington’s warnings, in order to stave off financial crises, 
developing countries have been increasing relying upon capital controls and other forms 
of regulation (see Kaplan and Rodrik 2001; Epstein et al. 2003 ).  However, the State 
Department, the closest entity to these conditions, fails to acknowledge and report on the 
success of such policy tools.  Instead, the State Department, through embassies abroad, 
has supported parochial U.S. economic interests over long-term economic development 
and stability abroad.       
The case of capital controls extends far beyond the U.S. Department of State.  
Washington has been completely on board to support financial parochial interests.  In 
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addition to the State Department, the former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy 
Geithner (2009-2013) personally rejected the calls for flexibility on the issue of capital 
controls.  Specifically for Latin America, this means trade initiatives that completely 
eliminate any use of capital controls.  However, such trade deals put stability and 
development in the area at risk, decreasing any public goods trade relations could create.  
Latin American economies continue to attract portfolio investment that can cause 
economic havoc by creating boom-and-bust cycles, economic bubbles, and massive 
capital flight.  The fluctuation of portfolio investment can often lead to, in the words of 
Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber (2005), “manias, panics, and crashes.”      
Latin American economists and policy makers continue to perceive a significant 
risk in the free flow of capital (Fanelli 2001; Gaggero and Casparrino 2008; Cuenca 
2011).  In fact, the free trade initiatives between Washington and Latin America go 
beyond the investor protection advised by international financial institutions such as the 
WTO (Hornbeck 2003).  That is, U.S. investors receive more protection than IFIs 
suggest.  This has worried economists both within and without of Latin America.  As 
Robert Hunter Wade (2005) points out, these rules are shrinking the “development space” 
for effective economic policies (80).  As a result, the subject of capital controls is one of 
the motivations behind Latin America’s new regionalization stressed in this dissertation.  
Witnessing the success of relying upon capital controls not only in Latin America, but 
Asia, South American nations have turned to UNASUR to discuss the issue.  Knowing 
that Washington is against their use, regional organizations that exclude the United States 
fill the vacuum.  During UNASUR sessions, even Colombia, Washington’s staunchest 
ally, has openly raised the issue.  Mauricio Cardenas, a development minister from 
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Colombia, revealed that the country was looking closely again at the use of capital 
controls as a viable policy tool, particularly considering the large influx of investment 
into Latin America (MercoPress 2011).  For Cardenas, Latin American nations should 
consider a “coordinate effort” to decrease any individual negative image or investor 
backlash (Ibid).  Chile, another U.S. ally under the government of conservative President 
Sebastián Piñera (2010-present), is also considering capital controls as a policy tool, 
which the Chilean finance minister brought up during a meeting of UNASUR (Ibid).       
The Removal of Parochial Economic Interests 
One could argue that economic interests always influence U.S. foreign policy.  
The removal of parochial economic interests from U.S. foreign policy, however, helps 
explain the variance in foreign policy approaches.  When Washington and the U.S. 
Department of State resist and reject the influence of parochial economic lobbying 
groups, U.S. foreign policy can be drastically different, providing public goods.  These 
goods extend far beyond both Latin America and the issue of international economics.    
The goal here is to shortly draw upon cases that demonstrate the variance in U.S. foreign 
policy.  The cases are the following: a.) President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor Policy and the State Department’s response to Mexico’s nationalization of its 
oil production; b.) President Harry S. Truman and the State Department’s response to 
Iran’s nationalization of its oil production; and c.) President George W. Bush and the 
State Department’s response to Argentina’s debt default. 
Mexico and Oil Nationalization    
When Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934-1940) nationalized the 
country’s petroleum sector in 1938 and encroached upon the interests of Standard Oil 
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(United States) and Royal/Dutch Shell (United Kingdom), the Roosevelt Administration 
(1933-1945) came under great pressure to intervene and possibly destabilize the 
democratically elected president.
98
  In addition to the companies directly affected, a 
variety of U.S. economic businesses, fearful of the dangerous precedent of 
nationalization, demanded that the president responded harshly (see McConnell 1939).  
Initially, there were a number of strong verbal exchanges between the State Department 
and Mexican government initially (Schuler 1998).  The U.S. government even suspended 
the purchase of Mexican silver above global prices (Iriye 1995).  President Roosevelt, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1933-1944), and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Josephus 
Daniels, however, ultimately rejected any harsh measures or hostile actions against the 
country. President Cárdenas’s nationalization of oil production, which was part of his 
Plan Sexenal, was strongly supported by the Mexican people and the Mexican 
constitution (Cárdenas 2009).  Washington only stressed compensation for the 
nationalization of U.S. property.  They supported a Good Neighbor Policy by maintaining 
solid relations with President Cárdenas.  The State Department was even able to reach a 
deal for economic compensation (Ibid).  As Louis Turner (1974) concludes, “The 
Mexicans were lucky in that Franklin Roosevelt was relatively sympathetic” (399).   
This diplomatic stance and rejection of parochial economic interests resulted in 
stable relations with Mexico.  It also helped provide stability within Mexico.  Popular 
pressure for expropriation was strong within Mexico.  This support did not only come 
from the Mexican masses.  More importantly, the influential Mexican elite were strongly 
in favor of the expropriation. As Camín and Meyer (2001) point out, “The opinion of 
ruling circles in the country was that Mexican oil had to be controlled exclusively by 
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Mexico” (156).  Any attempt to influence policy within Mexico, particularly intervention 
against Cárdenas, would have been met with a harsh Mexican response.  What is more, 
any attempt to destabilize the government could have not only soiled the U.S. special 
relationship with Mexico, but also pushed Mexico into relations with the Axis Powers 
prior to the outbreak of World War II.      
Oil Interests in Iran 
Only twenty years later, President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) faced a similar 
international crisis.  While deep into his second term, Iran nationalized its oil production 
in 1951.  Although the Truman Administration’s approach to the problem has received 
scant academic attention, the case demonstrates how the removal of economic influence 
can create not only regional, but world public goods. Truman and Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson (1945-1953) took a similar approach to that of the Roosevelt Administration.  
Although relations grew tense, Truman and Acheson resisted U.S. and British economic 
interests that demanded intervention.  Instead, Acheson engaged in relations with Iran 
and tried to convince the British and U.S. oil companies that that nationalization was 
complete and not reversible.  Acheson even met with Mossadeq in 1951 first at 
Washington’s Union Station and later at Walter Reed Hospital in order to use diplomacy 
to advance a fair settlement (Elm 1992).  In fact, Acheson became outraged at British 
persistence for intervention in Iran, prompting him to write a strong rejection letter, 
though later toned down, to Deputy Prime Minister Anthony Eden (1951-1955) (Ibid).  
Eden continued to demand the ouster of Mossadeq (Chace 1998).  Acheson, however, 
believed that economic interests had too much influence in the British government.   “In 
that area Eden continued to take advice from the same sources which had, I thought,” 
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Acheson wrote, “Poisoned the judgment of the Labour Party—the bureaucracy of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company” (in Pirouz 2008, 487).  By rejecting economic interests and 
maintaining an independent State Department, both Truman and Acheson created 
stability for the region and sustained democracy.  If there had not been a change in 
presidency and, thus, policy in 1954, the Middle East, specifically Iran, could have been a 
completely different place with better U.S. relations today.   
The Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961), however, had other plans.  With the 
incoming Dulles brothers John Foster and Allen Welsh as the Secretary of State (1953-
1959) and Director of the CIA (1953-1961), respectively, economic parochial interests 
and foreign intervention became more acceptable.  Allen Dulles (1932) even wrote an 
article in Foreign Affairs stressing the need for a State Department that was more 
supportive of U.S. economic interests.  As a result, British and U.S. oil companies found 
a friend in the new administration.  In 1953, the Eisenhower Administration, with the 
active support of the State Department and CIA, carried out Operation Ajax, a concerted 
and successful effort by Iranian dissidents, Washington (through the CIA), and Britain’s 
MI6 to overthrow Mossadeq.  The CIA and MI6 carried out the illegal act in 1953, 
imposing the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who periodically ruled Iran, and his 
authoritarian rule.
99
  The illegal overthrow of the democratically- elected Iranian Prime 
Minister was one of the biggest errors of the administration.  For the Iranians, this caused 
hatred for the United States and the politicization of the Mosques, led to the 1979 Islamic 
revolution, and created relational problems between Tehran and Washington that still 
persist today (Kinzer 2008).  Unfortunately, the Eisenhower Administration did not stop 
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with Iran.  Under the influence of the United Fruit Company, Washington, again through 
the CIA, overthrew the democratically-elected president Guatemalan President Jacobo 
Arbenz (1951-1954).  After coming to power, Arbenz initiated popular land reform 
programs, distributing idle land of the powerful U.S. Banana company.  After lobbying 
Washington and spreading propaganda against the Guatemalan president, a successful 
CIA-supported coup toppled the president and instituted a dictatorship that last for 
decades (see Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990 for more on the coup).  The establishment of 
authoritarian governance created the conditions for instability and guerilla movements for 
nearly four decades until the 1996 peace accords.
100
   
Bush and Kirchner  
Finally, a lesser known case between conservative U.S. President George W. 
Bush and the center-left Argentine President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) demonstrates 
how the removal of economic influence can create public goods in the most unlikely 
scenario.
101
  Although Bush had been close to financial capital, the president and the 
State Department resisted demands from financial capital to take a strong stance against 
Argentina after the country became the largest sovereign debt defaulter in the history of 
international finance.  In fact, since the 2001 default, a succession of Argentine presidents 
became more defiant with creditor demands.  President Kirchner became the most 
confrontational.  He continued to ignore creditor demands, which came from both the 
United States and Western Europe, to restructure the country’s nearly $100 billion debt.  
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essentially authoritarianism, for the populace leads to instability and possibly later revolution. 
   
101
 Eric Helleiner (2005) is the only one to write on this case to the author’s knowledge.   
194 
 
Instead, he offered an agreement in which bondholders would receive less than 10 cents 
to the US dollar back on their debt (Bloomberg 2004).  “Those who gambled with these 
high-risk bonds,” President Kirchner announced, “knew that they were playing in a 
casino” (in Tobar 2004).   
Washington, however, did not side with the creditors.  “While international 
investors were predictably upset,” Eric Helleiner (2005) points out, “the response of the 
USA was more unusual” (951).  Instead of calling for a bailout or pressuring Argentina to 
pay creditors, the Bush Administration engaged diplomatically with Kirchner.  Secretary 
of State Collin Powell met with President Kirchner to offer him support (Grech and 
Oppenheimer 2003).  Even the conservative US assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega offered support to Kirchner.  “It’s Time for the IMF 
to be more flexible and reasonable with Argentina,” he declared (Helleiner 2005).  Bush 
himself met with and supported Kirchner to strike deals with the IMF that would tie any 
new aid to restructuring creditor debt (Ibid).  The undersecretary of the Treasury for 
international affairs at the time, John B. Taylor succinctly explained the strategy: “We 
want to follow a policy that does not bail out bondholders and improves the market over 
all” (in Kahn and Sanger 2002, 3).  Bondholders of Argentine credit were not happy with 
the Bush Administration.  As the American Task Force Argentina (ATFA), one of a 
number of groups consisting of investors trying to pressure the U.S. and other 
governments to take a tough stance against Argentina, wrote on their website, “the Bush 
administration had not used the option of coordinated pressure on Buenos Aires” (Welt 
2007). 
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The reason behind the Bush Administration’s decisions still remains unclear.  
Instead of markets, a key motivation could have been to pry Argentina out of the 
influence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.  The administration maintained tight 
relations with leftist Brazilian President Lula de Silva.  The State Department may have 
endeavored to repeat its diplomatic success.  Regardless of the motives, diplomacy with 
Argentina was instrumental for Argentine stability and democracy.  Argentina had faced 
its worst economic crisis, a series of violent protests, and a succession of five ousted 
presidents within only two weeks at the turn of 2002.  If Washington had pressured the 
government, used interventionist tactics, or applied punitive economic measures, the 
Kirchner government may not have survived.  Instead, stability ensued, economic growth 
increased, and democracy, through a series of presidential and regional elections, ran 
smoothly.  The White House and Casa Rosada have maintained strong diplomatic and 
economic relations since.  In fact, the lack of influence financial capital has had over 
Washington in the case of Argentina prompted U.S. and European bond holders to create 
their own “Task Force” to pressure Argentina and bring the country to U.S. courts.102                                                   
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CHAPTER 8 
LATIN AMERICA’S NEW REGIONALIZATION: OPENING SPACE FOR 
ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE, DEBATE, AND POLICY 
Introduction 
Latin American regional agreements have come and gone throughout the last two 
centuries.  Few, however, have actually led to concrete regional institutions and real 
policy influence.  As mentioned earlier, a number of Central American initiatives that 
aimed to create a common union and shared political institutions throughout the 
beginning of the twentieth century failed to materialize and produce tangible benefits.  
Only with the multilateral assistance of the United States, the regional hegemony, and 
Mexico, an alternative hegemony, was the region able to create the Central American 
Court of Justice (1908-1918).  Other initiatives, however, have not been as fruitful.  The 
Contadora Group (1983-1985) and Esquipulas Peace Agreements (1987), attempts to 
forge Central American peace, failed to advance concrete conflict resolution strategies.  
Although they aimed to halt support for insurgency groups, create a better distribution of 
wealth, and decrease tension between the five republics (Ordóñez and Gamboa 1997), the 
accords failed to meet these objectives.  With the marginalization of U.S. diplomacy and 
the absence of an alternative power to counterbalance U.S. influence, particularly the 
Reagan Administration’s (1981-1989) illegal war against Nicaragua and unwavering 
support for the military regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador, the initiatives, though 
producing well-intentioned guidelines for peace, never had the adequate resources and 
power behind them.  Mexico, the alternative hegemonic regional powerhouse at the time, 
failed to take on its role.  Due to domestic constraints, the country’s waning interest in 
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Central American conflicts, and Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado’s 
(1982-1988) decision to cement U.S. bilateral relations, the government opted to 
withdraw adequate support from the region, causing the country to fail to become a 
viable alternative power to challenge U.S. hemispheric policies (Castañeda 1985).   
Currently, however, Latin America has experienced a renewed interest in the use 
of supranational institutions.  This new interest has emerged out of the rise of leftist 
political movements throughout the region.  Venezuelan President Hugo Rafael Chávez 
Frías (1999-present) has initiated a number of multilateral regional agreements and 
supranational bodies, including The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas 
(ALBA) (2004), The Declaration of Orinoco (2005), The Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) (2008), The Banc of the South (2009), and The Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (Celac) (2010).  While these regional initiatives have 
occasional attracted the attention of governmental officials, ideological bloggers, 
activists, and journalists, they have drawn minimal scholarly emphasis from the academic 
community.   
Critical Space      
Despite this failure of scholarship, this study finds that the new rise of 
international institutionalism in Latin America is of great importance for academic 
research, particularly international relations scholarship.  Instead of relying on the 
conventional IR theoretical approaches, however, this research draws upon critical 
literature related to spaces.  The concept of space allows us to understand the value of 
regional institutions beyond the United States and Europe.  Focusing specifically on the 
Declaration of Orinoco, the precursor to the Bank of the South, and UNASUR, this 
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research demonstrates that the current rise of Latin American regionalization provides 
what I call critical space for alternative regional policies.
103
  By isolating the United 
States, the regional hegemonic power, South American countries have been able to create 
space for alternative discourse and debate that have led to genuine change in 
governmental and economic policies.  These policies rely upon not only the use of 
international law, diplomacy, and regional negotiations to address current problems, but 
also alternative economic policies to facilitate economic stability and growth. 
Space in political theory has a long trajectory.  Jürgen Habermas considered 
public space vital for the creation of democracy.  In The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Space, Habermas (1991) posits significant questions regarding democracy.  Most 
importantly, can we know the conditions under which the argument itself and not the 
status of the individual will guide and determine society’s most important decisions?  For 
Habermas (1991), the development of public space, or what he would call the “public 
sphere” was instrumental (54).  Within this space, civil society, not just the elite, could 
participate and influence society.  “For Habermas the coffee houses, salons and table 
society of Europe were examples of inclusive literary public spaces,” Ted Fleming (2008) 
points out, “because of their equality, critique, problematizing the unquestioned, 
accessibility and reflexivity” (2).  Although space can entail competing powerful political 
interests, it is also a place in which the voiceless can have a voice.  Essentially, public 
space is an amorphous and often ambiguous place in which all societal members can 
participate, regardless of their social and economic standing.  Space, as Mustafa Dikec 
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(2005) avers, “becomes the polemical place where a wrong can be addressed and equality 
can be demonstrated” (172).  The concept of opening space for genuine equality and even 
justice has led to wide range of research agendas.  Furguson and Turnbull (1999), for 
instance, demonstrate how public space was instrumental in facilitating debate over U.S. 
military occupation in Hawai’i.  Drawing upon Derrida and the concept of hospitality, 
Doty (2006) further demonstrates how space opens assistance for Latin American 
migrants on the Arizona border.  Despite draconian laws against migrant workers and 
immigrants, there are ambiguous spaces, often overlooked by both scholars and policy 
makers, which facilitate, Doty (2006) concludes, “practices and experiences” that 
genuinely lead to humane acts of hospitality along the southwestern borders (55).
104
   
Building upon the literature and concept of space, I suggest that flexible 
regionalization can create the public space in which alternative ideas, discourse, and 
debate can take place at an international level.  This space does not only facilitate the 
discussion of different ideas, but also leads to genuine policy decisions, most of which 
the United States, the principal regional hegemon, would otherwise oppose.  Drawing 
upon critical spaces to understand regional organizations is innovative and significant for 
a number of reasons.  First, as with Doty’s case of borders and hospitality, scholars, 
policy makers, and the media often overlook the importance of space.  Even more 
importantly, in the fields of international relations and international political economy, 
the theoretical frameworks of neo-realism, economic liberalism, functionalism, and neo-
functionalism dominate the literature.  Scholars who draw upon theories related to 
realism stress security concerns.  States can engage in cooperation, but primarily for two 
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goals: To protect themselves from other states with stronger material capabilities and to 
balance the expansion of imperial states (see Doyle 1997 for state balancing).  The 
foreign policy of Venezuela is no exception.  Drawing upon conventional IR scholarship 
on state balancing, Marc Eric Williams (2011) confirms that Venezuela is engaging in a 
“new balancing act” (257).  Williams (2011) points out that Caracas is trying to change 
the unipolar world dominated by Washington by creating a “multipolar order” (260).  The 
alternative mainstream literature on regional integration relies on international economic 
theory.  The objective of states is to integrate economic activity in linear fashion: free-
trade agreements, customs union, common market, monetary union, and finally full 
economic union.  Based on the European Union’s experience, most literature analyzes 
integration within this framework.  For South America, scholars have researched 
integrations, particularly The Common Market of the South (Mercosur), which has 
attained the status of customs union, and to a lesser extent the Andean Pact, in this 
fashion (see Pang and Jarnagin 2009).  Although both research agendas offer insight into 
regionalism and integration, critical methods allow us to understand the new 
regionalization in a fundamentally different way: Spaces allow alternative ideas and 
policy initiatives to develop.  Conventional scholarly approaches, however, fail to 
understand the importance of space.        
The new development of Latin American regionalization, however, raises a 
fundamental question: Is an alternative hegemon able to provide public goods in the first 
place?  There are a number of concerns if Latin American countries look toward a local 
regional power.  First, an alternative hegemon could merely supplant the dominance of 
the United States.  Since space is fraught with political interests, the power and discourse 
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of the more influential Latin American states, as well as the economic and social classes 
that make up these countries, could dominate and marginalize the less powerful ones.  
Through regional initiatives, countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico have 
imposed their own parochial interests on smaller states.  During the 2006 Peruvian 
presidential election, for example, Alan García (2006-2011), the winning candidate, and 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Peru’s outgoing president, accused Venezuela of 
interfering in the campaign and encroaching on the country’s sovereignty (BBC 2006).  
This is a complaint more commonly reserved for the United States.  South American 
countries have also complained about the unfair power structures inherent in regional 
institutions.  The weaker members of MERCOSUR, Latin America’s most cohesive and 
advanced regional institution, have threatened to withdraw.
105
  Paraguayan President 
Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003-2008) is one who advanced this threat due to the power 
Argentina and Brazil has exercised over Paraguay and Uruguay.  Duarte lambasted the 
two countries’ “selfishness,” “hypocrisy” and “protectionism,” and demanded “[a] 
profound correction, a historic reparation” of MERCOSUR if the regional group wished 
to survive (in Mander 2006).  In fact, neighboring countries have often perceived the 
regional expansion of Brazil, MERCOSUR’s most influential member, as a 
“subhegemonic” power (Turcotte and Mostajo 2008, 804).  The country’s increasing 
economic power has put it at odds with not only MERCOSUR members, but also the 
current rise of progressive movements.  Brazilian companies such as Petrobas now 
penetrate the area.  When Bolivian President Evo Morales (2006-present) began 
nationalizing property on a popular mandate during his first term as president, tension 
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202 
 
grew between Bolivia and Brazil due to the economic interests of powerful Brazilian 
corporations like Petrobras (Kellog 2007).  Will these powerful interests dominate the 
space created by new regional institutions?   
Although such fear is valid, inter-Latin American conflict is qualitatively different 
from the conflict found between the United States and Latin American nations.  First, 
albeit Latin American countries engage in border disputes, few actually lead to outright 
invasion.  Invasion, however, is a common historical trait in U.S.-Latin America 
relations.  What is more, intra-Latin American conflict never reaches the “scope” or 
“depth” of U.S. intervention.106  I use scope to connote the wide range of interventionist 
policies Washington has exercised throughout the geographic area of the Americas.  The 
United States has intervened in domestic and international Latin American conflict both 
close to and far from its borders.  In addition to the extensive intervention and occupation 
in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, Washington has reached as far away as 
Chile and Venezuela to intervene in Latin American affairs.  Conflict within Latin 
America, on the other hand, is predominantly confined to surrounding territories.  
Although Peru and Ecuador engaged in the Cenepa War (1995) over contested areas of 
land, for example, the conflict never engulfed other countries.  Latin American countries, 
therefore, do not fight unless they are neighboring states.  Mexico will never invade 
Panama as Washington did in 1989.  Furthermore, Latin American nations have never 
had the “depth” of intervention.  Here, I rely on depth to describe the level to which U.S. 
interventionism runs.  Washington invests a great portion of its resources into a wide 
range of tactics that allow for a deeper level of interventionism.  These include covert 
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infiltration, spying, propaganda, military bases, Washington-friendly dictators, and so 
on.
107
  Despite a few number of incidents, such as Colombian espionage in Nicaragua 
(see Silva and Flores 2012), Latin American countries have rarely engaged in such 
profound intervention. 
Finally, there is the fear that regionalization could go in the direction of monetary 
unions.  A monetary union leads to a common currency.  President Chávez has suggested 
that the new Latin American regionalization moves in this direction.  ALBA countries 
have already released el Sucre, a virtual currency allowing certain transactions.
108
  The 
currency, initially valued at US$1.25, was created to purchase products between member 
states.  Products included various textiles, wood, and staple foods among other consumer 
goods (América Economía 2010b).   However, currency overvaluation is genuine fear for 
South America.  It can occur not only with the dollar, as in the case of Argentina’s one-
on-one peg with the dollar, but with local currencies as well.  Venezuela, the world’s fifth 
leading oil producer, suffers from Dutch disease.  Dutch disease, named after the 
Netherlands’ experience developing natural gas resources, entails a significant increase in 
a currency’s value.  This increase is attributable to the concomitant demand for the 
currency once the country begins to export a natural resource.  The currency becomes so 
overvalued that other exports become uncompetitive in the international market. 
Venezuela’s currency suffers from severe international pressures. Oil production has a 
drastic effect on its currency.  The bolívar has historically been an unstable currency that 
swings high and low depending on oil prices.  With respect to the international prices of 
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 The Sucre is named after General Antonio José de Sucre (1795–1830), a general who fought for Latin 
American independence. He is predominantly known for his pivotal role in the Battle of Ayacucho (1824). 
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oil, the elasticity of the bolívar’s exchange rate has ranged from 0.5 to 0.8 (Panayotou, 
Boscolo, and Faris 2002).  Therefore, Venezuela’s currency is overvalued, fueling 
domestic inflation.  Although economists often attribute inflation to the spending policies 
of the populist government (see Ramírez 1991), Venezuela had a history of battling 
inflationary pressures before Hugo Chávez’s implemented his expansionary policies.  
This economic concern of inflation still persists today.  Just between 2008 and 2009, 
Venezuela experienced a significant rise in inflation (see Figure 8.1).  
Figure 8.1: Venezuela’s core inflation rate (2008-2009) using December 2007 as the base 
year.
109
 Source: Adapted from Venezuela’s National Institute of Statistics. 
     
 
Although scholars continue to debate the extent to which Dutch disease has 
affected Venezuela and the extent to which the current government has been able to 
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handle the problem (see Hofer 2006), it exists as a serious policy conundrum.  Latin 
American countries want to avoid linking their currencies to that of Venezuela.  Flexible 
regionalization, however, allows the space through which Latin American countries can 
benefit from their own independent monetary policies.  It recognizes the intrinsic pitfalls 
involved with sharing common currencies. Flexible regionalization also remains pliable 
enough to retain the benefits from relations with the United States.  Retaining benefits 
from the United States is a crucial component.  Despite the anti-Washington rhetoric, 
even current Latin American leftist movements have openly conceded their desire to 
maintain relations with Washington.  Particularly in the area of trade and development, 
center-left presidents such as Lula de Silva (2003-2010) of Brazil and Humala Ollanta 
(2011-present) of Peru have sought bilateral U.S. trade relations.  Uruguayan President 
Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
with the United States in 2007.  President Daniel Ortega (2007-present) of Nicaragua has 
continued to offer support for the CAFTA-DR trade agreement.  Even President Evo 
Morales, who kicked the U.S. Drug and Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents out 
of the country, continually emphasizes that Bolivia-United States relations can be a 
positive-sum partnership.  In recent developments, both Cuba and the United States have 
even recognized that there are mutual benefits working together on environmental and 
drug trafficking issues (see Thale, Withers, and Boggs 2012). 
Despite numerous benefits, U.S. interventionism in Latin American economic and 
political affairs often fails to provide stability and progress.  The principal problem has 
been the asymmetric power structure.  Conceding the potential long-term benefits 
associated with U.S. relations, Morales laments that they have not been based on equal 
206 
 
partnership; the United States has historically been the dominant partner.  Morales 
stresses that the interventionist and misguided policies Washington exercises in regards 
to the cultural use of coca is tantamount to having a foreign nation write Bolivia’s own 
domestic policies.  As a member and then General Secretary of the cocalero union and 
grassroots movement, Morales has resented U.S. efforts to encroach upon Bolivia’s 
sovereignty to undermine the movement and destroy the crop.
110
  According to 
Wikileakes, Ortega echoed similar concerns privately with the U.S. Embassy, lamenting 
that through free trade, “the developed country can impose its will whenever it pleases” 
(Nation 2011).   
  Alternative regional institutions, however, can help contain the negative 
externalities of U.S. influence and allow Latin American countries to experiment with 
alternative ideas concerning economic progress and conflict resolution strategies.  
Drawing upon UNASUR and Banco del Sur, two current regional agreements initiated by 
the Venezuelan government, I examine the extent to which the supranational bodies have 
the capacity to balance U.S. regional influence.  Both UNASUR and Banco del Sur have 
attracted scant attention from academic scholars and policy makers.  The limited sources 
that have mentioned UNASUR and Banco del Sur fail to engage in an in-depth analysis 
of how they can serve as viable alternatives to the international initiatives supported and 
dominated by the United States, such as the Organizations of American States (OAS), the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Central American Free Trade 
Association (CAFTA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank.  What 
is more, scholarly and policy literature dismisses their validity and efficacy of UNASUR 
and Banco del Sur, depicting them as mere vehicles for President Chavez’ political 
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agenda against the United States.  Barry Eichengreen, a prestigious economist from 
University of California Berkeley, for instance, dismisses Venezuela’s initiative to 
purchase Argentine bonds in the aftermath of the country’s crisis as “a crazy idea” (in 
Kanenguiser 2005).  Eichengreen’s characterization, however, is quite superficial.  
Additionally, in his New York Times bestselling book The Post-American World, scholar 
and public “intellectual” Fareed Zakaria (2012) simply labels Venezuela “a 
troublemaker” and concludes that President Hugo Chávez only offers “insane rants” 
(19).
111
    
As a result of the lack of serious research, a gap has emerged in the literature.  
Relying upon two case studies, I aim to address this gap and contribute to the literature 
on regionalization and Latin American studies by addressing the two following questions: 
What specific regional policies has critical space facilitated and how have these policies 
made specific changes in either economic or conflict resolution strategies?  The first case 
study, the role of Venezuelan bonds in the aftermath of Argentina’s 1999-2002 economic 
crisis, demonstrates that creating an alternative lending institution can provide space for 
alternative economic policies.  The second case, the use of UNASUR to decrease tension 
between Colombia and Venezuela, demonstrates that curtailing U.S. influence can 
actually be beneficial for South American conflict resolution. 
The “Washington Consensus” and John Williamson 
The two principle types of U.S. influence regionalization aims to curtail are 
economic and political.  The economic model Washington supports has become known 
as the “Washington Consensus.”  The Washington Consensus has been debated, vilified, 
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and praised well enough in other literature to make a rehearsal here quite pointless.  
However, a brief synopsis is warranted since it remains a principal agent behind the rise 
of the new regionalization and leftism throughout Latin America more generally.  
Economist John Williamson originally employed the term “Washington Consensus” in 
the late 1980s to describe a range of policies to assist Latin American countries out of 
their economic slump.  He formally coined the term in his 1990 book Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?  Geared to debt-ridden Latin America, 
Williamson (1990) laid out ten economic reforms countries could use in order to 
revitalize their economies: Fiscal discipline, the alteration of public expenditures, tax 
reform, secure property rights, privatization of public entities, deregulation, more 
competitive exchange rates, the liberalization of interest rates, and the removal of barriers 
against trade and foreign direct investment.   
A decade later, the Washington Consensus has become a pejorative term to 
describe neo-liberal capitalist policies that developed countries have imposed on weaker 
impoverished ones.  Williamson (2002b) himself dislikes the idea of the Washington 
Consensus being negatively associated with insensitive capitalist economic policy.  
“[T]he world over seem[s] to believe that this signifies a set of neoliberal policies that 
have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial 
institutions and have led them to crisis and misery,” Williamson (2002b) laments, “[m]y 
own view is of course quite different.”  Williamson (2002b) points out that the essentials 
of his plan—economic openness, economic discipline, and market economics—all have 
wide acceptance even among center-left presidents such as Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; 
who has embraced such policies in order to be “electable.”  In fact, Williamson (2002b) 
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argues that he has never enshrined all neoliberal economic policies to begin with; for 
example, he is against the liberalization of capital accounts in developing nations, a 
current policy that’s very popular with neoliberal adherents. Williamson (1998) also 
stresses the need for both a large government-supported “safety net,” as in the case of Sri 
Lanka in the aftermath of the country’s economic crisis. 
Nonetheless, the Washington Consensus has become inseparably linked to 
neoliberalism.  It serves as an umbrella term for a cornucopia of neoliberal ideas on how 
not only to develop an economy but also to measure economic success.  The neo-liberal 
economic approach emphasizes limited governmental intervention, the privatization of 
state institutions, favorable conditions for foreign investment, the free flow of capital, 
utility maximization, low inflation, export-led growth, and deregulated free market 
capitalism.  The evaluative tools economists have used are gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, inflation rates, balance of payments statistics, foreign investment figures, fiscal 
equilibrium, and stable exchange rates.  Essentially, advocates of neoliberalism find most 
state intervention in the economy suspect.  The state either precludes economic 
development at its best, or destroys it outright at its worst.  “State-bashing” is often 
ubiquitous in neoliberal circles.  Let the people benefit from the invisible hand of market 
economics adherents rejoice.  The free market knows better than the government; thus, 
the private sector should grow unhindered by regulation.  This often means no 
environmental regulation, no taxes on foreign investors, and certainly no unions.  In fact, 
keeping macroeconomic stability is a number one priority.  Fiscal deficits must be 
controlled even if it means tough choices.  Cutting public expenditures such as healthcare 
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and education, at times, are important sacrifices for maintaining fiscal equilibrium, 
keeping low inflation, and sustaining international monetary reserves. 
The ideology behind neoliberal economics is not the only force contributing to the 
need for Latin American regionalization.  Powerful U.S. and international economic 
interests have pushed for not only neoliberalism, but also policies that privilege their 
particular economic objectives. International bond holders and other groups, as this 
dissertation has demonstrated, have relied on their lobbying power and contacts within 
the U.S. government to institutionalize specific guidelines for trade, aid, and 
development; however, the policies may not be beneficial for the particular host country.  
As mentioned in Chapter 7, U.S. interests have successfully lobbied for phasing out the 
use of capital controls, even though economists have advanced support for them as policy 
tools.     
The New Interventionism 
The other force is U.S. intervention in Latin American political affairs.  Since 
Latin American nations gained their independence in the early part of the seventeenth 
century, the United States has increasingly intervened in the domestic affairs of its 
southern neighbors.  In addition to invasions and occupations of Latin American nations 
such as Mexico (1846-1848), Nicaragua (1910; 1912-1933; 1980-1990), and Haiti (1915-
1934; 2004), the United States has intervened through regional and international 
institutions such as the IMF and the OAS.  The United States used the OAS to legitimize 
a number of questionable policies, including blocking Cuba’s participation, the recent 
Haitian presidential election (2010), and the invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965), 
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which, after finally receiving approval for a multi-lateral coalition, severely undermined 
the credibility of the organization (Longley 2011).   
U.S. intervention in Latin America, however, has been documented by a wide 
range of scholars, policy makers, journalists, and activists from both the United States 
and Latin America.  A recapitulation here is not necessary.  But it is crucial to understand 
that U.S. intervention is not limited to only direct military and CIA interference.  In lieu 
of supporting poorly trained and equipped guerillas or initiating and outright military 
invasion, economic and political interest groups have become more sophisticated.  They 
have learned to utilize relatively new phenomena such as the rise of NGOs, human rights 
campaigns, governmental-sponsored “peace” and “democracy” initiatives, and grassroots 
and civil society movements.  This is what I call the “new intervention.”  Although one 
could argue that this latter type of intervention represents similar tactics used in the Cold 
War, U.S. political and economic interest groups have adapted quite successfully to new 
technologies, movements, and buzz words.  For example, U.S. political interests have 
exerted power through NGOs.  As I mentioned in the mini-case study, the International 
Republican Institute (IRI) was able to receive funding from the U.S. government, create 
grassroots and civil society organizations, and fight for “democratic freedoms” in Haiti.  
The objective, however, was to destabilize President Aristide through these proxy 
movements (see Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).  With deep pockets, the U.S. 
government has also been able to co-opt academic scholarship, funding Washington-
centric journals, databases, and university programs.  These scholars engage in “policy 
critique,” but fail to challenge the world power structures.   Essentially, they criticize 
specific policies, but only to maintain the hegemony of the United States.  An example is 
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Rand Corporation’s criticism of Plan Colombia, pointing out that resources would be 
better used through drug rehabilitation centers in the United States, rather than fighting 
drug dealers beyond our borders.  However, Rand Corporation, self-described as an 
independent think tank, perpetuates and legitimizes U.S. intervention around the world.  
In Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire, the 
only research to access undisclosed files, author Alex Abella (2008) concludes that the 
think tank’s main object in the 1980s was to support then President Reagan’s foreign 
policy, particularly in Latin America.  The objective was not to provide “objective 
analysis.”112  The new rise of Latin American regionalization could be a powerful force 
to protect the area from extensive U.S. intervention.       
UNASUR and Banco del Sur 
  The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is the creation of a South 
American political union.  The original idea came from the Chavez Administration.  At 
the encouragement of the Venezuelan President, a number of South American nations 
came together in 2004 to sign the Cuzco Declaration, the initial agreement that set the 
foundation for the union.  The declaration embodied many of the same generic points 
found in any regional agreement, such as the support for democracy, human rights, and 
social justice.  In 2007, at the behest of Chile, the organization changed its name from the 
Community of South American Nations (CSN) to La Union de Naciones Suramericanas 
(UNASUR), or the Union of South American Nations in English.  It became an official 
regional institution, ratified by the twelve member countries, on March 11, 2011.  
Celebrating UNASUR’s constitutive treaty, Chavez proclaimed that the institution would, 
“defend our independence and consolidate our freedom” (Telesur 2011).  
                                                          
112
 See the Rand Corporation’s website at http://www.rand.org/.  
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Although many of the objectives may not be readily attainable, UNASUR has met 
its initial goal: To unite all South American countries under one institutional body that 
excludes the United States and Canada.  This achievement cannot be underestimated.  
Although Chavez has become infamously known for his anti-Washington agenda and 
discourse, U.S. South American allies have joined the Union.  Currently, Venezuela, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Guyana, 
Suriname, and Paraguay all have member status.  Convening states with such a wide 
array of ideological backgrounds and interests deserves recognition.  Colombia is not 
only governed by a staunch center-right president, Juan Manuel Santos, but also 
historically embroiled with Venezuela in a number of border disputes.  Most recently, 
However, Santos has given support to UNASUR by being an active member.  In fact, 
through UNASUR, Colombia is one out of six countries that have already begun to share 
information on military spending.  Chile and Brazil originally advanced the idea of 
coordinating military information during the 2005 Defence Bilateral Working Group and 
a number of successive bilateral meetings.  The initiatives had a number of lofty 
objectives: Disclosure of military budgets; exchange of military equipment; the creation 
of a regional military academy; and defence integration.  By 2009, all twelve South 
American UNASUR members officialized the Consejo de Defensa Suramericano under 
the aegis of the supranational body (Ministerio de Defensa 2009).  Interestingly, the six 
member countries that have disclosed information come from various ideologies. Center-
right presidents govern both Chile and Colombia, whereas center-left presidents preside 
over others: Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador.              
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Being able to unite twelve countries with different ideological views of the world 
leads to a pivotal question: What self-interest is in it for them?  Although intra-Latin 
American conflict has remained persistent since the early years of independence, there is 
mutual self-interest for cooperation.  First, Latin American nations are cohesive on a 
number of issues.  One current issue pertains to British naval ships off the coast of 
Argentina.  Although the Malvinas islands are considered British territory, Latin 
American countries have unanimously sided with Argentina on its stance against naval 
ships in the island’s waters.  Even Cuba sided with the rightwing dictatorship during the 
Malvinas War (1982).  Moreover, due to tensions between a number of South American 
nations, a more transparent and consolidated defense group would be in the region’s self-
interest.  Colombia, for example, protested directly to the Russian minister of foreign 
affairs, Serguéi Lavrov, about the country’s multimillion dollar arms sale to Venezuela 
(América Economía 2010a).  Colombia, due to historic border tensions with its neighbor, 
fears a Venezuelan military buildup (see Martz 1989 for Colombia-Venezuela border 
issues prior to the Chavez era).  But Colombia is not the only South American country to 
harbor such fears.  Venezuela and Ecuador are also jittery about Colombia’s military 
capacity.  Colombia has sought multi-million dollar weaponry deals from not only the 
United States, but Israel as well (WOLA 2010).  Colombia’s 2009 arrangement with 
Washington to create six additional U.S. military bases and expand its presence on the 
existent Palanquero base has also created friction with not only neighboring states, but 
the whole of South America.
113
  As a result, South American countries have made efforts 
to facilitate the sharing of defense expenditures.          
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 In 2010 the Colombian Supreme Court found the accord, which was signed under President Alvaro 
Uribe (2002-2010), to be unconstitutional. 
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This cooperation is often hindered by U.S. intervention.  Washington has impeded 
progress in two ways. First, through its own unilateral initiatives, the United States has 
intervened or advanced initiatives against the desire of the majority of Latin American 
nations.  The United States has stood alone on a number of important issues such as 
supporting the illegal coup against President Hugo Chavez in 2002, objecting to Bolivia’s 
emphasis on “food sovereignty,” expanding military bases in Colombia, and isolating 
Cuba.
114
  Furthermore, Washington fails to engage in objective diplomacy to assist in 
settling disputes.  Instead, it invests its vast resources to not only privilege one side over 
the other, but destabilize governments that do not privilege U.S. economic and political 
interests, as the mini case study on Haiti demonstrates.  UNASUR, however, facilitates 
an engagement that is more balanced and symmetrical.  Although every regional 
organization will have asymmetric power structures among states, they are equal enough 
to ensure that one does not completely dominate.  When the Venezuelan government 
tried to ensure FARC a place at UNASUR’s negotiating table, Colombia successfully 
blocked the initiative.  Even Chavez, who initiated UNASUR in the first place, could not 
get his way.  But the South American countries had no other choice but to cooperate.  
UNASUR: Conflict Resolution without U.S. Intervention 
UNASUR has served as a fundamental pillar for the new regionalization in Latin 
America.  On a number of occasions, the 12-member organization has opened space for a 
different type of conflict resolution that is commonly exercised by the OAS.  Most 
importantly, UNASUR excludes not only the United States, but also the concomitant 
political and economic interests that come with U.S. mediation and intervention.  As 
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 Chile stood with the United States in objecting to Bolivia’s use of “food sovereignty.  See Food First 
(2010) to learn more about the issue of food sovereignty.  
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mentioned above, these interests and biases have often caused the United States to stand 
alone on a number of vital regional issues.  Washington was the only government in the 
Americas to support the illegal coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2002.  
Even Colombia, Washington’s staunchest Latin American ally, denounced the illegal 
overthrow of a democratically-elected president.  Although Pedro Carmona, the 
Venezuelan coup leader, suspended the media and all judicial and legislative functions, 
the United States continued to support Carmona’s 36-hour regime.  South American 
governments, on the other hand, called for a return to the democratically-elected 
Venezuelan president.  Washington, therefore, failed to support democracy and stability 
and demonstrated it was out of step with the rest of the region.   
In fact, one of the principle reasons for conflict between Colombia and 
Venezuela, on which this case study focuses, is partly attributable to U.S. relations with 
the region.  One of the principle sources of tension stemmed from the expansion of U.S. 
bases in Colombia.  On October 30
th
, 2009, Bogotá and Washington signed the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which allowed U.S. access to seven military bases.  
Although the U.S. government claimed that a military presence would only address issues 
related to counterinsurgency and counternarcotics, a document published by the U.S. Air 
Force indicated that the bases would provide an “opportunity for conducting full 
spectrum operations throughout South America” including “anti-U.S. governments” 
(Esquivel and Serna 2009).  In response to a perceived threat, Venezuela, a country 
perceived to be anti-Washington, sent roughly 15,000 troops to the Colombian border.  
Venezuela, however, was not the only country apprehensive over a U.S. military 
expansion.  Every South American country stood against the bases, rendering U.S. 
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relations problematic for the whole region.  The Colombian Supreme Court finally 
defused the issue, however, when it ruled that the bases were unconstitutional.  
According to the Court, the executive branch failed to submit the policy for congressional 
approval (Amnistía Internacional 2011).  The U.S. military regional presence, 
nonetheless, continues to be a source of conflict, particularly for Colombia’s border 
neighbor Venezuela.    
The rise of tension between Venezuela and Colombia, however, goes far beyond 
Washington.  After a Colombian raid into Ecuadorian territory killed FARC leaders in 
2008, both Ecuador and Venezuela denounced the incursion.  By 2010, tensions escalated 
to a new high.  The Colombian government accused Venezuela of purposely aiding and 
harboring up to 1,500 members of the National Liberation Army (ELN in Spanish) and 
the larger Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in Spanish), two guerrilla 
groups that aim to overthrow the Colombian government.  Both the United States and 
Colombia classify the groups as terrorist organization.  President Chavez ratcheted up the 
rhetoric, stressing that Venezuela had to prepare for war.  “Preparing for war,” he stated 
in his weekly Aló Presidente speech, “is the responsibility of everyone” (“Chavez Pide” 
2009, 0:15).  The conflict spiraled to historically high levels.  Due to high levels of trade, 
shared pipeline, and mineral resource dependency, both countries had an intrinsic self-
interest to cooperate.  However, historical border issues, deep ideological differences, an 
arms build-up in both countries, and two leaders trying to prove their legitimacy 
exacerbated the conflict and hindered any chances of peaceful negotiations.
115
  During 
the 2010 Colombian presidential election, Santos continued to support a hard stance 
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 Venezuela and Colombia had experienced border tension long before Uribe, Santos, or Chavez took 
power.  For a thorough analysis, see Martz (1988). 
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against President Chavez.  “Colombia has had a very passive stance against Venezuela,” 
he stated, “the time has come to make Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez respect the 
differences” (in Reyes 2010).      
Failing to be a disinterested regional mediator, however, the United States or the 
OAS could not serve as an effective arbitrator to reduce tension.  Washington had already 
begun to intervene on the part of Colombia.  In a testimony before a congressional 
hearing, the head of the United States Southern Command, Gen. Douglas Fraser, 
conceded that there was scant evidence indicating that Caracas was supporting 
Colombian rebels.  “We have not seen any connections,” the General responded to 
Senator McCain (Rep. AZ) in March 2012, “specifically that I can verify that there has 
been a direct government-to-terrorist connection” (Latin American Herald Tribune 2010).  
The then Deputy Prime Minister of Spain, Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, echoed 
the same understanding, stating that Caracas had cooperated with the Spanish 
government in its enduring fight against Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a recognized 
terrorist group (Ibid).  However, after meeting with Arturo Valenzuela, a Latin American 
official in the U.S. Department of State, Fraser actually changed his testimony, accusing 
Venezuela of terrorist connections.  “Even the Bush administration had never forced its 
military officers to retract their statements,” Mark Weisbrot (2010), director for the 
Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington observes, “when they 
contradicted the state department's political agenda in Latin America, which they 
sometimes did.”  Even José Miguel Insulza, the Secretary General of the OAS, formerly 
stated before the U.S. House of Representatives that there was scant evidence linking 
Caracas to terrorist groups.  “You mean does Venezuela support terrorist groups?  I don't 
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think so,” Insulza responded to Connie Mack, a Floridian republican hostile to Latin 
American center-left movements, “[t]here is no evidence, and no member country, 
including this one (United States) has offered the OAS such proof” (AFP 2008).  The 
political agenda in Washington would have served as an impediment to successful 
mediation. 
Understanding the political stance of the United States, a number of South 
American states, particularly Ecuador and Bolivia, pushed to have the conflict mediated 
through UNASUR instead of the conventional OAS.  Excluding both the United States 
and Canada, South American nations believed that UNASUR was the optimal 
organization that would, in the words of Bolivian President Evo Morales, “not allow war 
to happen between brother countries” (in Ismael 2010).  UNASUR was a major variable 
that facilitated space for a new type of inter-state dialogue that led to the reduction of 
tension.  Prior to Colombia’s entrance into UNASUR, dialogue and diplomacy between 
Caracas and Bogotá were virtually absent (Miranda Delgado 2010).  Apart from the 
OAS, South America failed to construct formal institutions that opened space for 
productive dialogue, debate, and diplomacy.  Regional institutions such as MERCOSUR, 
Latin America’s most integrated organization, have been based on the ideas of economic 
liberalism and functionalist theory.  Essentially, the objective is to create a capitalist 
institution that, developing in linear fashion, addresses trade concerns by forming trade 
agreements, custom unions, and finally a monetary union.  There is no genuine conflict 
resolution body.  “Mercosur is based on development and trade,” Latin America 
specialist Andrés Serbin (2009) points out, “but it has not achieved to develop an 
advanced institutional structure to address conflicts and tension” (149).          
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UNASUR, however, created space for tit-for-tat shuttle diplomacy between 
Venezuela and Colombia.  The Colombian Foreign Minister María Ángela Holguín later 
admitted that UNASUR was the most optimal vehicle for peace.  This is because the 
OAS failed to serve as a credible mediator.  Latin Americans often perceive the OAS as a 
vehicle for U.S. interests.  However, under the mediation of the UNASUR, Argentine 
President Nester Kirchner (2003-2007), who served as the UNASUR Secretary General 
during the Colombia-Venezuela conflict, addressed the conflict more equitably.  
Maintaining productive relations with both Santos and Chavez, the regional organization 
“generated confidence on both sides” (in Borda 2012, 17).  Creating an environment that 
generates confidence and trust in all involved parties is instrumental for creating conflict 
resolution strategies (Ramsbotham et al. 2010).  Without U.S. interference, Kirchner 
aimed to create conditions under which countries could freely debate their security 
concerns through back-and-forth exchanges.   
Aiming to decrease regional conflict, the Secretary General shuttled between 
different South American capitals first with foreign representatives.  Kirchner hoped that 
President Chavez and in-coming President Santos would later hammer out an agreement 
after the initial meetings.  The first exchanges between the foreign ministers merely 
entailed accusations.  Taking place in Quito, Ecuador, the foreign minister of Colombia, 
Jaime Bermudez, accused Caracas of harboring and supporting Colombian guerillas 
groups, while his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolas Maduro, accused Bogotá of  “grave 
threats and grave attacks” (BBC 2010).  Although the exchanges failed to produce 
concrete treaties or signed negotiations, they facilitated dialogue for one of the first times.  
More importantly, without U.S. support for Colombia, the negotiations involved a fair 
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balance of power.  The overwhelming resources and power of Washington often 
significantly influences the side upon which Washington positions itself.
116
  However, 
UNASUR opened space not only for inter-Latin American diplomacy, but also a credible 
South American mediator. 
The second round of talks took place in Bogotá between Nicolás Maduro and a 
new Colombian foreign minister Maria Ángela Holguín.  After three hours of discussions 
on security matters, both sides came to minor agreements.  Most importantly, President 
Chavez appeared to finally decrease his solidarity with the Colombian guerrilla 
movements and concede that armed struggle in Colombia was counterproductive.  On his 
program Aló, Presidente, Chavez stressed, although always attacking the “empire,” that 
“the Colombian guerrillas had no future using weapons” (Flacso 2010).   For Santos, it 
meant toning down his rhetoric on accusing Caracas of maintaining safe havens for the 
guerrillas.  Maduro, after the arduous negotiations, stated, “we are very satisfied with the 
transparent dialogue” (Ibid).  In the end, the foreign ministers and Kirchner were able to 
convince both presidents to finally meet.  
The final round of talks took place in Colombia.  Despite being skeptical of the 
organization, the Colombian President finally agreed to meet in Santa Marta, Colombia 
under the auspices of UNASUR.  Initially, the Colombian government wanted to go 
through the OAS.  However, through skilled diplomatic maneuvering, Kirchner and other 
UNASUR members were able to convince both Presidents Uribe and then Santos to work 
through an alternative organization.  No novice to the political scene, President Santos, 
the former Colombian Minister of Defense, understood that he still needed the home-
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case significantly influenced the country’s decision to reject the case and destroy the Court.  
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country advantage since he was relatively new to the presidency compared to Chavez’ 
eleven years experience.  This would be their first face-to-face meeting. 
The final mediation process in Colombia resulted in the reestablishment of 
relations between Venezuela and Colombia. Throughout the tense mediation process 
between Presidents Santos and Chavez, each party committed to a number of agreements.  
These included the following: The repayments of trade debts that the suspension of 
relations incurred; the reestablishment of trade relations; an integrative effort to invest in 
social and developmental projects in the border region; and the creation of a commission 
on Venezuela-Colombia security (Observatory UNASUR 2010).  Venezuela also ensured 
Colombia that the country’s border regions would not be a safe haven for FARC guerrilla 
activities (MercoPress 2010).  Most importantly, Chavez recognized Colombian 
sovereignty to sign treaties, particularly with the United States, whereas Colombian 
recognized the potential threat such treaties could cause throughout the region.  A 
bilateral security commission to address such issues would be created by both Venezuela 
and Colombia (Observatory UNASUR 2010).      
The overall mediation took place over a 10-month period.  UNASUR decreased 
tension and facilitated peace by excluding U.S interests and creating an environment that 
fostered confidence and trust on both sides.  The space UNASUR provided led to 
plausible steps for negotiations and the re-establishment of bilateral relations.  Even 
President Santos, who was initially skeptical of UNASUR, later admitted that the 
regional institution helped create peace and democracy.  “But when you are wrong, you 
must admit it and I acknowledge that my perception was wrong,” Santos conceded 
regarding UNASUR (in MercoPress 2012).  Even U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
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(2009-2013) praised the role Kirchner and UNASUR played in creating peace (Bueños 
Aires Herald 2010).  During a speech before an audience at the New School in New 
York, Kirchner highlighted the accomplishments of UNASUR.  “UNASUR shows we 
can solve our conflicts,” the president stated (in 26 noticias 2010).       
La Declaración del Orinoco and El Banco del Sur 
Conflict resolution policy is not the only area for which the new regionalization 
can create space.  Economic policy can also change.  In fact, space is crucial to challenge 
the hegemony of liberal capitalism.  As mentioned above, the Washington Consensus had 
dominated economic policy thinking throughout Latin America even before the Cold War 
ended in 1990.  When Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) won the presidency, however, both 
the new Argentine president and the Venezuelan government understood that the country 
could no longer continue with the economic and social policies of the previous 
administrations.  By 2001, Argentina experienced one of the worst economic crises in the 
country’s history.  A succession of five governments within a three-year period failed to 
address the economic down turn and the growing mass discontent.   
The economic crisis was tied to the convertibility plan (la convertibilidad) (1991-
2002).  The most influential policy of the plan affected the country’s currency, the peso.  
In 1991, the Argentine government, under the guidance of the powerful Treasury 
Secretary Domingo Cavallo, pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar. The policy 
created a one-way one-to-one peg.  This meant that one Argentine peso would equal the 
exact value of one U.S. dollar.  Because Argentina had entered into a one-way peg, it 
accepted full responsibility to defend the fixed exchange rate without any assistance from 
the United States. The exchange rate was regulated under the currency board system. The 
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currency board ensured that the one-to-one peg was maintained. If the peso was weak, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina (BCRA) alone had to intervene, buying pesos 
and selling dollars to strengthen the currency. If the peso was appreciating ahead of the 
dollar, the BCRA had to sell pesos and buy dollars to decrease the peso’s value. The 
currency board system also gave every peso-holder the right to change his or her pesos to 
dollars at the one-to-one rate at any time, meaning that the amount of dollar reserves had 
to be tied to the amount of pesos in circulation. 
The convertibility plan involved more than the fixed exchange rate.  It served as 
an umbrella name encompassing several neoliberal economic policies, including opening 
the country to foreign investment, controlling fiscal spending (the government promised a 
“zero deficit”), and following laissez faire (apart from defending the exchange rate) 
principals.  The privatization of state businesses was also a major initiative.  The 
government privatized many public-owned companies, ranging from airports to the state 
oil companies. Multinational companies such as Enron, Duke Corp, and Pérez Company 
of Argentina bought up oil fields, telecommunications companies, and any other 
businesses they could get their hands on (Pilling 1995). 
The IMF became a staunch supporter of the Convertibility right from the plan’s 
inception.  “The Convertibility Plan received strong support from the international 
financial community and, especially,” Cavallo and Joaquin A Cottani wrote back in 1997, 
“from the International Monetary Fund.  In July 1991, the IMF approved” (18).  The fund 
even offered Argentina special drawing rights.  IMF support was justifiable.  The short-
term economic benefits of the convertibility plan were economically impressive. 
Although there are many variables influencing economic performance, such as increasing 
225 
 
world prices for exports and influential world growth, economists from a broad 
ideological spectrum recognized that the convertibility plan played a significant part in 
Argentina’s economic recovery.  Even Néstor Kirchner, Argentina’s former president and 
outspoken critic of the plan, recognized its benefits: “When the convertibility law was 
enacted in 1991 . . . it helped curb inflation. There was a certain improvement in 
Argentina’s economy. Poverty went down . . . you could see improvement in the middle-
class” (NACLA 2004, p. 4).  Other economic indicators improved as well.  Between 1991 
and 1994, the economy grew at an average of almost 10% a year (Pastor and Wise 2001). 
Unemployment was relatively low, hovering around 6% in the early years of the plan 
Exchange Rate Policy Options for South America 247 (Buscaglia 2004).  Savings were 
also up. Domestic bank deposits in Argentina were less than 5% of GDP in 1990 (Ibid). 
By 1994, the percentage had reached 20% (Ibid).  GDP was much higher. Argentine 
policy makers managed to weather the Mexican “Tequila” crisis of 1995 (Pastor and 
Wise 2001, 64), which further legitimized Cavallo’s economic management and vision. 
Two negative effects emerged. A country that conducts this policy first loses hard 
reserves.  In the case of Argentina, this had the potential to result in dire consequences. 
Convertibility laws stipulated that peso holders could automatically convert their 
holdings to dollars. A lack of dollars would undermine the whole economic system. 
Second, buying pesos and selling dollars reduces the domestic money supply, leading to 
increases in interest rates, decrease in growth, diminishing tax revenue, and increases in 
unemployment. The positive effect of this economic contraction is a decrease in inflation; 
a decrease in hyperinflation is exactly what the Argentine government promised the 
masses and investors. One problem was the appreciating dollar. While Argentina as 
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weathering crises first in Mexico and later Asia, the dollar began appreciating 
significantly relative to other currencies.  In 1996 and 1997, the dollar soared high above 
the yen and other Asian currencies (Feldstein 2002).  The Euro also plummeted 25% in 
comparison with the dollar (Ibid).  The appreciation was so significant that many U.S. 
export companies were severely damaged (Financial Times 1997). 
Although the complete economic meltdown is beyond the scope of this paper (see 
Ripley 2010, for an in-depth analysis), the inability to sustain the convertibility policies 
led toward economic and social crises.  The unmanageable current account surplus, 
skyrocketing indebtedness, and slowing export growth caused severe economic harm and 
undermined investor confidence.  A current account deficit of 3% made investors and 
policy makers nervous in industrialized countries.  Larry Summers (2004), former U.S. 
Treasury Secretary, ominously observed that the United States’ “startlingly large” current 
account deficit, which was heading toward 5% of GDP, caused grave concerns for the 
U.S. government (48).  As Argentina’s deficit passed this percentage, economic panic 
replaced the earlier economic optimism.  
Instead of ditching the plan, however, a succession of Argentine presidents tried 
to resolve the economic problems.  In 2001, Cavallo, who had returned to the Economic 
Ministry under President Fernando de la Rúa attempted to save the fixed exchange rate. 
“The flotation of the peso or a devaluation won’t occur,” Cavallo confidently announced 
(América Economía 2001), but the policies mimicked the same budgetary cutbacks the 
government had tried previously. Cavallo cut public worker salaries, pension accounts, 
and assistance to the elderly by 13% (América Economía 2001).  According to the 
Confederation of Health Professionals, an Argentine civic group, as early as 1995, the 
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government had initiated deep cuts in spending on education and healthcare, including 
reductions in the salaries of doctors and nurses (Gaudin 2002). 
Moreover, the IMF encouraged policies that aimed to placate the nation’s 
international bondholders.  The main concern was to restructure debt, offer acceptable 
initial debt payments, maintain the one-on-one peg with the dollar, privatize industries, 
and, through severe cutbacks in governmental social spending, balance the domestic 
budget.  In order to meet these objectives, the Fund laid out specific policies.  In August 
2001, the IMF gave Argentina a rescue package of US$8 billion, on top of previous 
funding (MacEwan 2002). The goal was twofold: To close the widening fiscal deficit and 
meet the payments to private and public lenders.  However, the lending failed to meet 
IMF-targeted goals.  The roughly $150 billion public debt was spiraling out of control.  
In addition to premiums, bondholders were demanding higher rates of returns at 14% 
annualized interest rates (O’Grady 2001).  As the Wall Street Journal wrote: “Bond 
investors fear that the aid package won't stave off substantial restructuring” (in Karmin 
and Murphy 2003).  As a result, Argentina continued to followed IMF-imposed austerity 
measures such as more cuts in spending, privatizations, and a fixed exchange rate.  
Rescue packages however, failed to provide solutions to Argentina’s economic 
ills.  The country’s economy fell under another attack: financial speculators, coming in a 
variety of shapes and sizes. There were international investors in portfolio investments 
and bureaucrats at credit rating corporations such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s 
Corporation.  Most investors bet that Argentina would fail to maintain the fixed exchange 
rate, and other investors became jittery.  Would Argentina pull out of the convertibility 
plan, causing a depreciation of the peso?  Would Argentina default on its debt?  Because 
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of the fixed exchange rate, investors were not hedging their investments. Even ordinary 
peso holders would lose; 10,000 pesos worth US$10,000 could be halved over night if the 
currency was allowed to float. 
The Argentine economy imploded. Recessions in the mid 1990s culminated in a 
“Second Great Depression” by 2001 (Hershberg 2002, 30). The unemployment rate was 
almost 20%, and the underemployment rate, defined as those who are working less than 
they want, was approximately 30% (MacEwan 2002; BBC 2003). Income per person also 
plummeted 14% between 1998 and the end of 2001 (MacEwan 2002).  Protests swelled 
the streets, leaving more than 20 people dead. Ordinary citizens looted grocery stores 
merely to obtain staple food products. The provinces, strapped for cash because of their 
own lack of revenue and a decrease in funds from the federal government, began printing 
their own money.  The province of La Rioja printed “Evitas,” named after Eva Peron, to 
pay workers (BBC 2003). By the end of 2001 Argentina had few options. In December 
2001, it had defaulted on more than US$150 billion of its debt (MacEwan 2002). In 
January 2002, in the midst of economic chaos, street riots, and five presidencies within 
the period of several weeks, Argentina finally pulled out of the convertibility plan, 
allowing the peso to float. Within the first day, the peso lost 40% of its value (América 
Economía 2002).  About a year later, it had fallen 70% (BBC 2003). 
When Kirchner entered the Casa Rosada, he wanted to abandon the previous 
policies and embark on a different course.  His initiatives included completely breaking 
with the Convertibility, devaluing the currency, rejecting IMF-encouraged austerity 
programs, reversing privatizations, privileging Argentina’s interests over those of 
international bond holders, and implementing counter-cyclical economic policies through 
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governmental spending. The president’s hands, however, were tied.  Influential 
international financial and political interests messianically lobbied to keep the same 
policies, albeit reformed, in place.  In addition to the IMF, Washington, powerful 
financial news outlets, and international bonds holders, in and Washington favored 
continuing such policies.  
The Bush Administration initially showed a modicum amount of flexibility 
toward the Argentine case.  After Argentina made the largest sovereign default in history, 
one would assume that the conservative Bush Administration, which had actively 
opposed center-left governments in Haiti and Venezuela, would have taken a strong 
stance against the new president of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner.   Kirchner rallied not 
only against IMF-imposed policies and world capitalism, but also the war in Iraq.  Instead 
of being marginalized and demonized, however, Kirchner found himself welcomed to the 
White House in 2003.  According to Kirchner, Bush, shy of cementing any economic 
commitment, actually listened as the Argentine president discussed the problems of IMF-
imposed policies (Allen 2003).  Later, Roger Noriega, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, offered support for Argentina’s efforts at restructuring 
its debt.  Many holders of Argentine bonds felt betrayed by not only the Bush 
Administration’s flexibility, but also what appeared to be tacit support for Kirchner’s 
policies.  In the eyes of U.S. and international creditors, Argentina became the nation to 
flout the whole international finance system.  But, as a number of prominent Latin 
American scholars contend, Kirchner had a friend in the White House.  “With Bush 
remaining in the White House,” Roberto Russell (2010) points out, “Argentina would 
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continue to receive support at the IMF and non-interference in the complex negotiations 
with private creditors. . .” (109). 
The Bush Administration’s flexibility did not come out of a change of heart. 
There were a number of geopolitical interests.  First, the administration was embarking 
on a policy of containment of the influence of Venezuela throughout the region.  What is 
more, the administration, staunched in a free-market ideology, was sending a message to 
the international finance community that the era of bailouts was over.  Essentially, Bush 
and his economic advisors were reluctant to support policies that encouraged what has 
become to be known as “moral hazard.”  In the area of international finance, the concept 
of moral hazard stresses that investors will engage in risky behavior if the costs are 
removed through financial bailouts.  Bailouts, therefore, are counterintuitive and do not 
fit neatly into the neoliberal ideological framework.  “It is interesting to note how the 
ideas of these neoliberal US policy makers dovetailed nicely with the perspective of the 
Argentine policy makers who came to power after December 2001,” Eric Hellnier (2005) 
points out, “Both agreed that international investors were partly to blame for the financial 
crisis and thus should be made to pay for their mistakes” (962).                     
Although U.S. flexibility helped forge positive relations between Washington and 
Bueños Aires, such relations were limited.  Before Kirchner took office, the United States 
had been privileging bond holders over sound policies.  Secretary of Treasury Paul 
O’Neill encouraged Argentina to continue adhering to the same IMF failed policies.  “We 
are encouraged that the Argentine Government is taking substantive steps to address its 
economic problems,” O’Neill (2002) stated to the press, “and hope that it will now 
accelerate its work with the IMF to formulate a sustainable economic program, including 
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an appropriate budget.”  The Treasury Secretary even blamed Argentine politics for the 
crisis, absolving policies supported by the IMF and Washington from any responsibility 
(Cardoso 2001).  “I do not think Secretary John Snow, O’Neil’s replacement, encouraged 
similar policies.  “The United States clearly has a strong stake in helping countries 
recover from financial crises,” Snow testified in 2004 to the U.S. House of 
Representatives, “and we have strongly supported the IMF's engagement with Argentina 
as it has worked to stabilize its economy. These efforts have been producing results” 
(U.S. Department of Treasury 2004).  Snow concluded: “Argentina's current three-year 
IMF program launched in September provides the basis for Argentina to consolidate its 
recent macroeconomic progress and to adopt the reforms needed to lay the basis for 
sustained growth in the years ahead” (Ibid).  The IMF economic program and budgetary 
suggestions, however, were the problem to begin with.  The principal objective was to 
stave off default and reaffirm international investors that emerging markets were 
profitable investments.  The IMF plan worked for awhile.  After the 2001 $8 billion 
bailout, the price of bonds for emerging markets grew significantly and Argentina’s own 
stock market activity increased by 8% (Karmin and Murphy 2001).  The economy, on the 
other hand, failed to recover.  The downturn only deepened.          
Argentina was in a precarious position.   Needing to recover from the economic 
crisis, the country required a financial bailout.  As Russell points out, the Bush 
Administration supported Argentina in the IMF.  Kirchner understood, however, that IMF 
investment would be the continuance of a vicious cycle.  The austerity measures imposed 
by Washington and the Fund would simply be more of the same policies, repeating the 
errors of past administrations.  In fact, in 2004, only a year within Kirchner’s presidency, 
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the IMF was still demanding conditions, requiring that the country enter into acceptable 
negotiations with 80% of the country’s bondholder debt by September of that year 
(Hornbeck 2004).  The President recognized that the policies preferred by Washington 
and the IMF would continue a similar neo-liberal agenda at the expense of other policies 
that could create genuine recovery and growth.  Therefore, Kirchner aimed to set a new 
developmental path.  The initial contacts between the two countries began when Nestor 
Kirchner won the presidency in 2003.  After a number of informal meetings, talks finally 
culminated in “La Declaración del Orinoco,” a solidified agreement in which the two 
countries hammered out the details of Venezuela’s portfolio investments in Argentina’s 
public finances. The principal objective was to cancel the IMF’s debt while maintaining 
an adequate amount of international reserves to sustain a sound financial base and initiate 
spending increases to create jobs, reduce poverty, and increase demand.  However, 
Argentina still owed the Fund up to $10 billion.           
Venezuela was an instrumental factor in Argentina’s dilemma.  Awash with 
international reserves through oil revenue, mineral commodities, and a booming economy 
with 9% growth, Venezuela had enough money on hand to replenish Argentina’s central 
bank reserves.  The initial steps began with only $950 million worth of purchases 
(Globovisión 2005).  By 2007, however, Venezuela had purchased roughly five billion 
dollars of Argentine debt.  The objective was clear: Purchase enough bonds so Argentina 
could pay off the IMF, hold enough international reserves, and break the IMF’s 
conditionality requirements.  “We are financially assisting countries in solidarity, but we 
have nothing to do with the IMF,” Nelson Merentes, the Venezuelan Minister of 
Finances, declared, “we do not put on any political or economic conditions” (in Bazzan 
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2006).  Even South American policy makers who are incredulous of Chavez’ intentions 
conceded that the funding came without conditionality.  Claudio Katz (2006), a 
prominent Argentine economist, criticizes Venezuela’s initiative to purchase the 
country’s bonds because, as with the IMF, “[it] maintains the indebtedness of Argentina” 
(79).  However, Katz (2006) continues to note that Venezuela’s lending came without 
any political or economic stipulations.  “The IMF is certainly inclined to lend money with 
guaranties for unpopular fiscal adjustments,” Katz (2006) points out, “that Venezuela 
does not in any way demand” (79). 
With this economic and political freedom, Kirchner was allowed to take another 
path.  Argentina’s efforts to cancel its debt with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
significantly decreased the reserves in the Banco de la Nación Argentina.  Reserves 
plummeted from roughly $28 billion to $18 billion (América Economía 2006).  By 
replenishing its reserves, a job commonly fulfilled by the IMF, Argentina was able to 
advance a number of different policy options.  First, Kirchner refused to negotiate the 
bondholder debt which, in the eyes of many Argentines, was accrued illegitimately 
through the encouragement of Washington, bondholders, and the IMF.  Up until 2005, 
the IMF had been pressuring Argentina to forgo popular social spending and investments 
to restructure its debt.  Kirchner, however, was able to not only focus more on domestic 
issues, but break away from the constraints of international financial capital.  What is 
more, by focusing on domestic concerns and not IMF-obsessed fiscal deficits and 
privatizations, the president could implement expansionary fiscal policies and reverse 
privatizations that had taken in previous administrations.     
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The plan attracted controversy.  The prevailing attitude in the United States was 
that it was a mere political move.  Eichengreen (2005) dismissed the plan as just another 
way to “bother the United States.”  International finance news outlets vilified not only 
Kirchner’s economic policies, but those of his wife, Christina de Fernández de Kirchner, 
who became president in 2007.  The Economist (2009), for instance, proclaimed: “The 
Kirchners' economic nationalism is leading their country down a blind alley.”  Latin 
Finance would later put Argentina on the list of financially “bad countries” (Crombie 
2010).  Even in death, the conservative British magazine disparaged Kirchner.  When the 
ex-president dies in 2010, The Economist criticized Kirchner as a “caudillo” who ran 
government “like a personal fiefdom.”   
The plan, however, worked.  Argentina ditched the IMF and Washington 
supported policies to take another route.  The economy grew, jobs increased, and 
Kirchner left the presidency with an approval rating of over 65%.  Breaking with the IMF 
was a success.  During Kirchner’s presidency, Argentina experienced 9% annual growth, 
a 70% increase in real wages, a 52% increase in private consumption, and a drop in 
unemployment from 20% to 9% (Levitsky and Victoria Murillo 2008). Living standards 
significantly improved (Ibid).  Even the Financial Times, the daily for international 
investors, admits that Argentina was able to break from the Fund:  “Argentina paid off its 
$10bn debts to the lender in 2006 and has refused surveillance ever since” (Webber and 
Mander 2011).  In fact, early in 2012, the IMF shuttered its doors in Argentina, closing its 
last office.  But it was the specific counter-cyclical policies, refusal to pay off creditors, 
nationalization of industries previously privatized, and a number of other policies the 
IMF stood firmly against that brought the country to success.  “There is indeed a 
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remarkable unwillingness in press coverage,” Paul Krugman (2011) wrote in his 
NYTimes blog on the lack of objectivity covering the Argentine economy and President 
Christina de Fernández’ reelection, “to face up to the reality that Argentina has done very 
well since its default and devaluation.”   
The assistance of Venezuela cannot be underestimated.  Replenishing the reserves 
of the Central Bank of Argentina was the only way to pay of the IMF and set a path for 
monetary independence.  In December of 2009, when President Fernández tried to pay 
off a number of creditors with reserves, the act proved extremely difficult.  She met stiff 
resistance from not only opposition members in Congress, but within her own cabinet.  
Fernández’ objective was to use roughly $6.5 billion of the Central Bank’s reserves to 
service outstanding debt (Webber 2010).  Congress, however, would not allow her to tap 
into the reserves without replenishing them.  As a result, the president relied upon 
presidential decree.  She justified her actions that the government would save in the long 
term by avoiding interest payments.  Martín Redrado, the head of the BCRA, however, 
agreed with the opposition.  He refused to allow the president to access the reserves, a 
defiant act that caused his departure.  The $6.5 billion, however, was significantly less 
than the $10 billion former President Kirchner relied upon to cancel debt obligations with 
the IMF.  The government, however, had no opportunity to replenish its reserves. 
Although Declaración del Orinoco preceded el Banco del Sur, the agreement 
served as the initial steps for its creation.  Opposed to being a mere vehicle for Chavez’ 
vitriolic anti-United States and capitalism rhetoric, there are genuine policy implications. 
Venezuela’s initiative facilitated Argentina’s ability to break from the IMF.  Furthermore, 
it offered space to discuss policies outside the conventional Washington Consensus 
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mentality.  Inevitably, however, there are a number of hurdles to create a viable regional 
bank.  Most importantly, there are already numerous lending institutions with disposable 
capital.  Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank are established entities upon which countries can readily rely.  Nonetheless, with 
previous success, Banco del Sur has attracted the support from a wide range of 
ideological groups and interests in South America.  In Argentina, the small business 
association supports the local lending institutions to help fund local businesses.  Hernán 
Lorenzino, the country’s former Secretary of Finance, points out, Banco del Sur “will be 
another tool to finance economic, social and ecological development in the region and 
will serve as an instrument to deal with the consequences of an economic crisis like the 
current one” (in Webber 2007).  What is more, flexible regionalization does not exclude 
countries from participating in other institutional agreements, as with Greece’s situation 
with the Euro.  Greece is unable to change interest rates, alter exchange rates, and 
devalue its currency since it is locked into the euro zone.  All monetary options are 
forfeited.  The regionalization of Latin America can offer the best of both worlds.  
Currently, however, only four countries—Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela—
are members of the regional bank.  Only time will provide information over the extent to 
which El Banoc del Sur will become a permanent financial institution.       
Conclusion 
 Instead of relying upon the conventional literature on regional institutions 
(realism, neorealism, economic liberalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism), critical 
space allows us to understand Latin America’s regionalization process in a different way.  
Opposed to a linear model that leads to security or economic integration based on 
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balancing and liberal economics, respectively, critical spaces focuses more on the 
development of economic and conflict resolution policies that the regional or even world 
hegemonic power would otherwise oppose.  As this chapter suggests, the alternative 
policies were quite successful, challenging the idea that the United States, the primary 
regional hegemonic power is a necessary variable for peace and development. 
Moreover, this study has implications far beyond the Americas.  Regional 
initiatives between Eastern European countries or Asian countries may rely on regional 
projects to help curb the more negative tendencies of their regional hegemons, 
particularly Russia and China, respectively.  The drawback of alternative regional 
organizations is that, as Kindleberger discovered decades earlier, a country needs not 
only to assume the leadership role, but also to have the adequate resources to play such a 
role. In the Americas, Venezuela under the leadership of President Hugo Chavez has 
fulfilled this role.  Whether another country in or outside of the Americas will take on 
this responsibility is a subject for future research.   
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION: ACADEMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Academic and Policy Relevance  
This in-depth analysis of U.S. diplomacy is theoretically significant and policy 
relevant for a number of reasons.  First it strongly suggests why we have variance in U.S. 
foreign policy initiatives.  The variance in U.S. foreign policy is instrumental for 
understanding how the United States, the regional hegemonic power, could play a more 
positive regional role.  Privileging diplomacy over more bellicose policies could lead to 
regional public goods, whereas more militaristic policies supported by competing 
agencies and bureaucrats can lead to public bads.  Although the Stuart thesis, which 
contends that the National Security Act of 1947 helped militarize U.S. foreign policy, 
offers insight, it is not an iron law of politics.  Foreign policy can privilege State 
Department diplomacy over militaristic approaches.  What is more, removing U.S. 
parochial economic interests from foreign policy decision-making could further 
strengthen the ability of the United States to have a more positive hegemonic presence.  
Washington could assist Latin American countries in economic and democratic 
development. 
These findings are extremely important.  In addition to having theoretical value 
related to HST, bureaucratic politics, diplomacy, and south-north relations, there are 
genuine policy implications that affect the lives of millions of people.  The war against 
Nicaragua during the 1980s and the aftermath of the 2004 U.S. invasion, for example, 
negatively affected the millions of innocent citizens who live in those respective 
countries.  Finding more optimal policy approaches could allow the United States to play 
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a more positive regional role, develop a Better Neighbor Policy, and actually provide 
effective economic policies and conflict resolution strategies.         
 Based on the findings here, however, this research further suggests that the United 
States is not likely to play a positive stabilizing role in the Americas.  Despite the 
destabilizing U.S. role, Latin American countries have a means through which they can 
create their own public goods: Flexible regionalization that excludes the United States.  
This policy advice is even more pressing with the death of Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez.
117
  Chavez provided the leadership to facilitate the current regionalization that 
has emerged throughout the Americas.  Latin American policy makers must understand 
that UNASUR, Banco del Sur, and other regional initiatives have utilitarian value far 
beyond the anti-Washington agenda of the former president.  Regional institutions help 
Latin American nations not only bypass their hegemonic neighbor to the north, but also 
provide regional public goods in the form of alternative economic policies and conflict 
resolution strategies Washington would otherwise oppose. 
Future Research     
 This dissertation is research generating.  First, additional case studies focusing on 
U.S.-Latin America relations can be advanced to either confirm or disconfirm the 
theoretical underpinnings that inform this research.  Evidence from cases such as the 
invasion of Grenada in 1983 continues to support the main argument advanced in this 
dissertation.  Second, additional cases beyond the Americas are applicable.  For example, 
if the State Department had not lost bureaucratic wars to manage the interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, both foreign policies initiatives could have had more favorable 
results.  This suggests explanatory power far beyond the case studies in this dissertation. 
                                                          
117
 Hugo Chavez died on March 5, 2013.  
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 More importantly, future research on the current rise of Latin American 
regionalization is imperative.  This study suggests that Latin American regional 
institutions have opened pockets of spaces that have allowed LACS to bypass their 
hegemonic neighbor to the north.  For decades, activists and scholars have described and 
criticized U.S. imperial tendencies into the area.  If UNASUR, ALBA, Banco del Sur, 
and CELAC can help tame U.S. intervention, as this research suggests, regionalization 
could be key for Latin American independence, economic development, and even peace.  
This would not only have great theoretical value, but genuine policy value as well.   
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